Archive for the ‘Law and Civil Liberties’ Category
Holder on the Hot Seat
Today Politico Arena asks:
Terror suspects: Eric Holder’s defense (nothing new here)–agree or disagree?
My response:
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; General; Law and Civil Liberties
Socialists Shouldn’t Have to Admit Libertarians Into Their Club
Hastings College of the Law, a public law school in California, has a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disabilities, age, sex or sexual orientation.” In 2004, the Christian Legal Society, a religious student organization at the school, applied to become a “recognized student organization” — a designation that would have allowed CLS to receive a variety of benefits afforded to about 60 other Hastings groups. While all are welcome to attend CLS meetings, CLS’s charter requires that its officers and voting members abide by key tenets of the Christian faith and comport themselves in ways consistent with its fundamental mission, which includes a prohibition on “unrepentant” sexual conduct outside of marriage between one man and one woman.
Hastings denied CLS registration on the asserted ground that this charter conflicts with the school’s nondiscrimination policy. CLS sued Hastings, asking for no different treatment than is given to any registered student group. The district court granted Hastings summary judgment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Hastings’s refusal to grant CLS access to student organization benefits amounted to viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible under the First Amendment.
Yesterday Cato filed an amicus brief supporting CLS — authored by preeminent legal scholar Richard Epstein – in which we argue that CLS’s right to intimate and expressive association trump any purported state interest in enforcing a school nondiscrimination policy. While Hastings may impose reasonable restrictions on access to limited public forums, it should not be allowed to admit speakers with one point of view while excluding speakers who hold different views. Our brief also discredits Hastings’s assertion that its ability to exclude the public at large from school premises renders their content-based speech restrictions constitutional.
We urge the Court to safeguard public university students’ right to form groups – which by definition exclude people – free from government interference or censorship. (Of course, our first choice would be for the government to get out of the university business and our second choice would be to stop forcing taxpayers to pay for student clubs, but given those two realities — as in the case at hand – freedom of association is the way to go.)
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties; Political Philosophy
Liberty, Even for People You Don’t Like
In a conversation about “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Peter Sprigg of the Family Research Council admitted that he wants to re-criminalize sodomy:
…which is easy for him to say, of course, because he’s unlikely to be affected by the law. As someone who is likely to be affected by the law, I’m tempted to criminalize Peter Sprigg. Liberty is never more negotiable than when it’s liberty for someone you don’t like.
What is it that I don’t like? I don’t like putting people in cages. Whenever we can reasonably avoid it, we should. Liberty means liberty even for people we think are weird, or disgusting, or immoral — provided that they do not hurt us or our own legitimate interests. Lawrence v. Texas, for which the Cato Institute filed an amicus brief, is one of the most important expressions of this idea in our time.
Once liberty applies only to the things that we like, we have abandoned the true idea of liberty entirely. From that point on, you and I, as enforcers, must cling ever more tightly to arbitrary power. If we don’t, then someone else may come along, take that power, and criminalize us. A free society leaves the misfits alone, because sooner or later, everyone is a misfit, in some way or another.
Look Who’s Talking Now
Today Politico Arena asks:
Should officials be talking about the Christmas-day bomber talking and what does it prove?
My response:
Amid growing bipartisan criticism of the Obama administration’s handling of the Christmas Day bombing, the Manhattan KSM trial, and much else in its approach to terrorism, it’s pretty clear that the White House put out the news last evening that Abdulmutallab is now talking simply to quiet that criticism. After all, that’s a story only because Abdulmutallab had not been talking. And why wasn’t he talking? Because shortly after he was arrested and briefly questioned by agents with no terrorism-related expertise, he was Mirandized and lawyered up, like any common criminal — consistent with the Obama administration’s law-enforcement approach to terrorism. And so he clammed up — and we were now put in the unseemly position of having to bargain with him to get intelligence. If this issue were not so serious, you’d have to call the Obama-Holder operation the Keystone Cops.
When Individuals Form Corporations, They Don’t Lose Their Rights
The blogosphere has been abuzz on the heels of the Supreme Court’s landmark Citizens United opinion. Hysteric criticisms of the speculative changes to our political landscape aside — including the President’s misstatements in the State of the Union — one of the most common and oft-repeated criticisms is that the Constitution does not protect corporations. Several “reform” groups have even drafted and circulated constitutional amendments to address this concern.
This line of attack demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both the nature of corporations and the freedoms protected by the Constitution, which is exemplified by the facile charge that “corporations aren’t human beings.”
Well of course they aren’t — but that’s constitutionally irrelevant: Corporations aren’t “real people” in the sense that the Constitution’s protection of sexual privacy or prohibition on slavery make no sense in this context, but that doesn’t mean that corporate entities also lack, say, Fourth Amendment rights. Or would the “no rights for corporations” crowd be okay with the police storming their employers’ offices and carting off their (employer-owned) computers for no particular reason? — or to chill criticism of some government policy.
Or how about Fifth Amendment rights? Can the mayor of New York exercise eminent domain over Rockefeller Center by fiat and without compensation if he decides he’d like to move his office there?
So corporations have to have some constitutional rights or nobody would form them in the first place. The reason they have these rights isn’t because they’re “legal” persons, however — though much of the doctrine builds on that technical point — but instead because corporations are merely one of the ways in which rights-bearing individuals associate to better engage in a whole host of constitutionally protected activity.
That is, the Constitution protects these groups of rights-bearing individuals. The proposition that only human beings, standing alone, with no group affiliation whatsoever, are entitled to First Amendment protection — that “real people” lose some of their rights when they join together in groups of two or ten or fifty or 100,000 — is legally baseless and has no grounding in the Constitution. George Mason law professor Ilya Somin, also a Cato adjunct scholar, discusses this point here.
In any event, as Chief Justice Roberts said in his Citizens United concurrence: “The First Amendment protects more than just the individual on a soapbox and the lonely pamphleteer.” Justice Scalia makes the same point, explaining that the text of the Constitution “makes no distinction between types of speakers.” The New York Times isn’t “an individual American” but its speech is still protected under the First Amendment (regardless of any exemption for “media corporations” — whatever those are in a world where conglomerates own interests not limited to media, not to mention the advent of blogs and other “new” media).
A related line of attack is that individuals acting through corporations should be denied their freedom of speech because corporations are “state-created entities.” The theory goes that if a state has the power to create corporations, then it has the power to define those entities’ rights. Somin rebuts the weakness of this argument here, correctly pointing out that nearly every newspaper and political journal in the country is a corporation.
In short, the contention that the First Amendment does not protect corporations ignores the fact that there is no constitutional difference between individuals and groups of individuals, however organized. Still, I give credit to the groups who are proposing constitutional amendments that would limit corporate rights: at least they recognize that, after Citizens United, there is no basis upon which to argue that the First Amendment does not protect corporate political speech. The Free Speech Clause, after all, is blind as to the nature of the speaker.
For further concise refutations of the basic arguments against Citizens United, see here (points 3-6 address issues relating to corporations and their rights).
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
Retroactive Surveillance Immunity, Obama Style
There’s a lot to unpack in the Office of the Inspector General’s blistering 300-page report on illegal FBI abuse of surveillance authority issued last month, but I want to highlight one especially worrisome aspect, about which I spoke with The Atlantic’s Marc Ambinder earlier today.
The very short version of the report’s background finding is that, for several years, analysts at the FBI blithely and illegally circumvented even the minimal checks on their power to demand telephone records under the PATRIOT Act. I’ll go into this further in a future post, but there are strong indicators that the agents involved knew they were doing something shady. Thousands of records were obtained using a basically made-up process called an “exigent letter” wherein they ask for records with what amounts to an IOU promising legitimate legal process any day now. (In many of those cases, the legitimate legal process would not actually have been available for the records obtained.) Still more disturbing, an unknown number of records were obtained without even this fictitious process: Agents simply made informal requests verbally, by e-mail, or via post-it note. And hey, why bother with subponeas or National Security Letters when you can just slap a sticky on someone’s monitor?
Treated to a preview of the OIG’s damning conclusions, the FBI was eager to find some way to cover its massive lawbreaking. So they apparently crafted a novel legal theory after the fact, in hopes of finding some way to shoehorn their actions into federal privacy statutes. On January 8—as in four weeks ago, years after the conduct occurred—the Office of Legal Counsel seems to have blessed the FBI’s theory, which unfortunately remains secret. Democratic Sens. Russ Feingold, Dick Durbin, and Ron Wyden have asked the Justice Department for details, but at present we just don’t know what kind of loopholes DOJ believes exist in the law meant to protect our sensitive calling records.
Communications records are generally protected by Chapter 121 of Title 18, known to its buddies as the Stored Communications Act. The few snippets of unredacted material in the OIG report suggest that the FBI’s argument is that the statute does not apply to certain classes of call records. Presumably, the place to look for the loophole is in §2702, which governs voluntary disclosures by telecom firms. There is, of course, an exemption for genuine emergencies—imminent threats to life and limb—but these, we know, are not at issue here because most of the records were not sought in emergency situations. But there are a number of other loopholes. The statute governs companies providing electronic communications services “to the public”—which encompasses your cell company and your ISP, but probably not the internal networks of your university or employer. The activity at issue here, however, involved the major telecom carriers, so that’s probably not it. There’s another carve-out for records obtained with the consent of the subscriber, which might cover certain government employees who’ve signed off on surveillance as a condition of employment. We do know that in some cases, the records obtained had to do with leak investigations, but that doesn’t seem especially likely either, since the FBI claims (though the OIG expresses its doubts about the veracity of the claim) that the justification would apply to the “majority” of records obtained.
My current best guess, based on what little we know, is this. The SCA refers to, and protects from disclosure to any “government entity,” the records of “customers” and “subscribers.” But telecommunications firms may often have records about the calling activity of people who are not the customers or subscribers of that company. For example, reciprocal agreements between carriers will often permit a phone that’s signed up with one cell provider to make use of another company’s network while roaming. When these outside phones register on a network, that information goes to a database called the Visitor Location Register. You could imagine a clever John Yoo type arguing that the SCA does not cover information in the VLR, since it does not constitute a “subscriber” or “customer” record. Of course, it beggars belief to think that Congress intended to allow such a loophole—or, indeed, had even considered such technical details of cell network architecture.
My guess, to be sure, could be wrong. But that just points to the larger problem: The Justice Department believes that some very clever lawyerly reading of the privacy statutes—so very clever that despite the rampant “creativity” of the Bush years, they only just came up with it a few weeks ago—permits the FBI to entirely circumvent all the elaborate systems of checks and balances in place (or so we thought) to protect our calling records. If investigators can write themselves secret exemptions from the clear intent of the law, then all the ongoing discussion about reform and reauthorization of the PATRIOT Act amounts to a farcical debate about where to place the fortifications along the Maginot Line.
Filed under: Law and Civil Liberties; Telecom, Internet & Information Policy
The Unrelenting Battle over Campaign Finance
Following on the heels of November’s gubernatorial elections in Virginia and New Jersey, the loss of Ted Kennedy’s Senate seat in Massachusetts two weeks ago was a devastating blow to Democratic Party hopes. But it must have been especially devastating to President Obama, who promised an adoring University of Missouri crowd, just before he was elected, that “We are five days away from fundamentally transforming the United States of America.” Yet it would appear, judging from the unrelenting commentary and from the president’s own behavior last week, that those losses pale in comparison to the government’s loss before the Supreme Court two days after the polls closed in Massachusetts. For 11 days now the wailing over the Court’s Citizens United decision has not ceased. Indeed, campaign finance regulation, intimately connected to incumbency protection, is a bedrock principle of modern liberalism.
Exhibit A is E.J. Dionne’s column today in the Washington Post — his second in a week on the subject. Last week, railing against the “reckless decision by Chief Justice John Roberts’s Supreme Court and the greed of the nation’s financial barons,” he charged the Court with “an astonishing display of judicial arrogance, overreach and unjustified activism” and urged “a new populist-progressive alliance” to demand “legislation to turn back the Supreme Court’s effort to undermine American democracy” — including a bill prohibiting political spending by corporations who hire lobbyists, no less.
Today, however, Dionne has last Wednesday’s unseemly episode of Obama rebuking a silent Supreme Court to work with. And, like the immortal Daniel Schorr on yesterday’s NPR Sunday Morning, he puts all the blame on Justice Samuel Alito for seeming to mouth, silently, “Not true” when Obama, before all assembled and a watching nation, tendentiously misstated the holding in Citizens United. But Dionne doesn’t stop there, of course. No, he thanks Alito. You see, “Alito’s inability to restrain himself” brought a long-ignored truth to the nation: “The Supreme Court is now dominated by a highly politicized conservative majority intent on working its will, even if that means ignoring precedents and the wishes of the elected branches of government.” Likening Obama’s behavior to President Reagan’s writing a 1983 article criticizing Roe v. Wade — I didn’t make that up – Dionne chastises conservatives for their double standard: “Reagan had every right to say what he did. But why do conservatives deny the same right to Obama?” Where does one begin?
Turning finally to “the specifics of Obama’s indictment,” Dionne tries to defend the president’s misstatements, but unfortunately the precision ordinarily expected of such a wordsmith seems to have deserted him. Citing Obama’s claim that the Court had reversed “a century of law” and also opened “the floodgates for special interests — including foreign corporations,” Dionne writes that ”Obama was not simply referring to court precedents but also to the 1907 Tillman Act, which banned corporate money in electoral campaigns.” That’s not what the Tillman Act did: It banned direct corporate contributions to campaigns. Only in 1947 were independent campaign expenditures by corporations (and unions) banned — and more clearly so only in 1990, which is the ban the Court overturned. Moreover, pace Obama, foreign corporations are still specifically banned from contributing anything of value “in connection with a Federal, State or local election.” Thus, in claiming, without more, ”that the ruling opens a loophole for domestic corporations under foreign control to make unlimited campaign expenditures,” Dionne seems simply to be passing along what he’s read or heard from others. Nothing in the Court’s opinion warrants that conclusion.
But it’s Dionne’s larger claim that most demands an answer — that an “activist” Roberts Court, exercising “raw judicial power,” is ”ignoring precedents and the wishes of the elected branches of government.” That’s hardly the definition of “activism.” That’s what the Court should be doing, where it’s warranted by the Constitution, whether the Court is defending the rights of blacks to attend unsegregated schools or of gays to sexual freedom or of corporate owners, the shareholders, to engage in political speech through their corporation consistent with their articles of incorporation and by-laws. The claim that corporations aren’t people is a red herring. Corporate owners are people, and their right to speak can take many forms. Fortunately, we have a First Amendment, which protects not only corporate owners but E.J. himself from all but the error of his ways.
[Cross-posted at Politico Arena]
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
Manhattan Says No to Terror Trials
Today, Politico Arena asks:
Terror trials: Is it time for the administration to retreat and rethink? Is it generally mishandling the terrorism issue?
My response:
On no issue is President Obama getting acquainted with reality more clearly than terrorism, or so it seems. He blazed into office, guns holstered, as the anti-Bush, putting Eric Holder’s Justice Department in charge, not of the War on Terror, a phrase he banished from his administration’s lexicon, but of “bringing those who planned and plotted the [9/11] attacks to justice,” as Holder put it in November when he announced that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and four others would be given civilian trials in downtown Manhattan. But as the manifold costs of such a trial became increasingly apparent, and as even New York Democrats have grown increasingly restive, the White House, it seems, has backed down. We await the line of congressmen saying “Bring the trial to my district.”
How could it be otherwise? The administration’s law-enforcement approach to terrorism has been unserious and folly from the start. In an understated yet devastating piece in yesterday’s Washington Post, former CIA director Michael V. Hayden cataloged that folly, nowhere more evident than in the FBI’s handling of the would-be Christmas Day bomber, who was Mirandized and lawyered up long before he could be seriously interrogated by agents with the background to elicit the intelligence we need — not to prosecute terrorists, but to prevent future terrorist attacks. The most telling revelation in Hayden’s piece came at the end, however. In August, the government unveiled its High Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG) designed to interrogate people like the Christmas Day bomber, and it announced also that the FBI would begin questioning CIA officers about alleged abuses in the 2004 inspector general’s report. Was the HIG called in to interrogate the Christmas Day bomber? No — it has yet to be formed. But the interrogations of CIA officers are proceeding apace. So much for the administration’s priorities. Is it any wonder that Scott Brown’s pollsters report that terrorism, and the administration’s mishandling of the issue, polled better even than Brown’s opposition to ObamaCare?
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
The Next Step after Citizens United
The debates following the Citizens United decision continue, thanks in part to President Obama’s criticism of the U.S. Supreme Court during the State of the Union address. Keeping track of those debates might cause you to miss what may well turn out to be the next step in liberalizing our campaign finance laws, the case of SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission which was argued last Wednesday before the entire U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.
SpeechNow is a group of individuals with a clear mission: “SpeechNow would like to run advertisements urging voters to elect federal candidates who support full protections for First Amendment rights and to defeat candidates who are hostile to those rights.” The group has made sure that its members are independent of candidates for office and the political parties.
You would think they could set up the group and spend as they wish since SpeechNow is not tied to a candidate or party and hence cannot pose a threat of corruption. After all, the First Amendment protects speech by individuals, and the courts have only permitted regulations related to corruption (contribution limits) or public education (mandatory disclosure of spending).
Unfortunately federal law requires any groups that receives contributions of more than $1,000 during a calendar year or spends more than $1,000 during a year to register as a “political committee.” That status would mean disclosure of SpeechNow’s members and limits on contributions and spending. Fulfilling reporting and other requirements and observing the contribution limits would kill SpeechNow’s effort before it started. No group, no ads, no speech.
The Federal Election Commission argues that allowing speech by SpeechNow’s members would lead to corruption. Elected officials, they assert, will reward people who support favored speech even if those people are independent of a candidate or a party. Justice John Paul Stevens endorsed this corruption argument in Citizens United. He was dissenting and had the support of a minority of his fellow justices. The judges who heard the case for the circuit court seemed to believe Citizens United had weakened this sort of corruption argument.
Citizens United limited the power of the federal government over independent expenditures and speech by groups taking a corporate form. The reasoning in that case should apply with added force to individuals associating together to speak, individuals who have no ties to candidates or the political parties.
We’ll keep you up-to-date on the fortunes of the SpeechNow effort. For now, you can read more about the case at the Institute for Justice website or see an account of the circuit court hearing here.
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
An Appalling Breach of Decorum
This morning, Politico Arena invites comments on Obama’s SOTU attack on the Supreme Court.
My response:
I join my Arena colleagues, Professors Bradley Smith and Randy Barnett, in condemning the president’s remarks last night singling out the Supreme Court for its Citizens United decision last week, which overturned law that the government itself admitted would even have banned books. Not only was Obama’s behavior an appalling breach of decorum, but he didn’t even get his facts right. As Brad, former FCC chairman, noted in his Arena post last night, and a bit more fully here, the decision did nothing to upset law that prohibits foreigners, including foreign corporations, from contributing anything of value to an American election. Obama, the sometime constitutional law professor, should have known that. At the least, his aides had plenty of time to research the question before he spoke. This is just one more example of the gross incompetence or, worse, the indifference to plain fact that we’ve seen in this administration.
But it’s the breach of decorum that most appalls. By constitutional design, the Supreme Court is the non-political branch of government. Like members of the military, Supreme Court justices are invited to the State of the Union event, but they do not stand and applaud when the president makes political points that bring others to their feet. For the president to have singled the justices out for criticism, while others around them stood and applauded as they sat there still, is simply demagoguery at its worst. I would not be surprised if the justices declined next year’s invitation. And Obama wanted to change the tone in Washington? He sure has.
Fresh Surveillance Data Show Spike in Traffic Tracking
The Department of Justice is required to report annually to Congress on its use of an array of surveillance tools. These include so-called “pen register” and “trap-and-trace” orders (often combined as “pen/trap orders”), which give investigators realtime access to traffic data from a target’s telephone or e-mail/Internet accounts. In combination with another type of court order, these are sometimes used to gather location tracking data on cellular users, but they’re primarily used to establish patterns of communication—to determine who the target is in contact with, and when. (Those in contact with the target may then come under further scrutiny.)
Unfortunately, there’s been no public reporting on the use of pen-traps since a five-year dump the Justice Department submitted in 2004. It’s not clear whether Congress, at least, has been getting them—other such surveillance reports are typically posted on the DOJ Web site—but thanks to intrepid privacy researcher Chris Soghoian and the Freedom of Information Act, we now have statistics on the use of pen-trap orders. In 2002, the federal government sought 4103 pen register orders (affecting 6540 people’s phone lines). By 2008, that number had risen to a whopping 11,126 pen register orders (affecting 13,998 people’s phones)—in other words, an increase of more than 171%. Bear in mind, that’s 13,998 people having their call behavior monitored in realtime, just at the federal level, and not counting foreign intelligence pen/traps under FISA. (I nevertheless use the first full year after 9/11 as a comparison point, since one might expect an uptick in terror-related criminal investigations.) It’s also not counting government requests for people’s historical call records—records that USA Today reported in 2006 were being vacuumed into a massive database by the tens of millions.
As the graph makes clear, it has also become more common for agencies to routinely obtain trap-and-trace orders (for data on incoming calls) when they obtain a pen register order (for outgoing calls), though the extent of the increase may be exaggerated because the U.S. Marshals Service, which appears to get combined pen/trap orders by default, did not provide separate statistics for trap-and-trace requests prior to 2004. The Justice Department also now appears to have begun tracking orders for e-mail and electronic networks, though it’s unclear whether these are being counted separately or represent a subset of the general pen/trap figures. In 2008, the FBI, DEA, and U.S. Marshals Service reported a total of 208 such orders.
What explains that substantial spike, at a lag of several years after 9/11? One possibility is that increasingly sophisticated tools for social network analysis and pattern-based data mining have made pen/trap orders a more valuable tool—or at least made them appear more valuable to investigators—for ferreting out suspicious patterns or uncovering organizational structures. Fans of the justly-celebrated HBO series The Wire may recall the episode “Back Burners,” in which Detective Lester Freamon shows a map of the Stanfield crew’s communication patterns, suggesting that it’s typical of a drug-dealing organization. There’s another technological angle to consider: If automation and digitization of the request process make it relatively painless to get pen/trap data, agents may be more likely to request more of them.
Intriguingly, the U.S. Marshals Service accounts for a huge proportion of the increase. In 2002, they sought only 556 pen registers (compared with 1703 for the FBI and 1841 for DEA). That had grown nearly tenfold by 2008, to a stunning 5475 (far more than the 2092 sought by FBI or 3260 for DEA). This, surely, is the figure that most cries out for further inquiry. Why is the USMS doing ten times the amount of traffic surveillance they conducted in 2002? I’ve put in a query with their public affairs office, but I’d encourage any enterprising reporters out there to follow up as well.
NRA Cares More about NRA Than Gun Rights, Liberty, Professional Courtesy
Yesterday the Supreme Court granted the NRA’s motion for divided argument in McDonald v. Chicago. What this means is that Alan Gura’s 30 minutes of argument time on behalf of Chicagoland gun owners just became 20, with 10 going to former Solicitor General Paul Clement, whom the NRA hired at the last minute to pursue this motion and argument. (Full disclosure: Alan Gura is a friend of mine, and of Cato.)
The NRA’s motion was premised on the idea that Alan had not fully presented the substantive due process argument for selective incorporation of the Second Amendment — presumably out of an outsized concern for the Privileges or Immunities Clause arguments about which I’ve previously blogged and written a law review article. This is a highly unusual argument and is a facial slap at Alan’s abilities as an advocate. Sadly, it’s also typical of how the NRA has behaved throughout this case and before that during the Heller litigation — sabotaging Alan at every turn and showing again and again that, even in the face of winning arguments that fully support its legal positions, the NRA prefers to seek glory for itself rather than presenting the strongest case for its purported constituency of gun owners.
Alan rightfully opposed the NRA’s motion because the group’s participation at argument adds nothing substantive to the case. No one will ever know why the motion was granted, as the Court need not (and did not) provide any reasons. Nonetheless, it’s a safe bet that this is solely a testament to Clement’s talent and reputation (notably, the motion was not filed by any of the NRA’s other excellent attorneys, who briefed and argued their case in the lower courts and in a cert petition and brief before the Supreme Court).
I have great respect for Paul Clement, and have worked with him by filing amicus briefs in two cases he’s already argued this term, but I do take issue with his repeated suggestion that the motion’s purpose — and the reason behind its granting — was so that “all the avenues to incorporation, including the due process clause, are fully explored at the argument.” This kind of comment — again impugning Alan’s litigation strategy — is uncalled for, and renews concerns over the NRA’s conduct.
Throughout this case, Alan has consistently and forcefully advocated for the Second Amendment’s incorporation under the Due Process Clause. That didn’t change when his case was taken up by the Supreme Court. The thing is that the due process arguments are not all that complex, and simply do not merit the same care and attention in the briefs as arguments based on the Constitution’s actual text and history. A first-year law student who’s taken constitutional law – let alone a Supreme Court clerk – could write a due process incorporation argument in her sleep! In any event, the oral argument will be driven by the justices’ questions, not by any long soliloquies by counsel. Alan’s — and all attorneys’ — job is to be ready for anything.
If the NRA were concerned about the final outcome of the case, it would be unlikely to attack Alan’s strategy or question his preparation (an odd way to be “helpful” to one’s side). It is not a stretch to predict that this case will be favorably decided at least in part on due process grounds, however, so what we are seeing here is likely an attempt by the NRA to position itself as responsible for such a victory – and that Alan isn’t.
Ultimately, then, the NRA is engaging here in fundraising, not liberty-promotion or ethical lawyering.
The Case of the Missing Evidence
Last fall, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals reinstated a lawsuit against Arizona’s K-12 scholarship donation tax credit program. Under the program, citizens can donate to non-profit organizations that help families pay for private school tuition, and in return, the donors receive a dollar-for-dollar tax cut. The 9th Circuit, ruled that the program violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, because many taxpayers choose to donate to religious scholarship-granting organizations whose scholarships are only usable at religious schools. This, in the Court’s view, meant that the program unconstitutionally favored religious scholarship-seeking parents over secular ones.
Supporters of the program will soon be appealing this decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. They’re very likely to win, for a variety of reasons. Foremost among them, the Establishment Clause forbids only governments from favoring religion, but imposes no similar limit on individual citizens. It is for this reason that charitable tax deductions can be claimed for donations to both religious and secular charities without running afoul of the First Amendment — even if taxpayers overwhelmingly choose to donate to religious charities.
In rereading the original complaint, I noticed something interesting: even if the 9th Circuit’s misconstrual of the Establishment Clause were correct, plaintiffs still wouldn’t have a case. That’s because the evidence they presented did not — and still does not — support their claim that secular parents have been at a comparative disadvantage in obtaining scholarships. To see why, read on….
Filed under: Education and Child Policy; Law and Civil Liberties; Tax and Budget Policy
Don’t Fear the Foreigner
You might have heard that the Citizens United decision will allow foreign corporations to become involved in American campaigns. You might have heard that from the President, in fact, whose speech decrying the decision said foreign corporations “may now get into the act” of pursuing their “special interests” in American politics.
Not true. Justice Kennedy explicitly says the Court did not decide whether Congress has the power to prevent “foreign individuals or associations from influencing our Nation’s political process.” Nothing in Citizens United prevents Congress from prohibiting such political spending by foreign corporations. The Supreme Court might uphold such a law or it might strike it down. The upholding or the striking down of such a law was left for another day. (Other parts of existing laws would also probably preclude foreign nationals or corporations from getting involved in American elections, as Brad Smith argues).
I don’t think I like the new populist Obama as much as I did the old rationalist Obama. The old Obama would have read a Supreme Court opinion before talking publicly about it.
Citizen United’s Concept of the U.S. Constitution
The Citizens United decision and the talk that has followed imply two different and incompatible ideas of the Constitution.
The majority in Citizens United believe that the U.S. Constitution establishes a government of limited and defined powers. They asked: “Does the Constitution give government the power to prohibit speech by corporations (and others)?” The First Amendment indicated the government did not have that power.
The critics of the Citizens United decision assume the Constitution created a government of plenary powers with limited exceptions. They recognize that free speech for individuals is one such exception. But that exception is limited to natural people, not legal constructs. If there is no exception to the plenary power of government, the critics conclude, then there is no right to speak. Congress may prohibit speech by corporations (and others).
The Citizens United decision depends on an idea of the Constitution that forces government to justify its powers to citizens. The critics of the decision assume an idea of the Constitution that forces citizens to justify their rights to the government. Absent such justifications, the government has plenary power over speech and much else.
Which concept of the Constitution do you find most appealing?
Filed under: Law and Civil Liberties; Political Philosophy
Populism: Good and Bad
Today, Politico Arena asks:
What is it about the word “populist”? (these days)
My response:
“Populist” (or “populism”), in its American usage, invokes the “common man,” yet the idea’s origins — in ”the people” or “the polis” — can be traced to ancient Greek democracy and, in particular, to political demagoguery. Both Plato and Aristotle had reservations about democracy as a system of government precisely because it was susceptible to corruption by populist appeals to superstition and error. In America, populism has had a long and varied history, but it is most often associated with the Populist Party that was formed in 1891 and, in particular, with the fiery speeches of the Democratic Party candidate for president in 1896 and 1900, William Jennings Bryan, and his famous ”cross of gold” speech at the 1896 Democratic National Convention.
Thus, in a fundamental way, populism stands opposed to elitism, yet it’s more complicated than that. On one hand, the populism of the late 19th and early 20th centuries contrasted with the Progressivism of the era, which held that society should be organized and run by “professionals” trained at the best schools. (Thus, the emergence of political “science,” as distinct from the older tradition of political philosophy.) But on the other hand, Progressives themselves purported to speak for “the people,” even if in practice they were often contemptuous of the people’s capacity to govern themselves, susceptible as the people were to the appeals of demagogues.
At the end of the day, therefore, populism is a double-edged sword. Used pejoratively, it stands for the idea that politicians, to obtain or preserve political power, will appeal to base popular sentiments or mistaken (often economic or legal) ideas. A good example is Obama’s reaction last week to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision, rooted in the First Amendment’s guarantee of political speech: He called it “a major victory for big oil, Wall Street banks, health insurance companies and the other powerful interests that marshal their power every day in Washington to drown out the voices of everyday Americans.” There is an element of truth to that sentiment, of course, because the system of government that has evolved in America under the influence of Progressive “professionals” has endowed those professionals (read: the governing class, in all its reaches) with unprecedented power over “the people,” who often feel powerless as a result. But demagogic appeals like that or like others we’ve heard lately from Obama will only exacerbate that problem. By contrast, a “populist” appeal that seeks to return power to people (N.B.: I did not say, as in the ’60s, “power to the people”) – power to run their own lives, free from unwarranted government regulation or dependency — is a side of the idea we hear too seldom. Yet it’s what our founding documents are about. They established not simply popular government but limited popular government – ensuring the right of the people to govern themselves, not mainly through government but individually or in voluntary association with others. It is that liberty that Progressive elitists who “knew better” — the folks in Cambridge who voted 84 to 15 against Scott Brown — have gradually extinguished.
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
If You Prick a Corporation, Does It Not Bleed?
Well, no, because as my liberal friends all seem to be indignantly announcing in the aftermath of the Citizens United ruling, corporations aren’t really people! They’re creatures of statute, and “corporate personhood” is just a convenient legal fiction. Which is fair enough, but also seems to miss the point rather spectacularly. As a practical matter, it is hard to imagine any constitutional liberty that could not be reduced to a hollow joke if we refused to count as an infringement any regulation that nominally targeted only the corporate mechanism for coordinating its exercise.
Having dispensed with the repellent doctrine of corporate personhood, we can happily declare that journalists enjoy full freedom of the press … as long as they don’t plan on using the resources of the New York Times Company or Random House or Comcast, which as mere legal fictions can be barred from using their property to circulate unpatriotic ideas. You’re free to practice your religion without interference — but if it’s an unpopular one, well, let’s hope you don’t expect to send your kids to a religious school or build a church or something, because those tend to involve incorporating. A woman’s right to choose is sacrosanct, but since clinics and hospitals are mere corporations with no such protection, she’d better hope she knows a doctor who makes house calls. Fill in your own scenarios, it’s easy.
The irony here is that it’s libertarians who are often accused of a myopic obsession with formal liberties rather than their real-world value to people — “the law in its majestic equality” and all that. But this, surely, would be the height of empty formalism — a right to swing your fist that stops at the air.
I think people are obsessing over this because we often think of rights as flowing, at least in part, from respect for our intrinsic human dignity, and it seems equal parts farcical and offensive to suggest that institutions like Exxon and Nike are in the same moral category. As a purely ethical matter, of course corporations as such don’t have rights. As a practical matter, though, rights that wither at the corporate touch won’t do you a whole lot of good in the 21st century.
Filed under: Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
Speech For Me, But Not for Thee
Politico Arena asked a second question today:
Will Citizens United alter American campaigns and if so, how?
My response:
A Victory for Fiscal Sovereignty and Human Rights
A Swiss court just threw a wrench in the gears of an IRS effort to impose bad U.S. tax law on an extraterritorial basis, ruling that Switzerland-based UBS does not have to hand over data to the American tax authorities. This ruling nullifies an agreement that the Swiss government was coerced into making with the U.S. government last year.
