Author Archive
The Real Story Behind the Chrysler Bankruptcy
If you worry about the abuse of executive power and declining respect among elected officials for the rule of law, you should watch this eloquent illumination of what really went down in the Chrysler bankruptcy earlier this year. The speaker is Richard Mourdock, Treasurer of the state of Indiana. The setting is a Cato Institute policy forum on October 15 about the “sordid details of the Bush/Obama auto industry intervention.”
As state treasurer, Mourdock is the person responsible for investment decisions concerning Indiana’s state employee pension funds, some of which owned a small share of Chrysler’s $6.9 billion in secured debt and some of which opposed the administration’s offer of $.29 on the dollar for that debt. Though these small secured holders were publicly castigated by President Obama as “unpatriotic” and unwilling to sacrifice for the greater good, Mourdock led the effort to stop the “sale” of Chrysler all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Mourdock’s presentation gives a flavor for the tactics employed by the Obama administration to “encourage” senior, priority creditors to back off their claims so that chosen parties could take priority—tactics that included backroom reminders that some of those creditors had received and might seek more TARP funding, threats of bringing the full weight and measure of the White House press office to bear down on dissenters, public condemnation, and other forms of arm-twisting most Americans would find unseemly for a U.S. presidential administration.
Filed under: General; Government and Politics; Regulatory Studies; Tax and Budget Policy; Trade and Immigration
Eyewitness to Government’s Robbery of Chrysler Creditors
Further to Ilya Shapiro’s post this morning, let me also point you to a concise chronology of events culminating in the government’s robbery of Chrysler creditors.
The story is that of Richard Mourdock, Treasurer of the State of Indiana and the man responsible for stewardship of the state’s pension funds, some of which were victimized by the Obama administration’s pre-packaged and then forced-fed bankruptcy deal for Chrysler. I strongly urge you to read Mr. Mourdock’s testimony, which is at once revealing, sobering, compelling and, regrettably, a frightening sign of the times.
Mourdock will be speaking on this very topic at Cato, along with bankruptcy law expert David Skeel, on Thursday, October 15 at noon. Reserve your seat now.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
An Omen in the Cash for Clunkers Results
Chris Edwards is right. Tad DeHaven is right. Cash for Clunkers was a shell game and an utter waste of taxpayer money. But C4C offers another teachable lesson, which is that the 35.5 mile per gallon by 2016 fuel efficiency standard will kill General Motors.
In just the latest example of government policies working at cross-purposes, the president buys a 60 percent stake in GM at a cost to taxpayers of $50 billion (conservatively), and simultaneously supports a mandate—in the rigid CAFE standard—that will severely handicap GM, while assisting the competition.
C4C gave consumers the opportunity to express their preferences in the high mileage vehicle market, and GM failed miserably. Consumers of high mileage vehicles prefer Toyotas, Hondas, Fords, Nissans and Hyundais, whose offerings comprise the top ten best sellers list under the program. Not a single GM (or Chrysler) product made the top ten under C4C.
GM’s competitive strength is in the luxury car, muscle car, SUV, and pick-up truck categories. But to sell those cars in 2016, GM will need to sell many, many more small cars than it does now to achieve an average fleet fuel efficiency of 35.5 mpg. So, while GM’s competitors are free to target the gas-guzzling market because there is already plenty of demand for their high-mileage vehicles, GM’s capacity to compete where it is strongest will be conditioned on its ability to cultivate an obviously very skeptical market for its small cars. And that bodes very poorly for GM’s future.
For more on GM’s future and the damage done to important U.S. institutions, like private property rights, the rule of law, the free enterprise system, and the proper separation of economy and state as a result of the Bush/Obama auto intervention, you are welcome to join us for a policy forum at Cato on October 15 at noon.
Filed under: Energy and Environment; Trade and Immigration
Democrats Favor Trade Sanctions on Americans
Scott Lincicome sharpens his pencil today and calculates that Congressional failure to ratify the U.S.-Colombia Free Trade Agreement–a deal that was signed almost three full years ago–has so far cost American exporters $2 billion. That tally increases $1.9 million each and every day.
