Notice of Court Orders Is Important in Death Penalty Cases
The representation of prisoners accused of capital crimes is unique in its difficulty — and in the consequences — when that representation is inadequate. Maples v. Thomas, which will be argued before the Supreme Court this fall, exposes some of the serious cracks in the system charged with representing indigent defendants in such cases.
Cato takes no position on the merits of the death penalty other than that the Constitution does not prohibit it and that our justice system is responsible for, at the very least, ensuring that prisoners receive fair notice of orders on which their lives depend. Both the courts and counsel failed Cory Maples here.
Maples was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for killing two companions. After a series of state court appeals which affirmed his conviction, Maples filed a petition for post-conviction relief, which was ultimately dismissed.
Maples never received notice of this deadline-triggering order because his pro bono lawyers left their big-firm jobs and a court clerk did nothing when the letter containing the order was consequently returned unopened. Because Maples did not receive notice of the deadline, he did not timely file an appeal and his claims were procedurally defaulted. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Maples’s subsequent federal habeas petition because Maples “cannot establish cause for his default because there is no right to post-conviction counsel.”
Cato has now joined The Constitution Project to file an amicus brief supporting Maples and arguing that the Supreme Court should excuse his default because the state failed to notify him of an order that could result in his death. Moreover, if the default is not excused, the state’s inaction will deny Maples his constitutional right of meaningful access to the courts.
The Eleventh Circuit relied on the rule that because “there is no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally ineffective counsel in such proceedings.” But Maples’s habeas claim does not involve the ineffectiveness of his post-conviction counsel; his underlying claim is that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Indeed, his post-conviction counsel provided no assistance whatsoever when it was time to appeal.
Finally, there is cause to excuse Maples’s default because this case is ultimately governed by principles of equity and basic fairness. Few if any reasonable observers would conclude that it is fair or equitable to put a man to death without allowing the least consideration of appellate claims that could save his life simply because his lawyers left their jobs, a firm mailroom returned letters to them unopened, and the court clerk’s office did nothing when it discovered that crucial notice was never received.
Again, the case is Maples v. Thomas and you can read Cato’s brief here.
A Life of One’s Own
Since Tuesday’s oral arguments in Virginia v. Sebelius—the first Obamacare challenge to reach the circuit court level, and one in which Cato also filed an amicus brief—the legal blogosphere has been discussing the Fourth Circuit panel’s incredulity concerning the activity/inactivity distinction at the heart of our arguments against Obamacare. As Ilya Shapiro explains, we contend that if Congress’s power to regulate “interstate commerce” reaches the inactivity of not buying health insurance, then there is nothing it does not reach. The Supreme Court will eventually have to grapple with this question and decide whether the distinction is constitutionally meaningful.
As Volokh conspirator Jonathan Adler points out, the activity/inactivity distinction is long-standing. At common law, there was no legally enforceable duty to rescue. In other words, if you didn’t act to create the danger, you would not be liable for your inactivity in not helping. To put it bluntly: you would have no legal liability if you ignored a drowning child.
Legal philosophers have grappled with the meaning of “act” and “omission” for centuries. While there are some difficult issues to ponder, there is also an element of navel-gazing in the question and the Supreme Court may have to gaze long at their navels to answer it. But it is worth remembering why the act/omission distinction matters in a free society. At the risk of getting too philosophical, I will add some thoughts of my own.
Anyone who has been to law school has likely had long conversations, probably in torts class, over whether the act/omission distinction is both meaningful and moral. If your torts class was like mine, your professor lamented the “no duty to rescue” rule as evidence of our individualistic and selfish society. Many law professors believe our slavish adherence to the act/omission distinction not only allows us to let children drown, but that it is just another “Western” belief that holds back a robust welfare state.
The aversion to mandating action, however, is not about letting children drown. I wouldn’t let a child drown and I imagine you wouldn’t either. The extreme hypothetical helps gloss over a meaningful principle for normal, run-of-the-mill cases. Just as bad facts make bad law, bad hypotheticals can blur vital principles. The act/omission distinction helps delineate, albeit imperfectly, the personal sphere of control and the governmental sphere of control.