In typical arrogant fashion, the IRS already has indicated that it still expects acquiescence, notwithstanding Switzerland’s strong human rights policy on personal privacy. The Bloomberg story excerpted below has the details, but it’s worth noting that this entire fight exists solely because the Internal Revenue Code imposes double taxation on income that is saved and invested, and imposes that bad policy on economic activity outside America’s border. But just as other governments should not have the right to impose their laws on things that happen in America, the United States should not have the right to trample the sovereignty of other nations:
The failure by U.S. citizens to complete certain tax forms or declare income doesn’t constitute “tax fraud” that would require Switzerland to disclose account data, the country’s Federal Administrative Court ruled in a judgment released today. …“The prosecutors at the Justice Department are not going to be happy with this opinion,” Namorato said in an interview in Washington. …U.S. Justice Department spokesman Charles Miller declined to comment. …The Internal Revenue Service said in a statement that while the agency hadn’t reviewed the ruling it “had every expectation that the Swiss government will continue to honor the terms of the agreement.” …Switzerland distinguishes between tax fraud, which is a crime, and tax evasion, which is a civil offense.
This battle is part of a broader effort by uncompetitive nations to persecute “tax havens.” Creating a tax cartel for the benefit of greedy politicians in France, Germany, and the United States would be a mistake. An “OPEC for politicians” would pave the way for higher taxes, as explained here, here, and here.
But this also is a human rights issue. Look at what happened recently in the thugocracy known as Venezuela, where Chavez began a new wave of expropriation. The Venezuelans with money in Cayman, Miami, and Switzerland were safe, but the people with assets inside the country have been ripped off by a criminal government. Or what about people subjected to persecution, such as political dissidents in Russia? Or Jews in North Africa? Or ethnic Chinese in Indonesia? Or homosexuals in Iran? And how about people in places such as Mexico where kidnappings are common and successful people are targeted, often on the basis of information leaked from tax departments. This world needs safe havens, jurisdictions such as Switzerland and the Cayman Islands that offer oppressed people the protection of honest courts, financial privacy, and the rule of law. Heck, even the bureaucrat in charge of the OECD’s anti-tax competition campaign admitted to a British paper that “tax havens are essential for individuals who live in unstable regimes.” With politicians making America less stable with each passing day, let’s hope this essential freedom is available in the future.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Government and Politics; International Economics and Development; Law and Civil Liberties; Tax and Budget Policy
The Government Should Have Less Power to Tax and Spend, Not More Power to Regulate Speech
Yesterday, The Hill asked various pundits and politicos to respond to the Supreme Court’s Citizens United ruling. The Big Question (as their periodic feature is called) was, “Will corporate money change campaigns?” You can read my response here.
Today, that same newspaper invited me to blog some further thoughts on the Citizens United decision. Here’s what I wrote:
Critics of yesterday’s decision say the sky of American democracy is falling. Supporters—including myself—say it’s a great day for the republic and a vindication of the freedom of speech. How can this be? Are nonprofit think tanks and advocacy groups like my own Cato Institute, the ACLU, the NRA, and many other odd bedfellows who supported Citizens United all in the pockets of Wall Street, Big Oil, insurance companies, and others that President Obama assails as corrupting our politics? Leaving aside the issue of why the politician who got more of his campaign funding from Goldman Sachs than any other source would be going after the very industries that most support him, the asymmetry in this debate rests on the myth that money is an evil in the political system, and that therefore the American people want so-called campaign finance reform to “clean up” government.
Money is no more an evil in politics than it is in life generally. Some people may not like mud-slinging attack ads, but some people also don’t like SUVs, the Super Bowl, the Jay Leno Show, and many other things that people spend money on—including donations to Cato, the ACLU, the NRA, etc. The problem with money in politics isn’t the money, but rather the politics. So long as the government is powerful enough to dole out tax breaks, subsidies, stimulus funds, regulations, earmarks, and a whole host of other goodies (and baddies), those that stand to benefit (and lose) will spend money on the political process. The way to get rid of this behavior and spending—which is constitutionally protected in a whole host of ways: freedom of speech, freedom of association, the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, etc.—is to reduce the government’s power to affect so many people’s lives and transform economic incentives for businesses big and small. Reduce the size of government and K Street will melt away.
Finally, as my colleague Roger Pilon points out, 26 states have minimal campaign finance laws, with no evidence that those states have more corruption—or a more unequal “political playing field”—than states that strictly regulate. And that’s because the real reason we have campaign finance regulations—the dirty little secret behind the whole convoluted regime—is that it’s an incumbency protection racket. From the so-called “millionaire’s amendment” that the Supreme Court struck down in 2008 to the limits on corporate and union advocacy that the Court struck down yesterday, McCain-Feingold and all other campaign finance legislation—passed by self-interested politicians—is designed to make it harder for challengers. After-all, incumbents have the benefit of name recognition, taxpayer-funded travel to and around their home districts and states, taxpayer-funded campaign literature disguised as informational flyers touting all the great things a congressman is doing, and a host of other advantages.
The First Amendment is not a “loophole” for big business and those of us who want freer speech—without bureaucrats deciding who gets to speak when and how much—are not corporate shills. Free speech is the very foundation of our democracy, and we are stronger today for the Citizens United decision.
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