The issue of border security has made its way into the 2012 GOP presidential race and candidates are jockeying to separate themselves from the pack. The topic garnered some attention at the Republican national security debate on November 22. An Associated Press story today examines the candidate’s platforms on the topic and as the title implies, rightly concludes securing the border is impossible. I am quoted in the article and make exactly that point:

Mitt Romney and Newt Gingrich have promised to complete a nearly 1,950-mile fence. Michele Bachmann wants a double fence. Ron Paul pledges to secure the nation’s southern border by any means necessary, and Rick Perry says he can secure it without a fence — and do so within a year of taking office as president.

But a border that is sealed off to all illegal immigrants and drugs flowing north is a promise none of them could keep.

“Securing the border is a wonderful slogan, but that’s pretty much all it is,” said Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the libertarian Cato Institute. “Even to come close would require measures that would make legal commerce with Mexico impossible. That’s an enormous price for what would still be a very leaky system.”

The bottom line is the border is simply too big to control. Attempting to fully police the border must pass a simple cost-benefit analysis, and it is not clear that our current policy passes that test. And yet, the candidates all agree securing the border is necessary to combat terrorism, illegal immigration, and drug violence stemming from Mexico.

The candidates have little reason to reexamine that assumption. Not only is it politically advantageous to call for securing the border, but it is a convenient one-size-fits-all solution to those three broader policy issues. They have calculated that this is what voters want to hear.

But it is an illusory solution. Laws protecting the border must exist and be enforced, but it is not clear that this alone, even if done more effectively or efficiently, will prevent terrorists or illegal immigrants from entering the United States. And the “securing the border” panacea certainly will not end the flow of drugs into the United States.

Curiously, while the GOP candidates all express worries about terrorism and illegal immigration, the subject of the war on drugs has hardly been discussed.  Although drug violence in Mexico is the only major security problem the Untied States faces on any of its borders, the issue has not produced serious consideration thus far.  Rep. Ron Paul (R-TX) has been the only candidate to offer a thoughtful, consistent approach the issue, calling for an end to the failed policy.

The candidates should be pressured to answer why Washington continues to spend billions of dollars to wage the war on drugs each year with little to show for it. The power of the drug cartels has reached the point that the Mexican government no longer controls some areas of the country. And there are worrying signs that the violence is beginning to bleed across the border into the United States.

Our prohibitionist efforts have failed and a new policy is needed. Only by removing the lucrative black-market drug trade and thus effectively defunding the Mexican drug cartels can we begin to end the violence and illegal activity that plagues Mexico and the southern U.S. border region.

That is the substantive discussion that should be taking place in the GOP debates, rather than the posturing and repeated faux policy prescriptions to secure the border.

Border Security, the War on Drugs, and the 2012 GOP Presidential Race is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Prominent conservatives continue to sputter about President Obama’s announcement that all U.S. troops will be withdrawn from Iraq by year’s end. GOP presidential candidate Rick Perry charges that the president was “irresponsible” for making that announcement, thereby “letting the enemy know” the date when U.S. forces would leave Iraq. Council on Foreign Relations writer Max Boot makes a similar argument, as do several other neoconservative pundits.

But as I’ve pointed out elsewhere, Obama did not set the December 31, 2011 deadline. George W. Bush did in an agreement with the Iraqi government that he signed in late 2008. One then has to ask whether Perry and other critics of Obama believe that Bush was being “irresponsible.” And if so, it is curious that virtually none of them have made that argument—or even hinted at such a conclusion.

That apparent double standard begs some other questions. The principal reason why Obama’s effort to modify the Bush agreement so that a residual U.S. force could remain after 2011 failed was that the administration refused to accept the Iraqi government’s demand that American troops be subject to Iraqi law. Are conservatives arguing that he should have made that concession? If so, their position is totally inconsistent with the position they have taken with respect to other countries that host U.S. troops. Indeed, fears that American military personnel might be subject to prosecution under foreign laws and in foreign jurisdictions have been a major reason for the intense opposition to U.S. involvement in the International Criminal Court.

Conversely, if Obama’s critics believe that U.S. troops should not be exposed to possible prosecution in a judicial system that has few of the due process protections that are considered the norm in the United States, how do they suggest that the administration get the Iraqi government to change its stance? Most of their criticisms on that front consist of little more than inane generalities that Obama should have shown greater leadership or engaged in more effective diplomatic bargaining. But how, precisely, should he have done that? Washington was not exactly in a position to order Baghdad to accept U.S. demands on the jurisdictional issue. And Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki knew that he would be risking political suicide if he capitulated to U.S. pressure and accepted a policy that is wildly unpopular with the Iraqi people.