Since that time [the trade agreement signing], American exporters have paid approximately $1.9 million per day in Colombian tariffs that they wouldn’t have paid if the Democrat-controlled Congress had just passed the FTA back then and thus allowed it to enter into force. By my math, that means that Congress’ and (now) the President’s partisan stalling has resulted in a pointless tax on American businesses of almost $2 billion ($1.9798 billion = 1042 days times $1.9 million) and counting.
My colleague Dan Griswold explained yesterday how U.S. trade policy punishes poorer people abroad, and amounts to a regressive tax here at home:
America’s highest remaining trade barriers are aimed at products mostly grown and made by poor people abroad and disproportionately consumed by poor people at home. While industrial goods and luxury products typically enter under low or zero tariffs, the U.S. government imposes duties of 30 pecent or more on food and lower-end clothing and shoes — staple goods that loom large in the budgets of poor families.
The Obama administration and Congress could easily remove the sanctions that burden America’s exporters and lower-income consumers. But until they’re convinced that they can make up the revenues lost by crossing Big Labor, the Democratic Party playbook counsels more of the same disingenuous rhetoric of fraternity with the common man and more exaggerations about evil foreign labor practices.
Hey G-20! Here’s How You Curb Protectionism
Last week I recommended reading a new paper published by the Lowy Institute in Australia, which proposes an utterly sensible reform for the G-20, if curbing protectionism is a serious aim.
Using Australia’s own successful experience as an example, the authors recommend other countries adopt “domestic transparency” programs, which would essentially include analysis from an independent, apolitical board or agency that measures the real costs and benefits of proposed trade restrictions.
The findings of these independent reviews would be accessible to the public—and probably published in newspapers and other popular media—in advance of any decision to impose or reject the proposed trade restrictions. The findings wouldn’t legally bind the authorities to take any particular action, but would help chase from the shadows the real costs of protectionism, so that those ultimately making the decision know that the public at large is aware of the costs.
When a politician knows that he/she can benefit politically by imposing import duties, the costs of which are hidden in higher prices paid by consumers, who are unlikely to make the causal connection, there is a profound asymmetry of incentives and disincentives. The politician is much more likely to choose to secure the political benefit of imposing duties since the costs are hidden. But if light is shone on those costs, through domestic transparency initiatives, that asymmetry is reduced or eliminated. Politicians, under these circumstances, can go back to the special interests and say how much they’d like to help out with a tariff, but the costs don’t justify the measure. And the protection-seekers know the politician’s hands are tied because the public is aware of those costs.
Well, Alan Mitchell of the Australian Financial Review on Monday supposed how the presence of a domestic transparency regime would have affected President Obama’s tire tariff decision. It is very instructive:
The Tire Tariff and the Invertebrate President: A Fable
Anyone still inclined to minimize the meaning of President Obama’s Chinese tire tariff decision should read George Will’s column today.
It is not only the direct costs of this particular decision, which are numerous and tallied in the article (and in this paper), that should concern us. Will’s bigger concern is the foreshadowing of more protectionism from a president who has proven to have no qualms about looking straight into other people’s eyes and claiming that his administration opposes protectionism, favors free trade, and is working to advance pending trade agreements through Congress, all while remaining “invertebrate as he invariably is when organized labor barks.”
Is this a sign of schizophrenia? No, it’s worse. What we have here is a president who views trade policy as nothing more than a tool to advance his own political standing with groups that are hostile to commerce. Since groups on the left have grown disenchanted that some of the most socialist elements of the health care debate might be left on the cutting room floor, why not try to placate them with anti-business, anti-consumer, anti-globalization protectionism? Will makes the link between tire tariffs and the health care debate in his concluding sentence.
A president who fancies himself economically enlightened and internationalist would treat trade policy as a means to promoting economic growth and sound foreign relations. This president, regrettably, views trade policy as a sacrificial pawn in the service of politics as usual.
Tire Tariff Decision Won’t Soon be Forgotten
The good folks over at Freedom to Trade recently filmed an interview with me about the implications of the China tire tariffs:
And if you just can’t get enough about the ramifications of the tire tariff, check out this Canadian Business News clip from yesterday, or this one from CNBC today.
