Author Archive
Lies, Damned Lies, and Trade Statistics
If you want to understand how global integration and cross-border investment have left U.S. trade policy in need of a new purpose, check out today’s Wall Street Journal article about the Apple iPhone’s complex production-supply chain. (And then see this analysis for more depth and detail.) The story is both testament to the benefits of globalization and the latest indictment of a decrepit international trade flow accounting system that nourishes misleading trade skeptics and misinforms policy.
Following in the footsteps of a groundbreaking and widely-cited 2007 UC-Irvine study, which disaggregated the components of a Chinese-assembled Apple iPod and assigned its constituent value to the companies and countries responsible for their production, two researchers at the Asian Development Bank Institute applied a similar analysis to the Apple iPhone. Like the UC-Irvine iPod study before it, the ADBI analysis found that just a tiny fraction of the cost of producing the iPhone is Chinese value-added. The only Chinese input is labor, which is used to assemble the components manufactured in other countries. The value of that labor accounts for $6.50 or 3.6 percent of the total cost of $178.96 to produce an iPhone (about the same percentage as the iPod). The other 96.4 percent of that total is the cost of components produced (and the labor and overhead employed to produce those components) in Japan, Germany, South Korea, the United States, and several other countries. This breakdown is very similar to that found for the iPod in 2007, and the punch lines are identical.
While firms in Japan and Germany account for the most expensive parts (and quite obviously benefit from the advent of the iPhone), most of the value of the iPhone (like the iPod) accrues to Apple, which reaps the lion’s share of the approximately 100 percent markup. When iPhones sell for $399 in the United States, the difference between that retail price and the $178.96 cost of production goes to retailers, distributors, marketers, other firms in the supply chain, and to Apple, which distributes some earnings to its shareholders and retains some for research and development, supporting engineering and design jobs higher up the value chain so that the virtuous circle can continue.
Rather than appreciate how this complementary process harnesses the benefits of our globalized division of labor, some begrudge iPod and iPhone sales in the United States for adding to the bilateral trade deficit. Technically, for every $399 iPhone sold in the United States, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China increases by $178.96. Even though only $6.50 of that iPhone is Chinese value, under our antiquated, pre-globalization, method of tallying a nation’s imports and exports, the entire $178.96 is chalked up as an import from China because that was the product’s final point of assembly. According to the authors of the ADBI study, iPhones added $1.9 billion to the politically volatile U.S. trade deficit with China in 2009. Alas, this is the basis of the claim—popular among the most shameless trade critics—that America has a “high-tech” trade deficit with China.
Should we lament a trade deficit in iPhones or any other products assembled abroad, particularly when those products comprise U.S. value-added and support high-paying U.S. jobs? I think not. As I wrote last year:
U.S. factories and workers are more likely to be collaborating with Chinese factories and workers in production of the same goods than they are to be competing directly. The proliferation of vertical integration (whereby the production process is carved up and each function performed where it is most efficient to perform that function) and transnational supply chains has joined higher value-added U.S. manufacturing, design, and R&D activities with lower-value manufacturing and assembly operations in China. The old factory floor has broken through its walls and now spans oceans and borders. Though the focus is typically on American workers who are displaced by competition from China, legions of American workers and their factories, offices, and laboratories would be idled without access to complementary Chinese workers in Chinese factories. Without access to lower-cost labor in places like Shenzhen, countless ideas hatched in U.S. laboratories—which became viable commercial products that support hundreds of thousands of jobs in engineering, design, marketing, logistics, retailing, finance, accounting, and manufacturing—might never have made it beyond conception because the costs of production would have been deemed prohibitive for mass consumption. Just imagine if all of the components in the Apple iPod had to be manufactured and assembled in the United States. Instead of $150 per unit, the cost of production might be multiple times that amount.
Consider how many fewer iPods Apple would have sold; how many fewer jobs iPod production, distribution, and sales would have supported supported; how much lower Apple’s profits (and those of the entities in its supply chains) would have been; how much lower Apple’s research and development expenditures would have been; how much smaller the markets for music and video downloads, car accessories, jogging accessories, and docking stations would be; how many fewer jobs those industries would support; and the lower profits those industries would generate. Now multiply that process by the hundreds of other similarly ubiquitous devices and gadgets: computers, Blu-Ray devices, and every other product that is designed in the United States and assembled in China from components made in the United States and elsewhere.