Are conservatives implying that the Obama administration should have overridden Iraqi objectives and just imposed our will? Ethical issues aside, that would certainly require far more than the limited number of troops the U.S. has in Iraq at the moment, and it would likely re-ignite a widespread insurgency directed against a continuing U.S. military occupation.

The utterly inconsistent and incoherent position that most conservatives have taken on the troop withdrawal issue underscores the bankruptcy of the overall Iraq policy that they’ve pushed since early 2003. They’re frustrated that the Iraq mission has not gone as planned, and they fear—quite correctly—that once U.S. forces have departed, the waste and futility of that mission will become glaringly obvious to all except a shrinking contingent of true believers. What we’re seeing now is a mixture of partisan politics and a temper tantrum in response to that disagreeable reality.

Cross-posted from the Skeptics at the National Interest.

Conservative Hawks Are Incoherent Regarding Iraq Troop Withdrawal is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Three issues are likely to dominate the talks this week between President Obama and South Korean President Lee Myung-bak. On the economic front, the two leaders will emphasize the extensive potential benefits of the bilateral free trade agreement.

On the security front, there will be considerable discussion of both North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program and the future of the U.S.-South Korean alliance. Unfortunately, leaders of the two countries are locked into increasingly obsolete and dysfunctional policies with respect to both issues. New thinking on those security matters is badly needed.

Seoul and Washington routinely contend that they will not tolerate North Korea having a nuclear arsenal. But other than the long-standing attempt to isolate Pyongyang internationally, U.S. and South Korean officials present no plausible strategy for preventing Kim Jong-il’s regime from expanding its nuclear capabilities. The much-touted six-party talks clearly have not worked. Moreover, without China’s active cooperation to deny crucial food and energy aid to North Korea (and there is no indication that Beijing is willing to take that step), North Korea cannot be truly isolated. Obama and Lee need to consider the possibility of learning to live with a nuclear North Korea, since the current U.S.-South Korean strategy for dealing with the nuclear issue is hopelessly ineffectual.

Policy regarding the bilateral security alliance is no better. Predictably, Lee and Obama will reaffirm the importance of that alliance. But from the standpoint of American interests, this commitment makes little sense. The principal effect of Washington’s security blanket for South Korea is to enable that country to shamelessly free-ride on America’s military exertions. Despite being located next to perhaps the most dangerous and unpredictable country in the world—Kim Jong-il’s North Korea—South Korea continues to spend an anemic 2.5 percent of its gross domestic product on defense. That is woefully inadequate, and the only reason Seoul can get away with such irresponsible behavior is that South Korean leaders believe they can rely on the United States to take care of their country’s security—at the expense of American taxpayers.

That arrangement was dubious even when South Korea was a weak, traumatized country facing a North Korea strongly backed by both the Soviet Union and Communist China. Today, South Korea is a wealthy country, and Moscow and Beijing regard North Korea as an embarrassment, not a crucial ally.

President Obama should inform Lee that an America whose government is hemorrhaging red ink at the rate of $1.5 trillion a year can no longer afford to subsidize the defense of free-riding allies—especially those that are perfectly capable of providing for their own defense. This summit meeting creates an opportunity for Washington to begin phasing-out the obsolete military alliance with South Korea.

Obama-Lee Summit: Time for New Thinking on the Korean Peninsula is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

After weeks of very little movement either militarily or diplomatically in Libya, there are apparent developments on both fronts in recent days. Rebel forces, aided by NATO’s air support, finally appear to be advancing into western Libya and cutting off supply lines to Tripoli, the long-time stronghold of support for Muammar Qaddafi. And reports are swirling about secret negotiations that might provide a peaceful exit from the country for the aging dictator.

Those developments underscore that U.S. and NATO officials urgently need to consider what strategy they intend to pursue if Qaddafi’s more than four-decade hold on power finally comes to an end.  That is more crucial for the leaders of the European members of the alliance, since Libya is located on Europe’s Mediterranean flank, but because the Obama administration unwisely chose to involve the United States in Libya’s internecine conflict by launching air strikes, it has become a pertinent issue for Washington as well.

The outlook for a post-Qaddafi Libya is midpoint between sobering and depressing.  It is possible that the warring parties will accept a de facto division of the country between the eastern and western tribes, although a formal agreement to that effect is unlikely. Even an informal partition would more accurately reflect the demographics, politics, and history of that territory than an insistence on keeping Libya intact. Moreover, the most probable alternatives to a peaceful territorial division would be a continuous, simmering civil war or a rebel victory that would merely breed resentment in the western part of the country and pave the way for a new round of fighting a few years from now.