Australian Trade Scholars Offer Perfect Cure for ‘Protectionitis’
Earlier this month, the Lowy Institute in Australia published a paper offering some very sound and, obviously, very timely advice about how to contain, and ultimately, eradicate protectionism. The paper is being circulated among the G20 delegations, who will undoubtedly discuss the topic of trade and protectionism in Pittsburgh next week. So for those of you interested in getting a sense of what will probably be the single best idea on (or at least near) the table at the G20 summit, I highly recommend this 20-pager.
The solution proposed by the authors boils down to a two-word phrase: “Domestic Transparency.” What is meant by that phrase is that “defeating protectionism begins at home.” And by that slogan, the authors mean that the key to reducing, and ultimately eliminating, protectionism is not external pressure from other countries, mercantilist trade negotiations, or filing trade complaints at the WTO, but rather greater awareness at home of the real costs of protectionism. I couldn’t agree more. (In fact better transparency is one of our recommendations in this paper).
When governments impose trade barriers at the behest of special interests, they usually justify that protectionism with diversionary rhetoric concerning some vague conception of the “national interest,” and the imperative of shielding domestic business from unfair competition and other vagaries of the globalized economy. That the protectionist measure itself—the product of special interests diverting productive resources from economic to political ends—forces involuntary and usually unknowing subsidization of those protection-seekers by the same citizens at large who are expected to buy into the national interest canard is a detail about which most people remain in the dark.
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Trade and Immigration
Return of the Trade Enforcement Canard
In defending its tire tariff decision, the White House has glommed on to the “logic” that free trade first requires enforcement of trade agreements. Scott Lincicome exposes the absurdity of that defense here. But with that fallacy serving to undergird what sounds like a pre-justification for more trade cases and more trade restrictions, let me remind the reader that we already have 299 active antidumping and countervailing duty measures in the United States, resticting or prohibiting imports from 43 different countries. We have all sorts of restrictions on imported textiles, clothing, footwear, food products, agricultural commodities, lumber, steel, pickup trucks, tobacco, and many, many more products, including tires. But despite all of this enforcement–of rules that are hard to justify, as they penalize most members of society for the benefit of a connected few–we still don’t have free trade in the United States. In other words, we’ve had the enforcement, where’s the free trade?
And if the holier-than-thou U.S. government is going to focus on enforcement of rules, then by all means do unto others. The United States remains baldly and defiantly in violation of its NAFTA commitments to open U.S. roads to Mexican trucks by the year 2000. The United States remains defiantly in protest of WTO Dispute Settlement Body decisions impugning U.S. cotton subsidies, U.S. prohibitions on gambling services offered by providers in Antigua, the antidumping calculation methodology known as “zeroing,” and the Byrd Amendment. Trade partners in some of these cases are either retaliating or have been authorized to do so.
The argument that more rigid enforcement leads to freer trade will be tested. But don’t let the inevitable slew of new 421 cases and related restictions in the name of enforcement fool you. After the restrictions, the retaliation, and the adoption of similar measures in other countries, free trade will be right around the corner. The next corner. Keep looking…
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Law and Civil Liberties; Trade and Immigration
President Obama Subsidizes President Obama with Tire Tariff
Who benefits from 35 percent duties on Chinese-produced tires?
U.S. producers? No, they are the ones who, pursuing profit-maximizing strategies, have consciously shifted production of low-end tires from their U.S. plants to their Chinese plants over the past few years. They will now have to incur the costs of shifting production from China to production facilities in Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia and other developing countries, where it makes economic sense to produce low-end tires.
U.S. workers, then? Nah. Low-end U.S. tire production workers won’t see an increase in U.S. capacity, capacity utilization, hours worked, or wages because, as implied above, production isn’t coming back to the United States. Meanwhile, U.S. workers in tire wholesaling, distribution, and other segment of the supply chain are likely to see a decline in business in the short-run, as higher prices reduce demand for tires. Things may improve once adjustments are made to the new production locations, but that will involve certain adjustment costs and lower profit margins because presumably China is the profit-maximizing production location. Right? Why else would producers have chosen China?
Does the tariff benefit consumers, then? Come on. Not only will it lead to higher prices for consumers, but it will hit cost-conscious consumers the hardest. And you thought President Obama opposed regressive taxation?