The Atlantic’s James Fallows characterizes the complementarity of U.S. and Chinese production sharing as following the shape of a “Smiley Curve” plotted on a chart where the production process from start to finish is measured along the horizontal axis and the value of each stage of production is measured on the vertical axis. U.S. value-added comes at the early stages—in branding, product conception, engineering, and design. Chinese value-added operations occupy the middle stages—some engineering, some manufacturing and assembly, primarily. And more U.S. value-added occurs at the end stages in logistics, retailing, and after-market servicing. Under this typical production arrangement, collaboration, not competition, is what links U.S. and Chinese workers.
The proliferation of cross border investment and global production-supply chains is a major reason the world averted a global trade war of 1930s proportions during and in the wake of the recession, as described in this paper; it explains why Chinese currency appreciation between 2005 and 2008 did not reduce the U.S. trade deficit with China during that period, and why Yuan appreciation, alone, going forward will have no discernible impact on the deficit in this paper; and, it explains why the world should rejoice in China’s becoming the world’s largest exporter in 2009, in this oped.
Global integration requires new thinking about trade statistics, which should be reported on a constituent value-added basis, if at all. It also requires that trade policy get with the times and consist of goals that are not mired in the old “Us” versus “Them” way of thinking. Relying on old-fashioned trade statistics for 21st century policy decisions is a recipe for disaster.
If Only the USTR Were This Enthusiastic about Liberalizing Trade
There was really never any doubt that the United States would prevail in the dispute brought by China to the World Trade Organization over President Obama’s decision last year to levy duties on tire imports from China. The WTO verdict, revealed yesterday, simply affirms that the administration acted in accordance with U.S. WTO commitments—and leaves to others, such as myself, to conclude that the duties were a highly political act perpetrated with utter contempt for the significant economic and diplomatic costs of those actions.
Thus, “prevailing” in the WTO case should not be considered a source of universal joy for all Americans or even most Americans, as one might infer from the reaction of U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk, who jubilantly proclaimed, “This is a major victory for the United States and particularly for American workers and businesses.” Really, Ambassador Kirk? Tell that to the American workers and businesses involved in importing, trucking, wholesaling, retailing, and installing those Chinese-made tires. Tell it to the American workers and businesses who also happen to be U.S. tire consumers and are now lighter in their wallets or dangerously riding on worn treads as a result of the duties. Feel free to ask the workers and businesses in the U.S. poultry and auto parts industries—against whom the Chinese imposed antidumping duties immediately after the tire tariffs took effect—how they feel about having “prevailed.”
In fairness to Ambassador Kirk, in addition to working to open markets abroad, the USTR’s office is tasked with prosecuting challenges of our trade partners’ allegedly non-compliant policies and actions, as well as defending challenges to allegedly non-compliant U.S. policies and actions at the WTO. In that regard, warding off a challenge from China of the U.S. Section 421 law constitutes, arguably, a victory for the USTR’s office. But to be clear, Section 421 is a blatantly protectionist law that serves, at best, a sliver of the U.S. population slightly broader than the U.S. Congress.
As part of its WTO accession agreement in 2001, China agreed to allow the United States and other WTO members to treat it differently—indeed, discriminatorily—on several matters for a number of years after it joined the WTO. The China-Specific Safeguard mechanism (known legally as Section 421 of the Trade Act of 1974 and under which the tire tariffs were implemented in September 2009) authorizes the United States to impose duties if there is a surge in imports from China that is causing or threatening market disruption in the United States. Market disruption exists “whenever imports of an article like of directly competitive with an article produced by a domestic industry are increasing rapidly, either absolutely or relatively, so as to be a significant cause of material injury, or threat of material injury, to the domestic industry.” In other words, if U.S. industry is suffering the effects of normal competition—that is, if it must compete against more capable or more efficient foreign competitors—then the firms or workers in the U.S. industry can petition the U.S. government to raise those competitors’ prices through the imposition of trade restraints.