The NATO powers must confront the question of how much they are willing to assist the insurgents in maintaining control of western Libya once Qaddafi is gone. Prospects are not good that a government formed by the eastern-dominated rebel forces would be able to win even a modest number of influential converts from the western tribes. And if the problem of achieving and maintaining political control was not enough of a challenge for the insurgents and their NATO sponsors, there is the matter of repairing the infrastructure damaged in the fighting and replenishing the now largely empty Libyan treasury.

A new government in Tripoli cannot count on oil revenues in the short or medium term to remedy those problems. Experts estimate that it will be at least three years before oil production can return to pre-war levels.

Libya’s probable security and economic difficulties will create tremendous pressure on NATO to provide extensive financial aid and deploy peacekeeping forces. Therein lies the danger to the United States. Logically, if NATO does deploy ground forces, they should come overwhelmingly from France and some of the other countries bordering the Mediterranean. Those nations have the most at stake in trying to stabilize Libya. NATO members in central and northern Europe (with the exception of Britain) have shown little desire to engage in such a mission. So far, the Obama administration has indicated that the United States will not put ground forces into Libya —a wise exercise in restraint.

But given the financial woes of Italy, France and other key European members of the alliance, and given the habitual desire of the Europeans to off-load security problems onto the United States as NATO’s leader, it is all too likely that we will see a concerted campaign to get Washington’s participation in a post-Qaddafi peacekeeping mission. The Obama administration should firmly reject such overtures.  Washington’s agenda is already more than full with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. And the NATO nation-building missions in Bosnia and Kosovo provide ample evidence that a similar venture in Libya could prove extremely lengthy, expensive, and frustrating. President Obama should resist any temptation to involve the United States further in Libya’s domestic quarrels.

Cross-posted from the National Interest.

U.S. Must Resist Military Role in Post-Qaddafi Libya is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The arrest of Ratko Mladic is a welcome development that should remove the last major obstacle to closer relations between Serbia and the United States and the EU nations.  For too long, the Western powers have placed an excessive emphasis on his apprehension as a condition (explicit or implicit) for Serbia’s full inclusion in the Western community.

If the objections now continue, Serbs will understandably conclude that the Mladic issue was little more than a convenient excuse that Western governments used to justify a less-than-friendly policy toward Belgrade.  An expected improvement in relations now that Mladic has been apprehended is especially pertinent with respect to Serbia’s path toward membership in the European Union.

The arrest will have little substantive impact on prospects for reconciliation in Bosnia-Herzegovina or anywhere else in the former Yugoslavia, however.  The trend in Bosnia over the past year or so is toward renewed tensions rather than reconciliation, and that trend is being driven by factors that have little to do with the Mladic issue.

Ratko Mladic Arrested is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

President Obama’s trip to Latin America is likely to focus on economic topics, but two security issues deserve scrutiny during his stops in Brazil and El Salvador. 

Washington’s diplomatic relationship with Brazil has become somewhat frosty, especially over the past year.  U.S. leaders did not appreciate Brazil’s joint effort with Turkey to craft a compromise policy toward Iran’s nuclear program.  The Obama administration regarded that diplomatic initiative as unhelpful freelancing.  And when Brazil joined Turkey in voting against a UN Security Council resolution imposing stronger sanctions on Tehran, the administration’s resentment deepened.  Obama should not only try to soothe tensions, he should shift Washington’s policy, express appreciation for Brazil’s innovative efforts to end the impasse on the Iranian nuclear issue, and consider whether the milder approach that the Turkish and Brazilian governments advocate has merit.

In El Salvador, worries about Mexico’s spreading drug-related violence into Central America are likely to come up.  El Salvador and other Central American countries are seeking a bigger slice of Washington’s anti-drug aid in the multi-billion-dollar, multiyear Merida Initiative.  President Obama should not only resist such blandishments, he should use the visit to announce a policy shift away from a strict prohibitionist strategy that has filled the coffers of the Mexican drug cartels and sowed so much violence in Mexico, and now increasingly in Central America as well.  Prohibition didn’t work with alcohol and it’s not working any better with currently illegal drugs.

Obama’s Latin America Trip is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Chinese President Hu Jintao arrives in Washington today for a summit meeting with President Obama following spats over economic and military issues that have created a chill in bilateral relations. This follows Secretary Gates’s visit just last week to Beijing for discussions with Defense Ministry officials. On the Huffington Post, I have a piece that looks at the current state of U.S.-China relations in the context of these visits:

“The process of repairing [the U.S.-China relationship] appears to be off to a rocky start. A key objective of Secretary Gates was to get China’s military leadership to agree to a wide-ranging dialogue on strategic issues, including nuclear weapons, ballistic missile defenses, space weapons, and cyber warfare. His hosts rebuffed his initiative, agreeing only to a very limited dialogue on such second-tier issues as combating piracy and cooperating on international peacekeeping missions. Chinese officials indicated that Washington would need some policy changes — especially moderate its willingness to sell arms to Taiwan — before a dialogue on larger strategic issues could take place. The most the Defense Ministry would agree to do in the meantime was “study” Gates’ broader proposal.