No, the only beneficiary of the tariff is President Obama, who presumably gets some political mileage for his Chicago-style payback of Big Labor. But make no mistake that any benefits to the president will be fleeting, as the direct costs of the tire tariff and the costs of copycat protectionism start to squeeze economic recovery. As the president is flooded with similar requests for protection from other unions and producers, he will have to choose between disappointing those favor-seekers or strangling economic prospects entirely. The tire decision was selfish and shortsighted.
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Trade and Immigration
Obama to Impose Tariff on Chinese Tires
From the quiet shadows of the White House, at around 10 pm on Friday night, came word that President Obama will impose prohibitive duties of 35% on imports of Chinese tires.
Well, we at Cato and elsewhere have warned repeatedly of the dangerous consequences of this outcome (June 18, July 24, August 13, September 9, September 11). Former Cato colleague and coauthor Scott Lincicome has an excellent analysis on the ramifications right here.
The good news is that we now have clarity about where the president stands on trade. The bad news is that his stance reflects his isolationist primary election campaign rhetoric and not the post-election messages of avoiding protectionism and repairing the damage done to America’s international credibility by unilateralist Bush administration policies. Short of armed hostilities or political subversion, no state action is more provocative than banning another’s products from entering your market. I guess this paper was too audaciously hopeful. We’re chastened.
Technically, the Chinese are not legally entitled to retaliate because the United States has legal recourse to restrictions under this so-called “China safeguard” law until 2013. But plenty of American exporting interests have been worried enough to write numerous letters to Obama urging restraint–but to no avail.
Restrictions have never been imposed under this law because in all previous cases — all during the previous administration — President Bush exercised his discretion to reject the recommended duties because of the likely cost of those restrictions on the broader economy. Thus, the Chinese know the decision is a matter of presidential discretion, unlike the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, which are on statutory autopilot and don’t require the president’s attention. Accordingly, the tire restrictions are the edict of the American president, and thus carries more profound meaning for the Chinese.
One of the more thrilling spectacles in all of this, if politicians were capable of humility, would be watching President Obama explain his decision to impose tire duties on China at the G-20 meeting he is hosting in Pittsburgh in 12 days. Recall the president’s pledge (along with the other G-20 leaders) at the last G-20 meeting in London to avoid new protectionist measures.
American credibility on trade is spent. And maybe Obama will find comfort in that fact because he won’t be burdened with that historic responsibility, as he signs off on the slew of new requests for trade restrictions (which are undoubtedly coming soon) under this law from other U.S. industries seeking handouts.
Strap on your armor; the die has been cast.
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Law and Civil Liberties; Trade and Immigration
New Cato Paper Warns of the Consequences of Restrictions on Chinese Tires
Despite the controversy that seems to color all portrayals of U.S. trade with China, the bilateral relationship has held up remarkably well, to the benefit of both countries. But, as I explain in this hot-off-the-presses Free Trade Bulletin, things could go south quickly if President Obama grants the wish of the United Steelworkers union to impose import restrictions on Chinese-produced passenger tires.
Under a special U.S. statute that applies only to China, the president can authorize import restrictions in cases where a domestic industry is found to be suffering from “market disruption” on account of increased imports from China. The U.S. International Trade Commission already rendered that conclusion in the tires case and recommended that the president impose duties of 55 percent. Though duties might benefit the USW, which represents fewer than half of all U.S. tire production workers, the restrictions would be immensely costly to almost every other interest in the tire supply chain, including distributors, wholesalers, retailers, downstream industrial users, and consumers — especially lower income consumers. Such a decision would amount to a crystal clear U.S. disavowal of its pledge to the G-20 to avoid new invocations of protectionism, just one week ahead of the G-20 summit in Pittsburgh.
The stakes are particularly high in the tires case because the president has the discretion to reject the tariff recommendations altogether, which is exactly what President Bush did on all four occasions when the ITC recommended restrictions under this statute during his administration. Unlike antidumping and countervailing duty restrictions, which run on statutory autopilot without requiring the president’s attention or consent, Section 421 explicitly requires the attention and participation of the U.S. president. The Chinese will view restrictions in this case, then, as a personal directive of President Obama, and the consequences for bilateral relations could be severe.
Please read the paper and circulate liberally.