It is also important to appreciate what Section 421 is not. Contrary to the rhetoric of too many politicians, trade lawyers, and union bosses, 421 is not an “unfair trade” statute. Unlike the antidumping and countervailing duty laws, a Section 421 case does not include allegations of prices at less than fair value or prices that benefit from countervailable government subsidies. The evidentiary threshold is much lower. All that is alleged-and all that has to be established-in a 421 petition is that imports from China are increasing in such a manner as to be a cause of market disruption (or threat thereof) to the domestic industry.
Section 421 is not intended to remedy any wrongdoing on the part of Chinese exporters, but is intended rather to give U.S. producers the opportunity to holler “time out!” as they catch their breath, assess prospects, and attempt to adjust to a new level of competition. Of course there are huge costs to this kind of intervention in the marketplace, thus the president is granted discretion, under the law, to deny relief if he determines that the costs to the broader economy clearly exceed any benefits to the petitioning industry. While such discretion provides some comfort that the law’s relaxed evidentiary standards won’t be routinely abused by domestic interests seeking to stifle competition, there are no guarantees that the president’s discretion will be based exclusively on considerations of the national economic interest. If there were, it would be nearly impossible to conjure a scenario in which the concentrated, temporary benefits to a specific industry receiving protection were not overwhelmed by the costs of that protection on the broader economy. Political considerations always influence decisions that lead to protection.
Yesterday’s WTO decision was arguably a victory for the rule of law in international trade—but also a reminder that politicians write the rules of trade, including some that are so antithetical to its purpose. I would be willing to cut Ambassador Kirk more slack for his jubilation if he were to find religion on the WTO and abide the rulings–such as on zeroing, gambling, and cotton subsidies–that his (and his predecessors’) office has lost.
President’s Statement about GM IPO Reveals a Defensive Politician
I don’t particularly relish picking on a president who, on virtually every policy front, is showing all the markings of a man in way over his head. But the president’s actions and statements are becoming excruciating to watch—like a highly-touted Olympic figure skater who can’t complete a maneuver without falling to the ice.
President Obama’s salutary statement about GM’s IPO yesterday reveals a man so focused on defending his policies that he can no longer conceal the incongruity between his political objectives and the country’s imperatives.
American taxpayers are now positioned to recover more than my administration invested in GM, and that’s a good thing. (My emphasis)
Besides revealing the president’s preference for LIFO accounting procedures, the statement strikes me as sub-presidential. Shouldn’t the POTUS be concerned about American taxpayers getting back all of the money invested in GM? Even though former President Bush is complicit, shouldn’t the sitting president of a country that owes its wealth, freedom, and future to the endurance of the rule of law and the other long-standing, bedrock institutions that were defiled and abused to bail out two automakers issue a statement of regret and reassurance that such extreme measures will never be undertaken again?
I think President Obama missed an opportunity to make amends, build a bridge, and reassure businesses and investors that the White House will do its part to reduce the economy-stifling problem of regime uncertainty going forward. But, then again, that might have been too presidential for a politician who appears motivated more by avoiding blame than by advancing the country’s best interests.
A Successful IPO Does Not a Justifiable Bailout Make
There seems to be a lot of confusion about the meaning of GM’s IPO today. A common narrative in today’s media is that GM’s return to the stock market affirms the wisdom of the auto bailout. Some tougher customers in the media insist on a higher threshold being met—that taxpayers get back the entirety of their $50 billion investment in GM—before declaring “mission accomplished.” And then there are the rabid partisans who—in their seething animosity toward the Obama administration—reach conclusions devoid of logic and rich only in conspiratorial-mindedness. For example, yesterday I was contacted by a media outlet vetting this conclusion: “The IPO is evidence of the failure of the bailout because taxpayers were excluded from buying shares at the IPO price and, therefore, denied the opportunity to get their money back.” Huh?
All of those analyses are wrong. Let me dispense with the last one first, as it simply betrays a gross misunderstanding of how taxpayers are on the hook. By divesting of GM (i.e., selling its shares), the government is beginning to make the taxpayer whole. But just as there were no checks written directly from taxpayers to GM, there will be no checks written to taxpayers, as the Treasury liquidates the public’s share of GM. Whether main street Americans could participate in the IPO has nothing to do with making the taxpayer whole. And, by the way, IPOs typically limit sales of shares at the initial price to a chosen few. So let’s just shelve the canned indignation on this claim. It’s a distraction.