“The lack of a meaningful military dialogue frustrates a persistent U.S. goal — to get Beijing to be more transparent regarding both the level of its military spending and the extent of its geopolitical ambitions — especially in East Asia and the Western Pacific. Recent reports of China’s possible breakthroughs in nuclear technology and stealth aircraft have intensified Washington’s concerns.”

The complex U.S.-China relationship has always had elements of both partnership and rivalry. The partnership component has tended to figure more prominently, especially in the economic arena where the benefits to both parties are substantial and widely appreciated. But the balance is now shifting toward the competitive end of the spectrum. There are many reasons for this, including the stress that arises whenever the dominant economic and military player in the international system encounters a rapidly rising great power. However, the current tensions between the United States and China also are the product of the sharply different political systems, histories, cultures, and agendas of the two countries.

The shift to a relationship in which rivalry may top cooperation poses serious challenges for leaders in both countries. Strategic and economic rivalry can easily escalate into viewing the competitor as an adversary, and even an outright enemy. Given the importance of the bilateral relationship, not only for the United States and China, but for the health of the international economic system and the future of global peace, it is imperative that both sides seek to manage and contain their disagreements. The Hu-Obama summit offers an opportunity to advance that process, and one hopes that the two leaders do not waste the opportunity.

Hu’s Visit and U.S.-China Tensions is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

When the United States first invaded Afghanistan, the objective was clear and direct: defeat al Qaeda and oust the Taliban regime that had given the terrorist organization a safe haven from which to plan the 9-11 attacks.   The mission has since become something very different—and utterly impractical.  U.S. officials now stress the goal of supporting an indigenous political structure that will provide security to the Afghan people and implement good governance (apparently under the enlightened leadership of Hamid Karzai and his corrupt henchmen).  Western military and civilian personnel are involved in everything from setting up schools to drilling wells to building roads.  They may avoid using the term nation–building, but that is clearly what is taking place.

Afghanistan is an extremely unpromising candidate for such a mission, given its pervasive poverty, its fractured clan–based and tribal–based social structure, and its weak national identity. Furthermore, U.S. and NATO officials should be sobered by the disappointing outcomes of other recent nation–building ventures.  The two most prominent missions, Bosnia and Iraq, ought to inoculate Americans against pursuing the same fool’s errand in Afghanistan.

The Dayton Accords ended the Bosnian civil war, but Bosnia is no closer to being a viable country than it was in 1995.  It still lacks a meaningful sense of nationhood or even the basic political cohesion and ethnic reconciliation to be an effective state.  If secession were allowed, the overwhelming majority of Bosnian Serbs would vote to detach their self–governing region (the Republika Srpska) from Bosnia and form an independent country or merge with Serbia.  Most of the remaining Croats—who are already deserting the country in droves—would choose to secede and join with Croatia.  Bosnian Muslims constitute the only faction wishing to maintain Bosnia in its current incarnation.

The economic situation is equally bad.  Indeed, without the financial inputs from international aid agencies and the spending by the swarms of international bureaucrats in the country, there would scarcely be a functioning economy at all.

Although Bosnia is a nation–building fiasco, it eventually may be less of a disaster than Iraq.  Americans who cheered the success of the surge strategy, and now swoon at the prospect of General Petraeus achieving a repeat performance in Afghanistan, were premature in their elation.  Tensions are again simmering, both between Sunnis and Shiite Arabs and between Arabs and Kurds, and there have been numerous violent incidents.  Months after national elections, the political squabbling is so bad that Iraqis have been unable to form a new government.

Moreover, Iraq has already ceased to be a unified state.  Baghdad exercises no meaningful power in the Kurdish region in the north.  Indeed, Iraqi Arabs who enter the territory are treated as foreigners—and not especially welcome foreigners.  Although the Kurds have not proclaimed an independent country, the Kurdistan Regional Government rules a de facto state with its own flag, currency, and army.

None of this bodes well for Iraq’s national unity or even stability going forward.  There are already calls by American pundits to abandon—or at least delay—plans for the withdrawal of the remaining U.S. combat forces, lest the country again erupt into chaos.