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Trade and Immigration
Harold Meyerson is Part of the Problem
I have argued time and again that America’s growing aversion to trade during the past few years is the product of myth perpetuation by campaigning politicians, captured policymakers, TV media charlatans, and woefully ill-informed newspaper columnists. Harold Meyerson always comes to mind as emblematic of this last category, so his fallacy-laden diatribe about the decline of U.S. manufacturing in yesterday’s Washington Post is par for the course.
Meyerson makes some claims that cannot be allowed to stand, such as.
“”We don’t [make things] any more – at least, not like we used to. Since 1987, manufacturing as a share of our gross domestic product has declined 30 percent.”
First of all, please note that Meyerson’s second sentence does nothing to support his first. A decline in the manufacturing sector’s share of the total economy speaks to the rapid growth of other sectors of the economy, but says nothing about the change in U.S. manufacturing output or value-added.
According to data from the 2009 Economic Report of the President, as gathered and reported yesterday by George Mason University Economics Professor Don Boudreaux, since 1987 real U.S. manufacturing output has increased by 81 percent – hardly a sign of manufacturing decline.
The facts – as reported by the Bureau of Economic Analysis – demonstrate that real manufacturing value-added reached a record high level in 2007 (the last year for which final data are available). Notwithstanding the recent recession that has affected all sectors of the economy, U.S. manufacturing has been thriving in recent years.
Second, if the United States doesn’t “make things anymore,” then nobody does. According to data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, U.S. factories are the world’s most prolific, accounting for 25 percent of global manufacturing value-added. By comparison, Chinese factories account for 10.6 percent.
That may be hard to fathom, given that everyone’s favorite story about shopping in retail establishments these days is that it’s impossible to find anything labeled “Made in the USA.” But that’s because, increasingly, U.S. manufacturing produces sophisticated components, such as airplane parts, not consumer goods.
American manufacturing is by no means in decline. What should be is Meyerson’s myopic way of seeing things.
Consequential Trade Decision Looms
By September 17, President Obama will decide whether to reject, adopt, or modify recommendations from the U.S. International Trade Commission to impose duties of 55 percent on tires imported from China. As I’ve stated before, imposition of duties could be the most consequential trade policy decision in several years, since it is rare that the president is tied so directly to a decision to impose barriers. Trade restraints would be perceived by the Chinese as the direct wishes of the U.S. president, which would not be taken lightly in Beijing.
Although I elaborate further in a forthcoming paper, here is some smart analysis from trade lawyer and Cato coauthor Scott Lincicome.
55% Duties on Chinese Tires Would Be Plain Stupid in Every Respect
Last month, I posted about the upcoming decision confronting President Obama on the question of whether or not he should impose trade restrictions (55% duties) on passenger tires from China, as recommended by the U.S. International Trade Commission.
I am in the process of finishing a short paper on the issue, explaining why doing so would be disastrous for the economy and foreign relations, but am taking a break to share this brilliant op-ed that appeared in today’s Detroit News. Ross Kogel, Jr., president of Tire Wholesalers, really hits the nail on the head, articulately and succinctly, explaining that there is no upside, only misery, in the proposed tariffs.
Michigan could sure use several more Ross Kogel and far fewer of the business-as-usual pols and union leaders who have run the state into the abyss.
Obama Fiddles While Trade Policy Burns
At least, that was our preferred title…
Strike a Blow for Freedom: Don’t Buy GM
Time and again my colleagues and I have warned that the government’s takeover of GM would divorce business decisions from economics and wed them to politics ‘til death do they part. But I won’t gloat. Better to be right and satisfied that government is reasonably restrained than right and house hunting in Galt’s Gulch.
We’ve already seen the president insist on the firing of a CEO, design and negotiate a bankruptcy plan devoid of much economic merit, impose preferences about which models to produce, and assure the diabolical, undeserving management of the UAW that GM won’t import small cars from its foreign plants to make space for its U.S.-produced budget-busting green vessels.
Now Congress is attempting to legislate its way into the boardroom. Last month, GM/Obama announced plans to terminate 1,300 dealerships, as part of a larger effort to reduce costs and, ultimately, turn a “profit.” (The term “profit” is, shall we say, imprecise in this case given the amount of production subsidization, fuel taxation, and tax code inducements that will be necessary to sustain GM for the foreseeable future). But many in Congress don’t like the idea. As reported in the Detroit Free Press:
By a unanimous vote, a U.S. House committee has approved a measure that would restore 2,100 dealers either cut or scheduled to be closed by General Motors Corp. and Chrysler Group LLC.