Here’s the real issue. Today’s IPO is nothing more than testament to the fact that the government threw GM a lifeline, enabling the company to expunge most of its debts and firm up its balance sheet on terms more favorable than a normal bankruptcy process would have yielded. That enabled GM to partake of the cyclically growing U.S. auto market in 2010 and turn a profit through the first three quarters. So what? Did anyone really think that a chosen company so coddled and insulated from market realities couldn’t turn a short-run profit? Yes, even GM, under those favorable conditions should have been expected to turn a profit this year.
But at what cost? That answer—even the question—seems to be elusive in the public discussion of the IPO. The cost was not only $50 billion—the amount diverted to GM in the first place. Nor was it that $50 billion minus the proceeds raised in today’s IPO (and minus the proceeds raised later when the government divests entirely of GM – it will still hold 33% of GM after today). In other words, making taxpayers whole does not absolve the Bush and Obama administration’s for the auto intervention. Recouping the $50 billion only gets us partially out of the hole. (And I’m not even sure who “us” includes because the costs are so far reaching.)
Yes, GM is making sales and accounting for market share, but only at the expense of the other automakers. Had GM been forced to severely atrophy or liquidate, the other automakers would have had greater revenues, more market share, and probably higher profits). They would have been able to attract GM’s best engineers and line workers. They would have more money to invest in R&D and to lead the industry into the future. Instead, by keeping GM in the mix, some of those industry resources remain misallocated in a company that the evolutionary market process would have made smaller or extinct.
The auto industry wasn’t rescued with the GM bailout. GM was “rescued.” By rescuing GM, the government overrode market forces, and there are significant costs to assign for that. Witness the stagnant economy with 9.6 percent unemployment. Is it not plausible that businesses are sitting on their cash and not investing or hiring because of the fear inspired by the government interventions starting with the bank and auto bailouts? It’s more than plausible. The regime uncertainty that persists to this day was spawned by the GM bailout and other interventions.
What about the weakening of the rule of law? Doesn’t the diversion of TARP funds by the Bush administration, in circumvention of congress’s wishes and in contravention of the language of the law, represent a cost? How about the property right of preferred bondholders who were forced to take pennies on their investment dollars under the Obama bankruptcy plan? Any costs there? What about U.S. moral authority to dissuade other goverments from meddling in their markets or indulging industrial policy? That may be costly to U.S. enterprises. And with the government still holding a third of GM, its hard to swallow the idea that public interest will be the driver of policies affecting the auto industry. And that suggests even more costs.
But don’t mistake this blog post for an anti-IPO rant. I’m in favor of the IPO. It couldn’t have happened sooner. But I suspect the investment bankers, the administration, and the other members of GM’s Board of Directors reckoned that, with the hype over the new Chevy Volt and the recent newsleak of GM’s $43 billion in unorthodox tax deferrments on the balance sheet, now was the perfect time to go public.
The GM ‘Turnaround’ in Bastiat’s View
GM’s long-rumored initial public stock offering will take place Thursday and self-anointed savior of the U.S. auto industry, Steven Rattner, is pretty bullish about the prospect of investors turning out in droves.
I’ve been saying for a while that I thought the government’s exposure [euphemism for taxpayer losses] in the auto bailout was in the $10-billion to $20-billion range.
But since investor interest has pushed the initial price up from the $26-to-$29 per share range to the $32-$33 range, Rattner now believes:
[T]his exposure is in the single-digit billion range, and arguably potentially better.
I won’t argue with Rattner’s numbers. After all, they affirm one of my many criticisms of the bailout: that taxpayers would never recoup the value of their “investment.” My bigger problem is with Rattner’s cavalier disregard for the other enduring—and arguably more significant—costs of the auto bailouts.
Rattner is like the foil in Frederic Bastiat’s excellent, but not-famous-enough, 1850 parable, That Which is Seen and That Which is Unseen. Rattner touts what is seen, namely that GM and Chrysler still exist. And they exist because of his and his colleagues’ commitment to a plan to ensure their survival, along with the hundreds of thousands (if not millions, as some “estimates” had it) of jobs that were imperiled had those companies vanished. (For starters, I very much question even what is seen here. I am skeptical of the counterfactual that GM and Chrysler would have disappeared and that there would have been significantly more job loss in the industry than there actually was during the recession and restructuring. But I’ll grant his view of what is seen because, frankly, the specifics are irrelevant in the final analysis).