Despite a 15–year effort and the expenditure of billions of dollars, the Bosnian nation-building mission is a flop.  Despite a seven–year effort (and counting), the expenditure of at least $800 billion, and the sacrifice of more than 4,300 American lives, the Iraq nation-building mission is, at best, a disappointment  Yet, instead of learning from those experiences, U.S. leaders seem intent on pursuing the same chimera in Afghanistan.

Foreign policy, like domestic politics, is the art of the possible.  Containing and weakening al Qaeda may be possible, but building Afghanistan into a modern, democratic country is not.  The increasingly evident failures of nation–building in Bosnia and Iraq—both of which were more promising candidates than Afghanistan—should have taught us that lesson.

C/P at Big Peace

Learning From Our Mistakes: Nation-Building Follies and Afghanistan is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Reports have leaked out over the past week that President Obama will announce that he is sending additional troops into Afghanistan. The only question seems to be whether he will send 30,000, 40,000 or some number in between. That is, frankly, not a very important issue.

And for all of his talk about “off ramps” for the United States if the Afghan government does not meet certain policy targets or “benchmarks,” the reality is that he is escalating our commitment. Since Obama has repeatedly asserted that the war in Afghanistan is a war of necessity, not a war of choice, his talk of off ramps is largely a bluff—and the Afghans probably know it.

There are obvious hazards in equating one historical event with a development in a different setting and time period, but there are a couple of very disturbing similarities between Vietnam and Afghanistan. In both cases, U.S. leaders opted to try to rescue a failing war by sending in more troops. And in both cases, Washington found itself desperately searching for a “credible” leader who could serve as an effective partner in the war effort.

The United States never found such a leader in Vietnam, and was frustrated by a parade of repressive, corrupt, and ineffectual political figures. That experience sounds more than a little like the problem the Bush and Obama administrations have encountered with Afghan President Hamid Karzai and his government. That fact alone suggests that our Afghanistan mission is not likely to turn out well.

Comparing Vietnam and Afghanistan is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Hours after thanking the world for the Nobel Peace Prize this morning, President Obama will gather with his war advisers to ponder sending 60,000 more troops into a country where our national security objectives are unclear at best.

Instead of embracing General McChrystal’s proposal for a substantial increase in the U.S. military presence — or even adopting a “McChrystal-Light” strategy — the Obama administration should begin a phased withdrawal of troops over the next 18 months, retaining only a small military footprint relying on special forces personnel. Otherwise, America will be entangled for years — or decades — in pursuit of unattainable goals.

We need to “define success down” in Afghanistan. That means abandoning any notion of transforming ethnically fractured, pre-industrial Afghanistan into a modern, cohesive nation state. It also means reversing the drift in Washington’s strategy over the past eight years that has gradually made the Taliban (a parochial Pashtun insurgent movement), rather than al Qaeda, America’s primary enemy in Afghanistan. A more modest and realistic strategy means even abandoning the goal of a definitive victory over al Qaeda itself.

Instead, we need to treat the terrorist threat that al Qaeda poses as a chronic, but manageable, security problem. Foreign policy, like domestic politics, is the art of the possible. Containing and weakening al Qaeda may be possible, but sustaining a large-scale, long-term occupation of Afghanistan and creating a modern, democratic country is not.

More here:

For Obama, Peace in the Morning, War in the Afternoon is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The Washington Post reports that despite reports of widespread violence and human rights abuses since Mexico increased its fight against the drug trade, the U.S. government is considering pumping more money to their failing efforts:

The Obama administration has concluded that Mexico is working hard to protect human rights while its army and police battle the drug cartels, paving the way for the release of millions of dollars in additional federal aid.

The Merida Initiative, a three-year, $1.4 billion assistance program passed by Congress to help Mexico fight drug trafficking, requires the State Department to state that the country is taking steps to protect human rights and to punish police officers and soldiers who violate civil guarantees. Congress may withhold 15 percent of the annual funds — about $100 million so far — until the Obama administration offers its seal of approval for Mexico’s reform efforts.

…In recent weeks, after detailed allegations in the media of human rights abuses, the Mexican military said that it has received 1,508 complaints of human rights abuses in 2008 and 2009. It did not say how the cases were resolved, but said that the most serious cases involved forced disappearances, murder, rape, robbery, illegal searches and arbitrary arrests. Human rights groups contend that only a few cases have been successfully prosecuted.

Sending additional anti-drug aid to Mexico is a case of pouring more money into a hopelessly flawed strategy. President Felipe Calderon’s decision to make the military the lead agency in the drug war–a decision the United States backed enthusiastically–has backfired. Not only has that strategy led to a dramatic increase in violence, but contrary to the State Department report, the Mexican military has committed serious human rights abuses. Even worse, the military is now playing a much larger role in the country’s affairs. Until now, Mexico was one of the few nations in Latin America that did not have to worry about the military posing a threat to civilian rule. That can no longer be an automatic assumption.