…The bill would turn back the clock to before the companies filed for bankruptcy, restoring the 789 dealers cut by Chrysler and 1,300 dealers GM chose to wind down.
…Executives from GM and Chrysler have both told Congress that cutting dealers was essential to their survival outside of bankruptcy, saving each company billions of dollars a year and strengthen their remaining sales force.
“This legislation, if passed, would put our long-term viability at risk,” said GM spokesman Greg Martin.
I suppose you can’t really blame Congress for trying to impose its wishes on GM. After all, the Constitution is silent on the matter of which branch of government furnishes the CEO of nationalized companies.
Attention GM Shareholders (That Means You!)
As my colleague Doug Bandow pointed out this morning, today’s Washington Post has an analysis about the uncertain prospects of GM ever making taxpayers whole again. It is a very similar analysis to the one I gave in this L.A. Times Dust-Up installment four weeks ago, although I find prospects unlikely, rather than just uncertain.
If GM emerges from bankruptcy next month in accordance with the pre-packaged Obama plan (as expected), taxpayers will be on the hook for $50 billion. That $50 billion will buy taxpayers a 60 percent stake in the company, which according to the laws of mathematics means that GM has to be worth $83.33 billion for the taxpayers to get their equity back without making a dime in capital gains or interest. In the L.A. Times, I asked:
How and when will that ever happen? At its peak in 2000, GM’s value (based on its market capitalization) stood at $60 billion. Thus, the minimum benchmark for “success” will require a 38% increase in GM’s value from where it was in the heady days of 2000, when Americans were purchasing 16 million vehicles per year. U.S. demand projections for the next few years come in at around 10 million vehicles. Taxpayer ownership of GM is something we should all get used to, and the “investment” is only going to grow larger. Think Amtrak.
High Noon for U.S. Trade Policy
This morning, the U.S. International Trade Commission issued an affirmative determination in a so-called “Section 421” or “China-Specific Safeguard” case that imports of consumer tires from China are causing market disruption in the United States. That may sound like just another day in Washington, but the decision could very well be the catalyst for the most consequential event in trade policy since the Bush steel tariffs of 2002. It will certainly force a defining moment for a president who has preferred obfuscation to clear direction on trade policy.
Under the statute (which became U.S. law as a condition of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001), the ITC has 20 days to provide remedial recommendations to the president and the U.S. trade representative. Those recommendations are likely to include quotas, tariffs, or some combination that will ultimately curtail the supply and raise the prices of all tires in the United States — not just those imported from China. However, the president has the discretion to deny import “relief” if he determines that such restrictions would have an adverse impact on the U.S. economy that is clearly greater than its benefits, or if he determines that such relief would cause serious harm to the national security of the United States.
I will forego my own explanation as to why restrictions would have an adverse impact that is clearly greater than its benefits, and instead give you the statement of the U.S. Tire Industry Association, which represents “all segments of the tire industry, including those that manufacture, repair, recycle, sell, service or use new or retreaded tires, and also those suppliers or individuals who furnish equipment, material or services to the industry.” Suffice it to say that no producers of tires in the United States supported this petition, so it is not a matter of U.S. tire producers against Chinese tire producers. It is really nothing more than a matter of a U.S. union objecting to management’s decision to produce its lowest grade (lowest quality, lowest priced, lowest profit margin) tires abroad. Yet the consequences of trade restraints could affect interests across and throughout the economy, particularly if China responds in kind.
During the Bush administration, there were six Section 421 cases filed by domestic parties, four of which were found by the ITC to warrant import relief. In each of those four cases, President Bush exercised his discretion to deny relief. The tires case is a test case for President Obama. Will 421 fly under this president? Or will it remain the dead letter that petitioners considered it to be under President Bush?
The stakes are much higher for Obama than they were for Bush because the unions (the United Steel Workers union is the petitioner in the tires case) and the Chinese both feel more emboldened in their positions now. Bush didn’t win the near-unanimous support of organized labor in his elections, nor did he promise to get tough on Chinese trade practices, as Obama did.