Regulator, Leave Those Kids Alone
“These kids today and their violent [blank]….” This refrain has been around for as long as there have been kids – and elders to shake their fists at them. In the 19th century, dime novels and “penny dreadfuls” were blamed for social ills and juvenile delinquency. In the 1950s, for example, psychologist Fredric Wertham’s attack on comic books – in his bluntly titled book Seduction of the Innocent – so ignited the national ire that Congress held hearings on the cartoon menace. In response, the comic book industry voluntarily adopted a ratings system. Similarly, backlash against the movie industry and the music industry (e.g., Tipper Gore’s attack on gangsta rap) caused those respective industries to also adopt voluntary ratings systems.
The videogame industry also adopted an effective and responsive ratings system after congressional hearings in the early ’90s. Thinking this ratings system ineffective, however, California passed a violent videogame law, which prohibits minors from purchasing games that are deemed “deviant,” “patently offensive,” and lacking in artistic or literary merit. The gaming industry challenged the California law and the Ninth Circuit struck it down on First Amendment grounds.
California now seeks to overturn the lower court’s ruling by arguing that violent videogames deserve an exemption from First Amendment protection. Cato’s brief supports the videogame manufacturers and highlights not only the oft-repeated and oft-overblown stories of the “seduction of the innocent,” but the less-repeated stories of the effectiveness and preferability of industry self-regulation.
We show that not only does self-regulation avoid touchy First Amendment issues but that entertainment industries take self-regulation very seriously. Moreover, evidence from the Federal Trade Commission shows that the existing videogame ratings system works more effectively than any other regulatory method. Adding a level of governmental control, even if were constitutional, would be counterproductive.
The case of Schwarzenegger v. Entertainment Merchants Association will be argued November 2 (coincidentally election day).
Another Judicial Takings Case Headed to the Court
The Montana Supreme Court overturned more than 100 years of state property law concerning navigable waters by effectively converting the title in hundreds of miles of riverbeds to the State. The majority of that court ruled that the entirety of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison rivers were navigable at the time of Montana’s statehood, producing a broad holding that eradicates property rights to the rivers and riverbanks that Montanans had enjoyed for over a century.
Before this case, the hydroelectric energy company PPL Montana and thousands of other private parties exercised their property rights over these non-navigable stretches that the state never claimed. Today, Cato joined a brief filed by the Montana Farm Bureau Federation supporting the PPL Montana’s request that the U.S. Supreme Court review the Montana high court’s ruling for possible Takings Clause violations under the Fifth Amendment.
We argue two main points. First, that the Court should adhere to its standard for navigability rights set out in Utah v. U.S. in 1933. Unlike the approach taken by the Montana Supreme Court’s majority — that entire rivers were navigable simply because certain reaches of the river were navigable — the U.S. Supreme Court in Utah used an approach of meticulously analyzing the rivers at issue section-by-section. Second, this arbitrary ruling against rights long protected by Montana law amounts to a “judicial taking,” as explained last term Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Dept. of Environmental Protection (in which Cato also filed a brief). There, a plurality of the Court held that there is no “textual justification” for limiting takings claims deriving from executive or legislative action, thereby extending it to a judicial action of the same nature (and two other members of the Court found potential relief in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause). Here, the Montana court did exactly that, violating due process rights that the Montana legislature could not and further violating the procedural due process rights of the thousands harmed by the decision in not affording them notice or a hearing.
The U.S. Supreme Court should thus review the case to reinforce its Utah precedent and ensure that arbitrary judicial takings of this sort cannot continue. The name of the case is PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana. The Court will decide later this fall whether to take it up.
Taxpayer Choice + Parental Choice = Good, Constitutional Education Reform
Arizona grants income tax credits for contributions made to school tuition organizations (“STOs”). STOs must use these donations for scholarships that allow students to attend private schools. This statutory scheme broadens the educational opportunities for thousands of students by enabling them to attend schools they would otherwise lack the means to attend. Still, several taxpayers filed a lawsuit challenging the program as creating a state establishment of religion.
Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledged that increasing educational opportunities is a valid secular purpose for a legislative act, it found that the tax credit program nonetheless violates the Establishment Clause because many of the STOs—as it happens, a decreasing majority—provide scholarships for students to attend parochial schools. Earlier this year, Cato filed a brief supporting the request for Supreme Court review filed by the various parties defending the program. The Court granted cert.
Now Cato (led by Andrew Coulson and myself) has filed another brief, joined by four education reform groups, urging the Supreme Court to overturn the Ninth Circuit’s decision because it was based on faulty reasoning: It equated the private and voluntary choices of individuals who donate to religious STOs with state sponsorship of religion. The lower court also made the dubious assertion that Arizona parents feel pressured to accept scholarships to religious schools, in spite of the fact that the share of STO scholarships available for use at secular schools is almost twice as large as the share of families actually choosing secular schools. Moreover, the tax credit scheme is indistinguishable from similar charitable tax deduction programs that the Court has previously held to pass constitutional muster.
We urge the Court to reaffirm its longstanding jurisprudence—especially the 2002 school-choice case, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris—whereby instances of “genuine and independent choice” are insulated from Establishment Clause challenge. Far from being an impediment to parental freedom, the autonomy Arizona grants to taxpayers and STOs is ultimately essential to it. More generally, should the lower court’s opinion be allowed to stand, the progress made to broaden the educational opportunities of students across the country will be stifled.
The case of Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn will be heard by the Court this fall, probably in November.
No One’s Property Is Safe in New York
Sad to say, but as expected, New York State’s highest court, the New York Court of Appeals, has just upheld yet another gross abuse of the state’s power of eminent domain, exercised by the Empire State Development Corporation on behalf of my undergraduate alma mater, Columbia University, against two small family-owned businesses, one of them owned by Indian immigrants. Details can be found in the press release just issued by the Institute for Justice, which filed an amicus brief in the case and has been in the forefront of those defending against such abuse across the country.
IJ has had success in obtaining eminent domain reform in over 40 states, but New York remains a backwater, where collusion between well-connected private entities and government is rampant, and the courts play handmaiden to the corruption by abdicating their responsibilities. Just one more example of why New York is an economic basket case, with a population that continues to flee to more hospitable climes. I’ve discussed the property rights issues more generally here.
Cato’s Amicus Brief Helps School Choice Get to the Court; Congrats, IJ!
As Andrew Coulson noted, the Supreme Court has agreed to hear Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn, the education tax credit case whose cert petition Cato supported with an amicus brief. So we didn’t get the summary reversal we optimistically hoped for but I’m confident that this means only that the Ninth Circuit’s reversal will have to wait 8-10 months. Congratulations to Tim Keller, Dick Komer, and our friends at the Institute for Justice, which successfully litigated the Zelman v. Simmons-Harris case that is the pro-school choice precedent the Ninth Circuit so blithely ignored here.
I should note that ours was one of only three amicus briefs filed in this case, and studies have shown that the first few such briefs increase chances of Supreme Court review significantly (having more than about three seems to be redundant). Which isn’t to say that we take credit for the successful strategy that IJ and its co-counsel are pursuing — indeed, as is good appellate practice, we coordinated with IJ so our brief would offer the Court some arguments and nuance for which the parties’ briefs didn’t have space — but it is gratifying to see the Court impliedly see the validity of our position. We will of course be filing again at the merits stage, which briefs won’t be due for a few months. The Court will likely hear the case in late fall, so we should expect a final decision in winter 2011.
For all the filings in the case, see its SCOTUSwiki page or its Supreme Court docket page. I blogged about the case here and here and George Will wrote about it last week. Andrew also blogged the original Ninth Circuit decision here.
Taxpayer Choice + Parental Choice = Education Reform That’s Constitutional
Arizona grants income tax credits for contributions made to school tuition organizations (“STO”). These STOs must these donations for scholarships that allow students to attend private schools. This statutory scheme broadens the educational opportunities for thousands of students by enabling them to attend schools they would otherwise lack the means to attend.
The Ninth Circuit held that the tax credit program violated the Establishment Clause because many of the STOs — as it happens, a decreasing majority — provide scholarships for students to attend parochial schools. Counsel for the defendants, including the Institute for Justice, asked the Supreme Court to review the case — and indeed to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit, based in part on a 2002 case (Zelman v. Simmons-Harris) rejecting a similar challenge to a school voucher program. Cato filed a brief, joined by the Foundation for Educational Choice and the American Federation for Children, supporting this request.
Our brief argues that the funds received by STOs are the product of individual taxpayers’ “genuine and independent choice” — the touchstone by which the Court judges the religious neutrality of statutes allowing for taxpayer money to fund religious education. Moreover, the tax credit scheme is indistinguishable from similar charitable tax deduction programs that the Court has previously held to pass constitutional muster. While the Ninth Circuit reasoned that Arizona parents feel pressured to send their kids to parochial schools due to limited scholarships available for secular schools, it failed to consider that the share of STO money available to secular schools was nearly twice as large as the share of families choosing to send their children to secular schools.
Far from being an impediment to parental freedom, the autonomy Arizona grants to taxpayers and STOs is ultimately essential to it. More generally, should the lower court’s opinion be allowed to stand, the progress made to broaden the educational opportunities of students across the country will be stifled.
The name of the case is Arizona Christian School Tuition Organization v. Winn. The Court will likely decide before it breaks for the summer whether to take it up — and, indeed, whether to summarily reverse the Ninth Circuit.
NRA Shoots Itself in the Foot
I previously blogged about the NRA’s misbegotten motion, which the Supreme Court granted, to carve 10 minutes of oral argument time away from the petitioners in McDonald v. Chicago. Essentially, there was no discernable reason for the motion other than to ensure that the NRA could claim some credit for the eventual victory, and thus boost its fundraising.
Well, having argued that petitioners’ counsel Alan Gura insufficiently covered the argument that the Second Amendment should be “incorporated” against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the NRA has now filed a brief that fails even to reference the four biggest cases regarding incorporation and substantive due process. That is, the NRA reply brief contains no mention of Washington v. Glucksberg (1997), Benton v. Maryland (1969), Duncan v. Louisiana (1968), or Palko v. Connecticut (1937). (The NRA did cite those cases in its opening brief.) What is more, it also lacks a discussion of Judge O’Scannlain’s magisterial Ninth Circuit opinion in Nordyke v. King (2009), which the Supreme Court might as well cut and paste regardless of which constitutional provision it uses to extend the right to keep and bear arms to the states!
I should add that the petitioners’ reply brief does cite all of those aforementioned cases (as well as the “Keeping Pandora’s Box Sealed” law review article I co-authored with Josh Blackman). I leave it to the reader to determine whether it is Alan Gura or the NRA who is better positioned to argue substantive due process — or any other part of the McDonald case.
For more on the rift between the McDonald petitioners and the NRA, see this story in today’s Washington Post (in which I’m quoted, full disclosure, after a lengthy interview I gave the reporter last week).
(Full disclosure again: Alan Gura is a friend of mine and of Cato, and I suppose I should also say that I’ve participated in NRA-sponsored events in the past.)
Socialists Shouldn’t Have to Admit Libertarians Into Their Club
Hastings College of the Law, a public law school in California, has a policy prohibiting discrimination on the basis of “race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disabilities, age, sex or sexual orientation.” In 2004, the Christian Legal Society, a religious student organization at the school, applied to become a “recognized student organization” — a designation that would have allowed CLS to receive a variety of benefits afforded to about 60 other Hastings groups. While all are welcome to attend CLS meetings, CLS’s charter requires that its officers and voting members abide by key tenets of the Christian faith and comport themselves in ways consistent with its fundamental mission, which includes a prohibition on “unrepentant” sexual conduct outside of marriage between one man and one woman.