Washington needs to stop pressuring its neighbor to do the impossible. As long as the United States and other countries foolishly continue the prohibition model with regard to marijuana, cocaine, and other currently illegal drugs, a vast black market premium will exist, and the Mexican drug cartels will grow in power. At a minimum, the United States should encourage Calderon to abandon his disastrous confrontational strategy toward the cartels. Better yet, the United States should take the lead in de-funding the cartels by legalizing drugs and eliminating the multi-billion-dollar black market premium.

More Anti-Drug Aid to Mexico? is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

A wild shootout over the weekend in Acapulco indicates that the drug-related violence in Mexico is spreading.

The Washington Post reports:

Suspected drug traffickers trapped in a safe house fought a furious gun battle with Mexican soldiers early Sunday in the beach resort city of Acapulco. As terrified residents and tourists cowered in their rooms, the firefight raged for two hours, leaving 16 gunmen dead. Two soldiers were also killed and several bystanders were wounded.

The gunmen, suspected members of one of Mexico’s major cartels, threw as many as 50 grenades at the advancing soldiers, and both sides fired thousands of rounds from assault rifles.

Mexican officials have long argued that while there has been serious turmoil in some cities along the border with the United States, the main tourist resort areas are safe. Even before the Acapulco incident, though, events over the past year had cast some doubt on such complacent assurances. A few months ago, a retired general who had just been appointed to direct anti-drug efforts in Cancun was assassinated, and there have been other troubling developments. The main Gulf coast and Pacific resorts are certainly safer than the war zones in such places as Tijuana, Nuevo Laredo, and Ciudad Juarez, but American tourists should not be lulled into thinking that those areas are immune from the drug violence.

President Felipe Calderon’s decision nearly three years ago to launch a military offensive against the drug cartels has backfired. The strategy has not stemmed the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, it has merely caused a spike in the violence and made Mexico a more turbulent, dangerous place for everyone.

Drug Related Gun Battle in Acapulco Leaves 18 Dead is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

This morning in The Wall Street Journal:

The Obama administration’s new drug czar says he wants to banish the idea that the U.S. is fighting “a war on drugs,” a move that would underscore a shift favoring treatment over incarceration in trying to reduce illicit drug use.

…Gil Kerlikowske, the new White House drug czar, signaled Wednesday his openness to rethinking the government’s approach to fighting drug use.

Mr. Kerlikowske’s comments are a signal that the Obama administration is set to follow a more moderate — and likely more controversial — stance on the nation’s drug problems.

…The Obama administration is likely to deal with drugs as a matter of public health rather than criminal justice alone, with treatment’s role growing relative to incarceration, Mr. Kerlikowske said.

Well, that’s at least a modest step in the right direction. However, I want to see how policies change (if they do) under the Obama administration. A change in terminology won’t mean much if the authorities still routinely throw people in jail for violating drug laws.

As for the international war on drugs, everyone in the Washington area is welcome to join us this Friday on Capitol Hill to discuss the consequences of the war on drugs abroad.

White House Czar Calls for End to ‘War on Drugs’ is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Americans who worry that the U.S. military has been stretched to the breaking point to wage the endless war in Iraq and fulfill a vast and growing number of commitments around the world can rest easy.  Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has found a vast new pool of military personnel–in Montenegro.  Skeptics might point out that Montenegro has a population of 630,000, and may, therefore, not be much help on the manpower front.  But such people are just the chronic defeatists we hear so much about. 

Admittedly, it might seem a tad humiliating for the secretary of defense of the world’s sole remaining superpower to go, hat in hand, to a tiny country and ask for military assistance.  But when said superpower insists on fighting unnecessary and counterproductive wars, it can’t let pride get in the way of seeking aid.  With Iraq and Afghanistan both heating up, though, we need more realistic options than to court mini-states as strategic partners.

Military Manpower Problem Solved! is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The Democratic Party’s most notorious hawk has struck again.

During the NATO military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, Sen. Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) embraced the notorious Kosovo Liberation Army, asserting that “fighting for the KLA is fighting for human rights and American values” (Linda Wheeler, “Marchers Strut Support for Independent Kosovo,” Washington Post, April 28, 1999). The KLA-dominated government in Kosovo has since proven his point by ethnically cleansing more than 240,000 Serb and other non-Albanian inhabitants of the province.