Instead, Bush set the precedent of denying relief. And he did it four times. So, the Chinese see this firmly as a matter of presidential discretion — unlike antidumping or countervailing duties, which run on statutory auto pilot without requiring the president’s attention or consent. In other words, although there are over 50 outstanding U.S. antidumping and countervailing duty orders against various Chinese products, none of them is considered to reflect the direct wishes of the U.S. president, and thus don’t rise to the level of a potentially explosive trade dispute. But trade restraints under the 421 will no doubt be considered by the Chinese to be a directive of the U.S. president, thus the offense taken and the consequences wrought could be profound.
The good news is that President Obama will finally be forced to take a stand — to match his words and deeds. After a campaign in which trade was disparaged, President Obama’s first 100 days were characterized by a conciliatory tone and some enlightened actions. He told the Mexican president and the Canadian prime minister that he no longer wanted to reopen NAFTA. He spoke out against the most protectionist provisions of the Buy American language in the so-called stimulus bill. He repudiated protectionism and pledged to avoid new protectionist measures at the G-20 and before other international gatherings. His Treasury Department declined to label China a currency manipulator. And his trade representative set about articulating a pro-trade agenda, including support for a push to pass pending bilateral trade agreements and concluding the Doha Round.
But there’s been very little follow through and trade partners are beginning to doubt his sincerity. Efforts to schedule votes on pending trade agreements have been shunted aside as too controversial to happen before health care reform legislation. In the meantime, imports are being turned away from U.S. procurement projects on account of some mindless Buy American caveats and overzealous interpretation of other Buy American rules by project administrators, which is inciting copycat rules in Canada and China.
The time has come for the president to stop wavering and to take decisive actions on trade policy. Of course, he will have until September 17 to render his decision about whether to grant or deny relief in the tires case. Between now and then he should conclude that trade restrictions are not the appropriate course — that among other problems, they will also undermine his economic and diplomatic objectives. And while he’s denying relief, he should take some advice from Scott Lincicome and me to speak the truth about trade to those constituencies who will feel betrayed. Directly and honestly making the case for trade to those who doubt is more durable than rationalizing each pro-trade decision, which has been the norm for too long in Washington. Besides, the polls show that Americans have already turned the corner and are moving away from their misguided flirtation with protectionism. That may help inspire an uncommitted president to take the baton.
Filed under: International Economics and Development; Trade and Immigration
A Nation of Lawlessness
The matter of Chrysler’s bankruptcy seems to have rendered quaint our system of checks and balances. President Obama is breaking the law and the other two branches are letting him get away with it. One can probably understand how a smitten public might casually allow this president a stipend of unconstitutional acts, since he doesn’t scowl like Nixon or stutter like Bush. But, even a popular president (in particular, a popular president) must be held in check by the legislative and judicial branches.
And that’s not happening.
On Tuesday at 4:00 pm, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg “stayed pending further order” the bankruptcy-related transactions of Chrysler, giving hope the Supreme Court might hear the appeal filed on behalf of certain Indiana state pension and construction funds, who claim that their property rights as secured creditors were violated by the forced sale and that the use of Troubled Asset Relief Program funds to support Chrysler and facilitate its restructuring was illegal. Only 28 hours later, the Supreme Court decided against taking the appeal, despite the seemingly compelling issues at hand.
Just as the Bush administration was telling Congress last September that there was no time to debate the merits of a financial bailout and that the only course was to give Treasury Secretary Paulson carte blanche immediately to spend $700 billion, the Obama administration was telling the Supreme Court this week that time was of the essence and that Fiat would walk away from the Chrysler deal if it wasn’t allowed to proceed right away. Was that the decisive factor in the Supreme Courts rejection of the appeal? It seems to me the appeal contains some serious constitutional issues worthy of judicial consideration (consideration that goes beyond merely rubber-stamping the Obama administration’s pre-packaged, politically-driven bankruptcy plan for Chrysler, which is what Judge Gonzalez appears to have done).
But it’s now a done deal, possibly facilitated by illegalities.
Cato on Facebook
Cato on Twitter
Cato on YouTube
Cato Tweets