President Obama Fails to Understand Trade
At the beginning of the Obama administration, I had the audacity to hope that the new president would defy conventional wisdom and become a proponent of trade and a good spokesman for its benefits. Scott Lincicome and I even wrote a 20,000-plus word Cato analysis explaining why the economic, geopolitical, and domestic political environment offered the president a unique opportunity to steer his party back to its pro-trade roots.
The thrust of our analysis was that, despite the campaign rhetoric, the president understood the economic benefits of trade and that he would see it as an escape route from recession and a path to political success; that the president’s visibility and new cache with his trade-skeptical political party—and the fact that he wasn’t George W. Bush—made him well-suited to the task of challenging and extinguishing lingering myths about the alleged ravages of trade, while explaining its many benefits; and, that the president would recognize that pro-trade policies should be part of the current Democratic Party platform, if for no other reason than the fact that restrictions governments place on trade harm lower-income Americans and the world’s poor more than they hurt anyone else. (Protectionism is regressive taxation, which is presumably anathema to Democratic Party creed.)
Alas, our study, “Audaciously Hopeful: How President Obama Can Restore the Pro-Trade Consensus,” was just a little too. It fell on deaf ears. It was ignored. In fact, it’s almost as if the past two years of trade policy were conducted to spite the recommendations in that paper.
From this administration, we’ve seen completed bilateral trade agreements sent to an off-site storage warehouse; the imposition of taxes on imported tires; “Buy American” provisions; prohibitions on Mexican trucks; demonization by the president of companies that outsource; defiance of multilateral rules governing use of the antidumping law; and, a “Boardwalk Empire”-style deal to prospectively compensate Brazilian farmers for the lower revenues they should expect on account of the lavish subsidies bestowed by U.S. taxpayers on U.S. cotton producers in lieu of reducing—or better still, halting—cotton subsidies altogether. Yes, the hallmark accomplishment of this administration’s trade policy so far is a deal that requires American taxpayers to subsidize Brazilian cotton producers for the right to continue subsidizing U.S. cotton producers.
Despite all that, I remained audacious (or gullible) enough to hold a glimmer of hope that the president would finally see the wisdom in our advice—given the new political landscape. That glimmer was snuffed out with publication of an oped in the New York Times this past Saturday, in which President Obama betrays profound misunderstanding of trade and its purpose. The president portrays trade as an enterprise that is won or lost at the negotiating table, where only the most savvy or most committed negotiators can succeed in bringing home the spoils. The president promises to fight hard to get Americans their fair shake from this dog-eat-dog process, while actual producers, consumers, workers, and investors are relegated to tertiary roles.
The central dysfunction between Americans and trade is the assumption—reinforced in the president’s op-ed—that exports are good, imports are bad, the trade account is the scoreboard, and our trade deficit means that we are losing at trade. That dysfunction resides comfortably within a zero-sum worldview, which the president touts in a purposeful cadence throughout the oped. In the penultimate sentence, the president writes:
Finally, at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Japan, I will continue seeking new markets in Asia for American exports. We want to expand our trade relationships in the region, including through the Trans-Pacific Partnership, to make sure that we’re not ceding markets, exports and the jobs they support to other nations.
By opining about trade without understanding that its real benefits are manifest in imports (here’s Don Boudreax’s elaboration of that process), the president is simply reinforcing myths that will continue to confuse and divide American. As long as politicians insist that our trade account is a scoreboard and that a surplus is a trade policy success metric, Americans will continue to be skeptical about trade.
Too Top-Down…Even for the Chinese Government!
It’s not surprising that Treasury Secretary Geithner’s recent G-20 proposal that governments agree to keep their current-account balances (either surplus or deficit) within 4 percent of GDP has met with resistance. After all, it assumes governments can and should manage the buying, selling, and investment decisions of hundreds of millions of Americans and billions of people worldwide. But I marvel at how deeply Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai’s tongue must have been planted in cheek when he uttered this rich rejection of Geithner’s idea: “The artificial setting of a numerical target cannot but remind us of the days of a planned economy.” If the shoe fits….
Ford Motor’s Curious Policy Priorities
Though it has been relatively successful in the marketplace lately, the Ford Motor Company continues to confound in its public policy commitments.
First, the company remained silent for the better part of two years as its chief domestic rivals General Motors and Chrysler were nursed back to viability by a doting government dispensing $65 billion of taxpayer-funded nourishment. Not once (to my knowledge) did Ford publicly complain that the government bailout of its struggling competitors was an affront to its own prospects or that it would deny the company its rightful increase in sales and market share (the so-called spoils of competition).
But now Ford is trumpeting its opposition to the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement. In a full page ad in today’s Washington Post, Ford implores Americans to reject the agreement as it currently stands, arguing that it would “allow Korea to remain one of the most closed automotive markets in the world.” So all of a sudden Ford is concerned about sales and market share?
Had GM and Chrysler been allowed to contract to a degree commensurate with their reckless decisions over the years, Ford might have hit the mother lode of sales and market share. But Ford didn’t even attempt to make that case. If Ford is so concerned about sales and market share, where is the outrage over the $45.4 billion in unconventional tax deferrals being granted GM as part of the ongoing bailout bonanza? Aren’t those deferrals just subsidies to help GM regain market share … at Ford’s expense?
Instead, Ford has chosen to target a trade agreement that promises enormous benefits to American businesses and consumers, a slew of new domestic employment opportunities, and annual increases in GDP of anywhere from $17 to $43 billion (bailout-type sums!) on the grounds that the agreement contains no guarantees of increased U.S. auto sales in Korea.
There are no guarantees in trade. But that’s what Ford and others in the U.S. auto industry and in Congress want: guaranteed sales figures, bilateral trade balance within the auto sector, managed outcomes. Is that what Ford means in the ad where it claims to support free trade?
Granted, the Korean auto market has been notoriously difficult to penetrate. Behind-the-border taxes levied on engine size and other non-tariff barriers have discouraged purchases of U.S. automobiles in Korea. But without the agreement, none of that will change. With the agreement, Korea reduces its tariff on passenger vehicles from 8% to 0 immediately, while the United States reduces its tariff on passenger vehicles from 2.5% to 0 immediately. So both are good reforms, but there is no question that U.S. auto exporters get a relatively bigger boost from the agreement. And though there are no guarantees of hard sales quotas, one can be pretty well assured that only the most inept producer/exporter would fail to capitalize on an 8 percent cost reduction granted with the stroke of a pen.
Ford should stop politicking and stay focused on the goal of making better automobiles.
Glory-of-Government Religiosity Finds Bailout Skeptics “Willfully Stupid”
When you believe in things that you don’t understand,
Then you suffer,
Superstition ain’t the way
- Stevie Wonder
David Ignatius is entitled to this opinion:
We have just lived through one of the more notable successes of government intervention in modern times – the auto and bank rescues that almost surely saved the country from another Great Depression.
But if his intention is to convince skeptics—and not just to rally the deflated spirits of those who came to Washington with high hopes of teaching Americans how to love their government—he does a lousy job. A bold assertion like his requires supporting evidence more rigorous than hearsay, superstition, and the opinions of his friend, and former “Car Czar,” Steven Rattner.
Ignatius considers the bailouts successful because GM is still in business and the banking sector didn’t collapse. According to Ignatius (often channeling Rattner):
Private companies made bad decisions that put the U.S. economy at risk; government made good (if politically unpopular) decisions to keep these mismanaged companies afloat, fearing that a collapse would mean much worse trouble…Private actors made bad decisions, but public officials generally made good ones…Washington is such an easy target that we forget the real villains of this story are the bankers and auto executives who steered their companies toward disaster.
Well.
Where is the credible evidence that without the interventions we were headed for another Great Depression? Where is support for the argument that it’s smart to keep “mismanaged companies afloat”? Where are the convincing facts (not the figures produced by the Big Three’s PR machine in November 2008) that the auto industry would have shed 2 to 3 million jobs had the government not intervened to save GM and Chrysler on the administration’s terms? Where are the soothing facts that the incentives to avoid failure in the banking and auto sectors have not been weakened by the interventions? Where is the compelling defense against the charge that government policies that subsidized chosen firms in the mortgage industry created the incentives for risk-taking—that Ignatius pegs as the root cause of the problem—in the first place?
Apparently, Ignatius doesn’t swell with desire for limited constitutional government. He writes, “It’s one thing to denounce government when it fails to achieve its goals. But to ignore government’s achievements in times of crisis is willfully stupid.”
It’s clear that Ignatius column is more of an ideologically-driven rant doubling as a pitch for Rattner’s new book about the heroic role of the Auto Task Force in saving the auto industry. As I wrote a few months ago in response to Rattner’s chest-puffing:
Rattner’s verdict rests on the singular consideration that “a year after the government-sponsored bankruptcies of GM and Chrysler, both patients are alive and progressing well toward recovery.” But that’s like hailing the stable medical condition of a drunk driver after an accident, while ignoring the injuries to the family in the vehicle he struck.
The impact of the auto intervention on its victims doesn’t factor into Rattner’s analysis.
Rattner’s claim of auto “rescue” success is the product of a straw-man set-up. The most compelling objections to the bailout were not rooted in the belief that the government couldn’t use its assumed power to help GM and Chrysler. On the contrary, the most compelling objections were over concerns that the government would do just that. It is the consequences of that intervention—the undermining of the rule of law, the confiscations, the politically-driven decisions, and the distortion of market signals—that animated the most serious objections.
Thus, any verdict on the outcome of the auto industry intervention must take into account, among other things, the billions of dollars in property confiscated from the auto companies’ debt-holders; the higher risk premium built into U.S. corporate debt, as a result; the costs of denying Ford and the other more successful auto producers the spoils of competition (including additional market share and access to the resources misallocated at GM and Chrysler); the costs of rewarding irresponsible actors, like the United Autoworkers union, by insulating them from the outcomes of what should have been an apolitical bankruptcy proceeding; the effects of GM’s nationalization on production, investment, and public policy decisions; the diminution of U.S. moral authority to counsel foreign governments against market interventions that can adversely affect U.S. businesses competing abroad, and; the corrosive impact on America’s institutions of the illegal diversion of TARP funds under two presidential administrations.
It is willfully deceptive to direct the public’s attention away from these less discernible, but very consquential costs of the bailout.
Media Darken Americans’ Perceptions of Trade
Today’s Wall Street Journal headline screams: “Americans Sour on Trade.” And why shouldn’t they? After all, the public is routinely bombarded with misleading or simplistic trade coverage that too often relies on cliché, innuendo, and regurgitated conventional wisdom: it’s Team America versus the world. Without the war metaphor, trade is just a peaceful, mutually-enriching endeavor between consenting parties. BO-RING!
Dan Griswold attributes the declining sentiment to the business cycle and goes on to suggest that this “collective attitude is more reflective of the complaints people hear in the media than of any hard reality on the ground.” Let me continue with that theme because I’ve made no secret of my concern about media’s inclination to eschew context and fact to pitch a particular narrative about trade. The polling data at the heart of today’s WSJ article bears out that concern. A nation that has strong misgivings about trade is less likely to stop a conspiracy of politicians and special interests from taking away their right to do so.
The problem is not just limited to one or two newspapers; the problem is endemic. Here are just a few examples of faulty trade reporting that my colleagues and I have criticized over the past year or so (Exhibit A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, . . .). And here’s a more recent example from the editorial board of USA Today on Friday, October 1:
“From 2000 to 2009, America’s trade deficit with China surged nearly 300%. During that same time, 5.4 million American jobs in manufacturing were eliminated. It’s tough for U.S. manufacturers to compete against China’s lower wages, looser regulations and cheaper currency.”
Yes, the facts about the trade deficit and the American manufacturing jobs are correct. But the point is to imply that trade is responsible for the destruction of U.S. manufacturing. Nowhere does it mention that U.S. manufacturing jobs peaked in 1979 (well before trade with China was more than a statistical rounding error in our total trade figures) and has been trending downward ever since. Nowhere does it mention that China has lost many millions more manufacturing jobs than we have in the United States because of the same phenomenon: productivity growth. Nowhere in the editorial does it mention that U.S. manufacturing has been breaking records year after year during the decade (with the exceptions of recession years 2002 and 2009) with respect to output, value-added, revenues, profits, return on investment, and exports. Nowhere does it mention that U.S. manufactures are the world’s most prolific, accounting for the largest share of global manufacturing value added. Nowhere does it mention that China has been America’s fastest growing export market for a decade and that U.S. goods exports to China are up 36 percent compared to the same period last year, which is a 50 percent faster growth rate than U.S. exports to the rest of the world. Obviously, that fact would undermine the assertion that “it’s tough for U.S. manufacturers to compete against China’s lower wages, looser regulations and cheaper currency.” Nowhere does it caution that the use of statistics from 2009, the nadir of the recession, might be a bit misleading. Nowhere does it mention that as U.S. manufacturing jobs declined by 3.8 million between 2000 and 2008, a total of 8.8 million new jobs were created in the U.S. economy, for a net gain of 5 million jobs.
Americans have soured on trade largely because of the way media conveys its stories about trade. There is no alternative explanation for a majority of Americans harboring ill-will toward trade. Most Americans enjoy the fruits of international trade and globalization every day and in countless ways, and less than 3% of U.S. jobs loss is attributable to import competition or outsourcing. It is simply implausible that the degree of antipathy toward trade reflected in opinion polls is driven by past personal experiences or realistic fears about the future.
Rather than focus so much on shaping public opinion, media should rid itself of the curse of group think and get back to the basics of objectively reporting the facts, challenging the conventional wisdom, and citing multiples sources. The kind of lazy acceptance of unsubstantiated theories of cause and effect that are evident in international trade reporting these days is reminiscent of the media’s passive role in the months leading up to the invasion of Iraq.
Economists Ignore the Facts in Supporting Chinese Currency Legislation
The Chinese currency issue is in full bloom this week, as the House of Representatives passed the Currency Reform for Fair Trade Act of 2010 by a vote of 348-79 on Wednesday. Though there is so much to criticize about the bill and about the layers upon layers of misinformation, myth, and subterfuge that brought us to this point, this post concerns the dubiousness of the bill’s central premise: that Yuan appreciation will significantly reduce the bilateral trade deficit.
That is the position of the Peterson Institute’s Fred Bergsten and Bill Cline.
The premise seems plausible enough. At least, the economics textbooks tell us that as a nation’s currency appreciates, its people will consume more imports and foreigners will reduce consumption of that nation’s exports. Hence, a stronger Yuan vis-à-vis the dollar would mean that the Chinese buy more from the United States and sell less to the United States, reducing the bilateral deficit.
But in March Cato published a short paper of mine titled “Appreciate This: Chinese Currency Rise Will Have a Negligible Effect on the Trade Deficit.” The central argument of that paper was that our national obsession with the value of the Chinese currency is misplaced—a red herring, in fact. I presented recent historical data showing that despite a 21 percent increase in the value of the Yuan between July 2005 and July 2008, the U.S. deficit with China increased from $202 billion to $268 billion, or by 33 percent. U.S. exports to China increased (as would be expected) by $28 billion, but U.S. imports from China increased, as well (contrary to expectations based on the old textbooks), and by $94 billion, or 38.7 percent.
In other words, in the face of a 21 percent increase in the Yuan’s value, the U.S. bilateral trade deficit with China increased by 33 percent—a fact that raises serious questions about the integrity of the testimony, discussion, and “debate” that preceded the House vote on Wednesday.
The Rumors of Manufacturing’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated
“US manufacturing grows for 13th straight month” is the headline of an AP newswire story posted around noon today. This statistic doesn’t surprise me, since I’ve been following developments in U.S. manufacturing for many years now, and have published analyses of public data that refute the myth of deindustrialization and manufacturing decline.
With the exception of the recession of 08-09, when all U.S. economic sectors took a hit, U.S. manufacturing has been breaking its own record, year after year, with respect to output, value-added, profits, returns on investment, exports, and imports. U.S. factories are the world’s most prolific, accounting for 21.4% of global manufacturing value added in 2008 (China accounted for 13.4%).
But I bring the AP headline to your attention for one reason: so that you can judge for yourself who has any credibility on Capitol Hill, within the executive branch, in the media, among organized labor, in industry, in the think tank world, and within the international trade bar, as Nancy Pelosi tries to stuff a ruinous anti-China trade bill down our throats in the name of supporting our floundering manufacturing base. Look for the columns, the op-eds, the press releases, and the floor statements between next week and November.
Who among them will continue to cite our suffering manufacturing sector as the justification for protectionism? They should never again have any credibility.
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