Lieberman has now brought his acute powers of analysis to bear again. Responding to the disruption of the latest terror plot in the UK, he opined that Islamic terrorists pose an even greater threat to America’s security than did the Soviet communists during the Cold War.

That comment exhibits historical illiteracy. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union was the world’s number two military power. Its conventional forces could have overrun Europe and condemned hundreds of millions of additional people to communist slavery. Its arsenal of thousands of nuclear weapons was capable of killing tens of millions of Americans and effectively ending American civilization. The USSR was a strategic threat of the first magnitude.

Al Qaeda and other Islamic terrorists are certainly scary, but their ability to cause destruction and loss of life is decidedly more limited. We need to remember that terrorism is the strategy of weak forces, not strong ones. The terrorists killed some 3,000 people on September 11. Subsequent incidents, such as those in Bali, Madrid, Istanbul, London, and Mumbai, have each killed dozens or hundreds more. That is certainly tragic, but it doesn’t begin to compare to the number of deaths caused by the Soviet Union and its communist allies during the Cold War in various wars, much less to the deaths that would have occurred if the Cold War had erupted into World War III.

Lieberman’s scare mongering — and the similar tactics of others who hype the threat by saying that we’re already in World War III (or IV–or V!) — is profoundly unhelpful. We need to keep the terrorist threat in perspective (pdf).

Lieberman Mangles History — Again is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The Washington Times reports that U.S. military commanders believe American forces will be needed in Iraq until at least 2016.

There often are bad ideas in the arena of foreign policy. Sometimes there are very bad ideas. Occasionally, there are even monumentally bad ideas. Staying in the Iraqi snake pit for another decade belongs in the third category. As Cato scholars explain here, here, here and here, the Bush administration needs to adopt a strategy for a prompt exit from this unnessary and ill-conceived mission.

We need to have our forces out of Iraq in a matter of months, not years. And no reasonable person should want to keep our troops in harm’s way for another decade. Given the casualty rates during the first three years of this war, staying until 2016 would mean another 8,000 dead Americans. At that point, U.S. fatalities in Iraq would exceed the number the Soviet Union suffered during its ill-fated intervention in Afghanistan during the 1980s.

Remaining in Iraq for another decade while the country descends into sectarian civil war is a policy that should appeal only to masochists.

Entangled in Iraq until 2016? is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Rumors continue to swirl that North Korea is about to conduct a test of its long-range Taepodong 2 missile, which would be capable of reaching targets in the United States. The prospect of Pyongyang having not only a small nuclear arsenal but the means eventually to deliver such weapons at great distances has understandably generated agitated commentary in the United States and East Asia.

The latest entry is a Washington Post op-ed by former Clinton administration defense department officials Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry. Carter and Perry suggest that if the North Koreans do not heed U.S. warnings to refrain from conducting the missile test, the Bush administration should launch preemptive air strikes to take out the missile while it is still on the launch pad. Surprisingly, Vice President Dick Cheney rejected their idea.

It is clear that extremist and reckless proposals have come to dominate a policy debate when Dick Cheney is the resident dove. The Carter-Perry article provides more evidence (as if we needed it) that foreign policy irresponsibility is not confined to neoconservatives in the Republican Party.

Those who propose attacking North Korea need to sit down and take a deep breath. First of all, the rumors about a missile test may or may not be true. On at least two occasions since Pyongyang announced a moratorium on testing in 1999, there have been reports that the test of a long-range missile was imminent. Those reports proved unfounded. This one may as well.

Even if North Korea does conduct a test of the Taepodong 2, it is not the end of the world. Granted, every sensible person would wish that the weird hermit kingdom did not have either nuclear weapons or long-range missiles. But the United States has thousands of nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them with pinpoint accuracy. We’ve deterred other weird regimes in the past, most notably Stalinist Russia and Maoist China. We should be able to deter the likes of Kim Jong-il. The North Korean regime, while bizarre and brutally repressive, has never shown signs of suicidal behavior. And attacking a nation that possesses thousands of nukes would definitely be suicidal.

The decision to launch preemptive air strikes would certainly be more dangerous than relying on deterrence. If the Bush administration follows the advice of Carter and Perry and attacks North Korea, it could easily trigger a general war on the Korean Peninsula. The last Korean war cost the lives of millions of Koreans and more than 50,000 Americans. We should spurn any proposal that risks a repetition. 

Dick Cheney is right to be a dove on this issue. One only wishes that the viewpoint becomes habit forming. 

Dick Cheney, Dove? is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The Associated Press reports that 16 Afghan soldiers have just graduated from a new program at Fort Bliss that trained them to fly helicopters in drug eradication campaigns. They will now return to their homeland, the world’s top opium producer.