Hastings denied CLS registration on the asserted ground that this charter conflicts with the school’s nondiscrimination policy. CLS sued Hastings, asking for no different treatment than is given to any registered student group. The district court granted Hastings summary judgment and the Ninth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether Hastings’s refusal to grant CLS access to student organization benefits amounted to viewpoint discrimination, which is impermissible under the First Amendment.
Yesterday Cato filed an amicus brief supporting CLS — authored by preeminent legal scholar Richard Epstein – in which we argue that CLS’s right to intimate and expressive association trump any purported state interest in enforcing a school nondiscrimination policy. While Hastings may impose reasonable restrictions on access to limited public forums, it should not be allowed to admit speakers with one point of view while excluding speakers who hold different views. Our brief also discredits Hastings’s assertion that its ability to exclude the public at large from school premises renders their content-based speech restrictions constitutional.
We urge the Court to safeguard public university students’ right to form groups – which by definition exclude people – free from government interference or censorship. (Of course, our first choice would be for the government to get out of the university business and our second choice would be to stop forcing taxpayers to pay for student clubs, but given those two realities — as in the case at hand – freedom of association is the way to go.)
Liberty, Even for People You Don’t Like
In a conversation about “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” Peter Sprigg of the Family Research Council admitted that he wants to re-criminalize sodomy:
…which is easy for him to say, of course, because he’s unlikely to be affected by the law. As someone who is likely to be affected by the law, I’m tempted to criminalize Peter Sprigg. Liberty is never more negotiable than when it’s liberty for someone you don’t like.
What is it that I don’t like? I don’t like putting people in cages. Whenever we can reasonably avoid it, we should. Liberty means liberty even for people we think are weird, or disgusting, or immoral — provided that they do not hurt us or our own legitimate interests. Lawrence v. Texas, for which the Cato Institute filed an amicus brief, is one of the most important expressions of this idea in our time.
Once liberty applies only to the things that we like, we have abandoned the true idea of liberty entirely. From that point on, you and I, as enforcers, must cling ever more tightly to arbitrary power. If we don’t, then someone else may come along, take that power, and criminalize us. A free society leaves the misfits alone, because sooner or later, everyone is a misfit, in some way or another.
Supreme Court Lets Eminent Domain Abuse Continue
Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided not take up an important takings case, the infelicitously titled 480.00 Acres of Land v. United States. As I blogged previously, Cato filed an amicus brief in the case in the hopes that the owner of the “480.00 Acres of Land,” Gil Fornatora, would ultimately receive the “just compensation” to which he is constitutionally entitled. The Court also missed the chance to correct the pattern of due process abuse that is apparently rampant in Florida. The case involved the federal government maneuvering to unjustly drive down property values before taking land for (legitimate) public use — in this case expanding the Everglades — thus greatly diminishing the compensation it was obligated to pay the owners. Fox News recently had a report about the case, in which I briefly appeared.
Interestingly — and sadly – since the Fox News report, my voicemail and email inbox has been receiving story after story of individuals who have experienced injustices similar to that of Mr. Fornatora. While it is unfortunate that this case has come to an end, the number of calls and emails leads me to believe that more cases like this will be making their way through the federal judiciary and that, eventually, this abuse will be halted.
To that end, while Cato does not involve itself directly in litigation, on the subject of takings and eminent domain abuse I can certainly recommend our friends at the Institute for Justice and Pacific Legal Foundation. Specifically on the type of “condemnation blight” at the heart of the Fornatora case, feel free to contact PLF’s Atlantic (Florida) office at (772)781-7787 or write to Pacific Legal Foundation, 1002 SE Monterey Commons Blvd., Suite 102, Stuart, FL 34996. Steven Gieseler was the attorney who presented the Fornatora case to the Supreme Court, and who got me involved.
In other eminent domain news, George Will had an excellent column on January 3 condemning the pernicious Atlantic Yards land grab that you can read about here.
Cato on Facebook
Cato on Twitter
Cato on Google+
Cato on YouTube