Washington’s increasing pressure on the government of Afghan President Hamid Karzai to wage a vigorous war on drugs is the latest installment in a prohibitionist strategy that has failed for decades. The international drug war is a terrible policy wherever it is tried, but it is an especially unwise venture in Afghanistan. As a recent Cato Institute policy study notes, the drug trade accounts for more than a third of that country’s economic output. Regional warlords who originally backed the Taliban and Al Qaeda but switched their allegiance to the Karzai government derive much of their revenue from the opium trade. Even more important, hundreds of thousands of Afghan farmers base their livelihood on drug crops. They will not look kindly on the Karzai government if it tries to drive their families into destitution.

U.S. policymakers need to keep their priorities straight. Our overriding objective in Afghanistan should be to eliminate the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. The drug war undermines that objective and may drive otherwise friendly Afghans into the arms of our enemies. There is a troubling correlation between the upsurge of violence in Afghanistan in recent months and the intensification of drug-eradication efforts during that same period. Indeed, the upsurge has been greatest in the main drug-producing provinces.

Even those Americans who remain wedded to a prohibitionist policy as a general principle ought to realize that an exception needs to be made in Afghanistan. Otherwise, the Taliban-Al Qaeda insurgency will grow, and we will replicate the Iraq debacle in that country, too.

Afghan Drug War Follies is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The government of Taiwanese president Chen Shui-bian has proposed a surprisingly large (20 percent) increase in the island’s defense budget. It is a modest, long-overdue step toward enhancing Taiwan’s ability to deter military coercion from China. Yet, it merely boosts spending from a absurdly anemic 2.5 percent of GDP to a still anemic 3 percent.

The Taiwanese need to do far more–for their best interests and ours. Beijing maintains that Taiwan is merely a renegade province, and Chinese leaders in recent years have become increasingly vocal about using military force, if necessary, to compel reunification. As I explain in my latest book, Washington’s implicit commitment to help defend the island places this country right in the middle of a looming armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait sometime in the next decade. Although Americans can and should sympathize with the plight of a plucky democracy facing possible conquest by a dictatorial neighbor, maintaining the island’s de facto independence is not a vital American interest. It certainly is not worth risking war with a nuclear-armed China.

Taiwan’s inadequate commitment to its own defense encourages China to contemplate coercion, thereby increasing America’s risk exposure. Unfortunately, even the Chen government’s tepid proposal to boost military spending may not become reality. Chen’s approval rating in his country is even lower than George Bush’s rating in the United States. Even worse, the national legislature is controlled by the opposition Kuomintang Party and its ally, the People First Party. Their obstructionism has blocked for nearly 5 years funding of an arms package offered by the United States in 2001. The KMT and PFP apparently believe that Taiwan’s defense budget should consist of money to purchase a telephone to call Washington in the event of a crisis and urge the United States to send planes, ships, and troops forthwith. They are the ultimate security free riders.

U.S. officials should stress to Taiwanese of all political persuasions the need to get serious about their own defense. The most effective way to do that is to make it clear that the American cavalry is not about to ride to the rescue if trouble breaks out between Taiwan and China.

Is Taiwan Finally Getting Serious about Defense? is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Mexico’s Congress has just passed legislation that would decriminalize the possession of small quantities of illegal drugs. If President Vicente Fox signs the legislation (and it appears that he will), Mexico will join the ranks of the Netherlands and several other countries that have abandoned the “zero tolerance” model embraced by the United States. Under the new law, possession of up to 25 milligrams of heroin, 5 grams of marijuana (about four joints) or 0.5 grams of cocaine (about 4 “lines”), for personal use would no longer be a criminal offense.

That legislation is a step in the right direction. One of more odious features of the war on drugs is the practice of filling the jails with small-time (often recreational) users. But Mexico’s proposed decriminalization measure does not get to the root of the growing problems of drug-related corruption and violence in that society. As I have documented in my book Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington’s Futile War on Drugs in Latin America and more recently in a Foreign Policy Briefing, Mexico Is Becoming the Next Colombia, most of those problems are caused by the enormous black market premium in the illicit drug trade. Unfortunately, Mexican leaders show no willingness to legalize the manufacture or sale of marijuana, cocaine, and other drugs. Indeed, they have argued that the new law will enable law enforcement agencies to devote more resources to supressing trafficking. That means the huge potential profit in the drug trade will persist—and so will the corruption and violence that is tearing Mexico’s society apart.

The new law is a small step in the right direction. But Mexico (and other countries) need to abandon the entire prohibition model to produce truly meaningful benefits.

Two Very Restrained Cheers for Mexico’s New Drug Law is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog