The Supreme Court has agreed to review Arizona v. United States, the case regarding SB 1070, the Arizona law (only) four sections of which have been enjoined by the lower courts: requiring police to check the immigration status of anyone they have lawfully detained whom they have reasonable suspicion to believe may be in the country illegally; making it a state crime to violate federal alien registration laws; making it a state crime for illegal aliens to apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or work as an independent contractor; and permitting warrantless arrests where the police have probable cause to believe that a suspect has committed a crime that makes him subject to deportation.  For my previous analysis of SB 1070 and the legal challenges to it, see here, here, here, and here.

By taking up this case, the Supreme Court is wisely nipping in the bud the proliferation of state laws aimed at addressing our broken immigration system.  One way or another, states will know how far they can go in addressing issues relating to illegal immigrants, whether the concern is crime, employment opportunities (providing or restricting them), registration requirements, or even so-called sanctuary cities.

Of course, states wouldn’t be getting into this mess if the federal government — elected officials of both parties — hadn’t abdicated its responsibility to fix a system that serves nobody’s interests: not big business or small business, not the rich or the poor, not the most or least educated, not the economy or national security, and certainly not the average taxpayer.  For their part, SB 1070 and related laws in Alabama, Georgia, and elsewhere are (with small exception) constitutional — the state laws are merely mirroring federal law, not conflicting with it or otherwise intruding on federal authority over immigration — but bad public policy.  (For more on both these conclusions, read my SCOTUSblog essay from last summer.)

What this country needs is a comprehensive reform that obviates the sort of ineffectual half-measures the states are left with given Congress’s shameless refusal to act.  It’s not very often that Cato calls for the federal government to do something, but the immigration system is quite possibly the most screwed-up part of the federal government — which of itself is a significant statement coming from someone at Cato — and one that is so incredibly counterproductive to American liberty and prosperity.

The Court will hear Arizona v. United States in the spring.  For more immigration-reform developments, see this note in today’s Wall Street Journal and my blogpost on Utah’s plan, which the federal government has also since sued to enjoin.

Supreme Court Takes Up Arizona Immigration Law is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Utah’s done it (great editorial in the WSJ):

Passed by the state’s GOP legislature and signed by Republican Governor Gary Herbert in March, Utah’s plan is notable because it’s the first in the country that would allow undocumented immigrants to get a permit and work legally, after paying a fine of up to $2500 and meeting other conditions. The program is part of a larger package that includes increased scrutiny of immigrants who break the law. The compromise allows the state to address the economy’s demand for workers—thus reducing the incentive for illegal immigration—while satisfying voters who don’t want to reward those who arrived illegally.

Of course, states can’t just announce their own guest-worker programs — the federal government has plenary power over immigration — so Utah may need a waiver from the feds.  Which might not be forthcoming, given politically tone-deaf and legally dangerous statements like this:

In a Senate Judiciary hearing on Wednesday, Attorney General Eric Holder said the law, which combines enforcement measures with a guest worker program, needs to be adjusted or face federal lawsuits. Pressed on whether the Administration planned to sue Utah, Mr. Holder said the Department of Justice “will look at the law, and if it is not changed to our satisfaction by 2013, we will take the necessary steps.”

“To our satisfaction?”  What does Holder think an eventual federal immigration solution would look like?  Here’s Cato’s proposal, but anything that gets through Congress will have to expand employment opportunities for both skilled and unskilled immigrants, normalize the status of current illegals, and otherwise refocus resources on criminals and terrorists.

But it’s not just the government that’s up in arms about Utah’s sensible legislation:

Like Arizona, Utah is already fending off lawsuits from the left. On Tuesday, the American Civil Liberties Union and the National Immigration Law Center sued to stop the portion of the law similar to the one in Arizona that enlists state and local police in the effort to identify illegal immigrants. In Utah’s version, anyone who is arrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor has to show proof of citizenship.

Good grief!  State officials do not violate the Supremacy Clause — or engage in unconstitutional racial profiling — when they enforce federal law, which is what Utah’s enforcement measures, like most of Arizona’s, do.  Critics naturally maintain that such enforcement decisions should be left to the feds but that only gets it half right: the federal government, particularly its executive branch, has discretion over how to prioritize enforcement priorities, but those discretionary decisions (which, after all, can change from one administration to another and even within one presidency) cannot preempt state law.  Only federal law can do that.

This not a question of policy; while I generally like Utah’s plan, I’ve written before that Arizona’s (very different) SB 1070 is constitutional but mostly bad policy.  The larger issue is states wanting to do something in the face of federal abdication.  Some of Utah’s laws — the “plan” is actually five separate laws, covering the spectrum of immigration issues from expanding legal immigration (HB469, HB466) to addressing those already here for economic reasons (HB116) to addressing serious criminals (HB116, HB497) — may well end up losing in court, but they at least get national attention and to try to push federal action (SJR12).

As Rep. John Dougall, Vice Chair for Appropriations (#2 on the state budget), has explained to me, a major goal Utah had was to shift the dialogue from “enforcement only” to something more comprehensive, especially expanding legal immigration.  A more controversial purpose was to plant the federalism flag, arguing that states share some of the jurisdiction over immigration.  For example, Dougall wrote in an email to me that I quote with his permission, “HB469 rests on the belief that citizens should have the right to freely associate with anyone in the world, who don’t pose a public safety threat to others, and those citizens should be able to sponsor those immigrants in UT. A belief that the state should defend a citizen’s right to freely associate from an overly expansive federal government.”

I’m not fully convinced that some of this isn’t preempted — by federal law, not by what attorneys general or secretaries of homeland security say or do – but the goal is laudable and the classical liberal first principles are unassailable.  The Utah model could work for other states looking to split the Gordian knot between the extremists on both sides whose “debate” generates into ”amnesty” versus “racism.”  Texas Republicans have introduced similar legislation and other states’ lawmakers are also apparently interested.

That’s all to the good: even if you can’t enjoy the “greatest snow on earth” during the summer, anyone interested in innovative immigration reform should book a flight to Salt Lake City.

What Immigration Reform Would Look Like is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Rhee, the former chancellor of DC Public Schools, and Moskowitz, head of a NYC charter school, were asked at an event last week what they thought of the Supreme Court decision upholding  Arizona’s K-12 scholarship donation tax credit program. The program offers a dollar-for-dollar tax cut to anyone who donates to a non-profit Scholarship Tuition Organization (and the STOs then help families pay for private school tuition).

Children’s Scholarship Fund president Darla Romfo asked the question, and here’s the answer she received.

Michelle Rhee and Eva Moskowitz on School Choice is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Justice Kagan’s dissent yesterday in the Supreme Court ruling upholding Arizona’s education tax credits seems to me so obviously mistaken on both the facts and the law that I feel I must be missing something. I offer my initial analysis briefly below, and if anyone can tell me if/where I’m going wrong, my e-mail address is just a Google away.

First, Kagan and her fellow dissenters express dismay at the putative novelty of the majority’s distinction between tax credits and government spending. But, more than a decade ago, this very same distinction was acknowledged by the Arizona Supreme Court in Kotternman v. Killian, and that AZ Court ruling itself cites a string of precedents from around the country supporting it. Clearly, the majority’s ruling is far from novel, and Kagan and the dissenters should know that.

Next, Kagan claims that the majority’s ruling would preclude taxpayers from suing the government for operating a program that gives tax credits exclusively to one religious group. She claims that taxpayers of other faiths would lack standing. That seems quite wrong. The pivotal issue is that taxpayers would have to show a specific personal harm resulting from the government’s actions in order to have standing. In the case of Arizona’s tax credits, as the majority acknowledged, there is no harm to taxpayers. Everyone is eligible for the credit and credits can be claimed against donations to any type of scholarship organization, of any faith or no faith. By contrast, under Kagan’s straw man example of a credit for the purchase of crucifixes, non-christian  taxpayers would suffer a specific personal harm: they would be denied the right to use the credit to purchase religious symbols of their own faith (or to buy “Who is John Galt?” posters if they happened not to be religious). This harm would be the direct result of government action–specifically, of the government’s decision to favor Christians over members of other faith groups and secular taxpayers.

A program that discriminates based on religion causes harm to taxpayers by virtue of excluding them from participation. That, in turn, is a clear equal protection violation, not to mention a violation of at least two of the three prongs of the First Amendment Lemon Test, and so such taxpayers would not only have standing to sue they would win the suit.

Again, the AZ tax credit program causes no such harm, because anyone, regardless of faith, can participate, and no one is compelled to support any kind of religious education. Why could Kagan and her co-dissenters not see this?

Credits for Crucifixes. Or: What’s the Matter with Kagan? is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Yesterday the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the Arizona matching-public-campaign-funding case, McComish v. Bennett, spearheaded by our friends at the Goldwater Institute and the Institute for Justice.

Here’s the background:  In 1998, after years of scandals ranging from governors being indicted to legislators taking bribes, Arizona passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act. This law was intended to “clean up” state politics by creating a system for publicly funding campaigns.  Participation in the public funding is not mandatory, however, and those who do not participate are subject to rules that match their “excess” private funds with disbursals to their opponent from the public fund. In short, if a privately funded candidate spends more than his publicly funded opponent, then the publicly funded candidate receives public “matching funds.”

Whatever the motivations behind the law, the effects have been to significantly chill political speech. Indeed, ample evidence introduced at trial showed that privately funded candidates changed their spending — and thus their speaking — as a result of the matching funds provisions. Notably, in a case where a privately funded candidate is running against more than one publicly assisted opponent, the matching funds act as a multiplier: if privately funded candidate A is running against publicly funded candidates B, C, and D, every dollar A spends will effectively fund his opposition three-fold. In elections where there is no effective speech without spending money, the matching funds provision unquestionably chills speech and thus is clearly unconstitutional.  For more, see Roger Pilon’s policy forum featuring Goldwater lawyer Nick Dranias, which Cato hosted last week and you can view here.

The oral arguments were entertaining, if predictable. A nice debate opened up between Justices Scalia and Kagan about the burden that publicly financed speech imposes on candidats who trigger that sort of financing mechanism under Arizona law. Justice Kennedy then entered the fray, starting out in his usual place — open to both sides — but soon was laying into the Arizona’s counsel alongside Justice Alito and the Chief Justice.

The United States was granted argument time to support Arizona’s law, but Justice Alito walked the relatively young lawyer from the Solicitor General’s office right into what I consider to be his (Alito’s) best majority opinion to date, the federal “millionaire’s amendment” case (paraphrasing; here’s the transcript):

Alito:  Do you agree that “leveling the playing field” is not a valid rationale for restricting speech?

US:  Sort of.

Alito:  Have you read FEC v. Davis?

Note to aspiring SCOTUS litigators: try not to finesse away direct precedent written by a sitting justice.

My prediction is that the Court will decide this as they did Davis, 5-4, with Alito writing the opinion striking down the law and upholding free speech.  Cato’s amicus briefs in this case, which you can read here and here, focused on the similarities to Davis, so I’m keeping my fingers crossed that we’ll get cited.

NB: I got to the Court too late to get into the courtroom today but live-tweeted (@ishapiro) the oral arguments from the (overflow) bar members’ lounge, which has a live audio feed. I was later informed that such a practice violates the Court rules, however — ironic given how pro-free-speech this Court is – so I will not be repeating the short-lived experiment.  (That said, you should still follow me on Twitter — and also be sure to follow our friends @IJ and @GoldwaterInst!)

If the Government Gives Your Election Opponent More Money the More Money You Spend, It Burdens Your Speech is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Today POLITICO Arena asks:

Post-Tucson will campaign trail rhetoric change in any discernible way? Should it change? What phrases or words should be considered out of bounds? Or is that approach a way of silencing legitimate criticism of political candidates?

My response:

Post-Tucson campaign trail rhetoric won’t change because, as Charles Krauthammer put it brilliantly in yesterday’s Washington Post, fighting and warfare are routine political metaphors for obvious reasons: “Historically speaking, all democratic politics is a sublimation of the ancient route to power — military conquest. That’s why the language persists,” why we speak of “battleground states” or “targeting” opponents.

That doesn’t mean that no charge is “out of bounds.” It’s perfectly all right for Sarah Palin to “target” 20 potential swing districts — Democrats do the same. And her use yesterday of “blood libel,” as Alan Dershowitz explains, is entirely acceptable too. What is out of bounds is the kind of scurrilous charges we’ve seen from The New York Times, the Paul Krugmans, E.J. Dionnes, Jonathan Alters, and their ilk, that the Tea Party and the political discourse around it contributed to the Arizona shooting — when there isn’t a shred of evidence to support that, and every indication that a lone mentally disturbed individual was responsible.

But far deeper issues are at play here, and they’re brought out in a penetrating piece by Daniel Henninger in this morning’s Wall Street Journal, “Why the Left Lost It.” He points first to the devastating, potentially sea-changing midterm elections — “Republicans now control more state legislative seats than any time since 1928” – which “came atop the birth of a genuine reform movement, the tea parties.” And the debt crises, state and federal, that animate the Tea Party pose a mortal threat to a liberal agenda that stretches back at least to Goldwater.

As Henninger writes, the divide between today’s left and its conservative opponents “is deep, and it will never be bridged. It is cultural, and it explains more than anything the ‘intensity’ that exists now between these two competing camps.” Read it.

Behind the Political Rhetoric Are Profound Differences is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Radley Balko writes:

[I]t’s worth remembering that the government initiates violence against its own citizens every day in this country, citizens who pose no threat or harm to anyone else. The particular policy that leads to the sort of violence… is supported by nearly all of the politicians and pundits decrying anti-government rhetoric on the news channels this morning. (It’s also supported by Sarah Palin, many Tea Party leaders, and other figures on the right that politicians and pundits are shaming this weekend.)

I hope Rep. Giffords—and everyone wounded yesterday—makes a full recovery. It’s particularly tragic that she was shot while doing exactly what we want elected officials to do—she was making herself available to the people she serves. And of course we should mourn the people senselessly murdered yesterday, government employees and otherwise: U.S. District Judge John Roll, Dorothy Murray, Dorwin Stoddard, nine-year-old Christina Green, Phyllis Scheck, and Gabe Zimmerman.

That said, I long for the day that our political and media figures get as indignant about innocent Americans killed by their own government—killed in fact, as a direct and foreseeable consequence of official government policy that nearly all of those leaders support—as they are about a government official who was targeted by a clearly sick and deranged young man. What happened this weekend is not, by any means, a reason to shunt anti-government protest, even angry anti-government protest, out of the sphere of acceptable debate. The government still engages in plenty of acts and policies—including one-sided violence against its own citizens—that are well worth our anger, protest, and condemnation.

The worst outcome would be for all dissent to become suspect. “Anti-government” is a concept used, essentially, to stifle debate, by conflating reasonable criticisms with the actions of lunatics. Both — of course! — are “anti-government,” and both are therefore guilty. It should be obvious what sort of agenda this furthers: Everything “government” is good.

Government and Violence is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

In-coming House Speaker John Boehner’s endorsement of Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ) for a seat on the chamber’s appropriations committee means that it’s probably a done deal. Flake is one of the few policymakers who actually lives up to the fiscal conservative label. Thus, Flake’s appointment to a committee that many members think only exists to increase spending on special interests would be welcome news.

Boehner also endorsed a suggestion from Rep. Jeff Kingston (R-GA), who has mounted a dark-horse campaign to chair the appropriations committee, to create a subcommittee focused on investigating federal programs. Flake would chair this subcommittee, and according to a release on his website, he has already lined up worthy targets like Head Start and farm subsidies.

How much success will Flake have within the committee?

The New York Times quotes Flake as boldly saying, “It has been a favor factory for years, and now it is going to become a slaughterhouse.” At the same time, Flake acknowledged to Politico that putting a few anti-spenders on appropriations isn’t going to be enough:

Flake said the conservatives that Boehner wants to get on the committee will be “marginalized” if they’re scattered throughout the panel.

“It’s not enough just to have a few going on the committee,” he said. “They could be dispersed among the subcommittees that are forgotten.”

I recently warned the House Republican leadership against serving tea party voters re-heated meatloaf by allowing old-school spenders to dominate the committees. Getting Jeff Flake on appropriations is a step in the right direction, but his appointment can’t be a token gesture. Anti-spenders like Flake will need support from their leadership to succeed because they sure won’t be making friends with the big-spending old bulls.

Rep. Jeff Flake to Appropriations is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Tomorrow morning, the United States Supreme Court will hear one of the most important education cases in a generation: the appeal of a 9th Circuit ruling that would cripple or end Arizona’s k-12 scholarship tax credit program.

As you’d expect, commentators aren’t sure how the Supreme Court will ultimately rule: it may decide to overturn the 9th Circuit on the merits of the case, or it could overturn the 9th Circuit on the grounds that the plaintiffs never had standing to sue in the first place. Heck, there might even be people who think SCOTUS will uphold the lower court’s ruling… can’t actually find anyone who thinks that, but they could be out there… somewhere.

On the merits, the law and evidence are clear. Arizona’s program allows private individuals to donate to non-profit k-12 scholarship organizations and get a tax credit when they do–much as federal tax deductions are available for donations to non-profit charities. Since federal deductions for donations to religious organizations are Constitutional, the same applies to the credits in the AZ case. Respondents (those trying to kill the program) didn’t marshal a serious argument to the contrary. In fact, one of the cases they cite actually eviscerates their own argument, as I noted in Section II (b) of the Cato Institute Winn brief co-written by Ilya Shapiro and myself.

The rest of Respondents’ merits arguments are equally ineffectual, not only taking a form (relying on a moving statistical target) that has already been explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court in Zelman and elsewhere, but actually being wrong on the facts as well (see Section IV of the Cato brief linked above).

But while I’ve been exclusively focused on the merits of the case, it seems that the legal experts defending Arizona’s tax credit program have been arguing that the Respondents (originally, the Plaintiffs) never had a right to sue in the first place (“standing”), because they cannot show, in the context of Supreme Court precedents, how they have been harmed.

Both the SCOTUS blog’s reporter and independent experts seem to think the Court will overturn the 9th Circuit on the standing issue before even considering the merits, and I’m confident that the Court will overturn on the merits if it ever gets that far.

If the ruling comes down in either of those ways, modern education tax credit programs will retain their perfect record of never having been overturned by a court–a record not enjoyed by any other private school choice policy. The reason that is so very important is explained in the final section (V) of our Cato brief.

How Do I Overturn Thee? Let Me Count the Ways is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Today is the first Monday in October, the traditional start of the Supreme Court term.  While we have yet to see as many blockbuster constitutional cases on the docket as we did last term—which, despite the high profile 5-4 splits in McDonald v. Chicago and Citizens United actually produced fewer dissents than any in recent memory—we do look forward to:

• Two big free speech challenges, one over a statute prohibiting the sale of violent video games to minors, another the offensive protesting of a fallen soldier’s funeral;
• An Establishment Clause lawsuit against Arizona’s tax credit for private tuition funds (an alternative to educational voucher programs);
• Regulatory federalism (or “preemption”) cases involving:
  • safety standards for seatbelts;
  • an Arizona statute regarding the hiring of illegal aliens; and
  • the forbidding of class-arbitration waivers as unconscionable components of arbitration agreements;
• Important ERISA and copyright cases;
• A case examining privacy concerns attending the federal government’s background checks for contractors; and
• A criminal procedure dispute regarding access to DNA testing that may support a claim of innocence.

Cato has filed amicus briefs in several of these cases—and in various others which the Court may decide to review later this year—so I will be paying extra-close attention.

Perhaps more importantly, we again have a new justice—and, as Justice White often said, a new justice makes a new Court.  While her confirmation was never in any serious doubt, Elena Kagan faced strong criticism (including from me) on a variety of issues—most importantly on her refusal to “grade” past Court decisions or identify any specific limits to government power.  The 37 votes against Kagan were the most ever for a successful Democratic nominee, which is emblematic of a turbulent political environment in which the Constitution and the basic question of where government derives its power figure prominently.  

Given Kagan’s political and professional background, it is safe to assume that she’s not the second coming of Clarence Thomas.  And because she replaces the “liberal lion” Justice Stevens, her elevation from “tenth justice” (as the solicitor general is known) to ninth is unlikely to cause an immediate change in issues that most divide the Court—particularly because she is recused from nearly half the cases this term.  She could, however, add an interesting and nuanced perspective on a variety of lower-profile issues.  Only time will tell what kind of justice Kagan will be now that she is, seemingly for the first time in her ambitious life, unconstrained to speak her mind.

Here’s to another interesting, varied, and (hopefully) liberty-enhancing year!

Another New Supreme Court Term, Another New Justice is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

In 1998, after years of scandals ranging from governors being indicted to legislators taking bribes, Arizona passed the Citizens Clean Elections Act. This law was intended to “clean up” state politics by creating a system for publicly funding campaigns.

Participation in the public funding is not mandatory, however, and those who do not participate are subject to rules that match their “excess” private funds with disbursals to their opponent from the public fund. In short, if a privately funded candidate spends more than his publicly funded opponent, then the publicly funded candidate receives public “matching funds.”

Whatever the motivations behind the law, the effects have been to significantly chill political speech. Indeed, ample evidence introduced at trial in a lawsuit challenging the law showed that privately funded candidates changed their spending — and thus their speaking — as a result of the matching funds provisions. In elections, where there is no effective speech without spending money, the matching funds provision of the Clean Elections Act diminishes the quality and quantity of political speech.

In 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court in Davis v. FEC struck down a similar provision in the federal McCain-Feingold law in which individually wealthy candidates were penalized for spending their own money by triggering increased contribution limits for their opponents. Even this modest opportunity for opponents to raise more money was found to be an unconstitutional burden on political speech.

Cato has thus filed a brief supporting a request that the Supreme Court review the lower court’s decision upholding Arizona’s Clean Elections Act.  We highlight Davis (in which Cato also filed a brief) and numerous other cases that point to a clear conclusion: if the mere possibility of your opponent getting more money is unconstitutional, then the guarantee that your opponent will get more money (Arizona’s act automatically disburses matching funds) is even more so. Allowing the government to abridge political speech in this fashion not only diminishes the quality of our political debate, but it ignores the fundamental principle upon which the First Amendment is premised: that the government cannot be trusted to regulate political speech for the public benefit. 

The Supreme Court will decide later this fall whether to review this case, McComish v. Bennett.

Clean Elections Act Dirties the First Amendment is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Yesterday, the Obama administration filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Arizona’s recently enacted law that is designed to curb illegal immigration. The Arizona law has not yet taken effect — that will occur on July 29.  To generate more discussion and debate, Cato will be hosting a policy forum on the legal challenge and related issues on July 21.  If the weather in DC continues to cooperate, it will feel like we are actually in Arizona.

Go here for Cato work related to immigration policy.

Feds Challenge Arizona Immigration Law is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

NRO editor Robert VerBruggen has weighed in a couple of times this week on the relative merits of school vouchers and education tax credits, raising interesting and important issues.

In response to my earlier post today about an education tax credit case now before the U.S. Supreme Court, VerBruggen writes:

If the Supreme Court buys this logic — which I suppose is sound on its face — it could lead to some very interesting programs. Any time it’s illegal for a government to fund something directly, it could simply make a dollar-for-dollar “tax credit” program for it, allowing sympathetic taxpayers to technically “donate” — but actually just redirect the taxes they’d otherwise have to pay — to the cause.

This is actually an argument presented by critics of the program in their brief asking the Supreme Court not to hear the appeal that it… just decided to hear. The fact that this argument is fallacious is no doubt one reason that the Supreme Court decided to reject critics’ request. Here’s where it goes wrong:

Under a constitutional tax credit program such as Arizona’s, the state has no power to pressure/encourage taxpayers to do anything that the state could not do directly. Taxpayers can choose to give no money to religious charities, or to give all their money to them. The state is unable to affect their decisions in any way.

As Ilya Shapiro and I pointed out in Cato’s amicus brief in this case, this is identical to the law pertaining to federal charitable tax deductions. Religious charities get more tax deductible donations than any other kind of entity, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld their constitutionality because the decisions regarding such donations are left entirely to the unfettered choices of private citizens.

While it would be unconstitutional for a tax credit program to only allow donations to religious charities, it is perfectly consistent with the U.S. Constitution and Supreme Court precedent for a tax credit program to be religiously neutral, leaving the donating decisions to private citizens.

But there’s much more to it than this. Credits are not just constitutional, they offer an important advantage over vouchers. Under voucher programs, all taxpayers must support every kind of schooling, which can be a source of social conflict in a diverse society. [Think liberals being forced to fund religious-conservative-capitalist schooling; or conservatives being forced to fund schools supporting homosexuality as natural and without any inherent moral implications]. While this doesn’t violate the U.S. constitution (see Zelman v. Simmons Harris), it’s still a less-than-ideal outcome, as was observed in all three dissents in the Zelman case.

Tax credits, as I explained in the last section of our amicus brief (p. 21), avoid this source of social conflict. Not just families but taxpayers enjoy the benefits of free choice and voluntary association. Tax credits are thus a way to ensure universal access to a free educational marketplace without putting citizens into conflict with one another on matters of conscience. For this and many other reasons, they are the best realistic policy for advancing educational freedom yet devised.

School Vouchers vs. Tax Credits is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

An otherwise very good story in the Arizona Republic today begins badly:

The U.S. Supreme Court on Monday agreed to review the constitutionality of an Arizona program that diverts state tax revenue into private-school scholarships.

Here’s the thing: it doesn’t do that. No state tax revenue is used in Arizona’s program, which offers a tax cut (a.k.a. “credit”) to folks who donate to non-profit k-12 tuition assistance organizations. Those non-profits then subsidize private school tuition for families seeking financial help.

Back in 1999, the Arizona Supreme Court made all this clear. Those who were trying to kill the program (at the time, the “petitioners”) claimed that the donated funds were “public money.” The Court begged to differ, writing:

Petitioners argue that this tax credit channels public money to private and sectarian schools in violation of the state constitution…. As respondents note, however, no money ever enters the state’s control as a result of this tax credit. Nothing is deposited in the state treasury or other accounts under the management or possession of governmental agencies or public officials. Thus, under any common understanding of the words, we are not here dealing with “public money.” (p. 19-21)

It would be fine for the Arizona Republic to report that critics refuse to accept the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation, and that they are hoping the U.S. Supreme Court will see things their way (FYI: not gonna happen). But it is not okay for the Republic, on its “news” pages, to take sides in a case now before the U.S. Supreme Court by adopting the legal assumptions of the program’s critics.

P.S.  Yes, the title is a reference to this.

‘All Your Income Are Belong to the State’ is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Since I provided my legal analysis of the new Arizona immigration law, I’ve become aware of a few interesting developments in that regard.

First, it seems that I wasn’t working off the latest version of the bill — which I should add is awfully hard to find.  Indeed, perhaps we should excuse Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano for not having read it; both the Arizona Senate’s website for SB 1070, and the Arizona House’s website for the amending legislation, HB 2162, list several different versions under their “Bill Versions” tabs that do not match the bills in the other.  As someone who typically plays in the federal sandbox, if someone can direct me to a verified true copy of the final operative bill, as signed and amended, my colleagues and I – indeed the entire policy community – would be grateful.

In any case, I’m please to announce that the (seemingly) final amended version I’m now working from has improved an already constitutional bill by further safeguarding civil liberties.  Most notably, the ”may I see your papers?” provision was changed to read that law enforcement officials shall make a “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable, to determine the immigration status” only after having made a “lawful stop, detention, or arrest . . . in the enforcement of any other law or ordinance . . . where suspicion exists that the [detained] person is an alien and is unlawfully present in the United States” (amended text in bold). This establishes a higher predicate standard for police to initiate contact with any person to whom this law will be applied. In other words, there has to be an independent reason for the stop or detention before the police can ask to see proof of immigration status.

The amended bill also prohibits any consideration of “race, color or national origin” in enforcing the new law in any manner that runs afoul of either the U.S. or Arizona constitutions.  Moreover, the legislature clarified that the determination of an alien’s immigration status would only be performed by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), the Border Patrol, or a “law enforcement officer who is authorized [to do so] by the federal government.”

All of these changes unquestionably improved the civil rights provisions of the law and should further protect it from successful legal challenge — again without saying anything about the law’s policy wisdom.

Second, while some analysts have argued that Arizona’s law might be preempted by federal law — although the leading case, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, which is 34 years old and predates more recent immigration reforms, is not favorable to that position — Roger Pilon alerted me to a 2005 case (unanimous in the judgment, less so in the reasoning), Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, that shows that Arizona’s law doesn’t go as far as the Constitution might allow.  In Mena, the police detained the inhabitants of a house whice they were searching pursuant to a lawful search warrant.  While most of the officers performed the search, others questioned one detainee about her immigration status without any reasonable suspicious that she committed any crime — and certainly without having any reasonable suspicion that she was an illegal alien.  The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, upheld this line of questioning.  Part of the reasoning was that the “may I see your papers?” bit did not prolong the detention in any way — the search was still ongoing — but this is at least some indication that the Constitution allows immigration-related questioning without even the reasonable suspicion required by Arizona.

Third, apparently the head of ICE, John Morton, said his agency will not process illegal immigrants referred to them by Arizona officials.  Morton apparently doesn’t think that laws like Arizona’s “are the solution.”  Well, we at Cato certainly agree that Arizona’s law will not solve a problem that demands a comprehensive federal solution, but that doesn’t mean federal officials can simply decline to perform their duties under the law as it exists.  What Morton proposes is akin to state “nullification” of duly enacted federal law — except worse, because his agency’s job is to enforce that very law.  If Morton feels that strongly about our immigration laws, he should either resign or, while complying with his duties, testify before Congress about the law’s defects and lobby his boss, President Obama, to push reform.

Fourth and finally, President Obama is deploying 1,200 National Guard troops to the border and requesting $500 million more for border security.  With due respect to Arizona Senators John McCain and Jon Kyl, who want even more troops and money, this approach is neither here nor there.  (And it echoes Obama’s split-the-baby decision on Afghanistan, not willing to go for a whole-hog escalation but also not willing to rethink the overall policy.)  Half-measures won’t do it here, Mr. President (and Congress).  If you lack the heart (or have too much of a brain) for a full wall-and-militarization of our southern border — and perhaps mass rounding up and deportation of 12 million people — it’s time for a fundamental reorganization of the immigration system.

U.S. immigration (non-)policy is nonsensical and unworkable.  We’re beyond the point of perestroika; it’s time for regime change.

Update on the Arizona Immigration Issue is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

FBI crime figures reported in today’s Wall Street Journal challenge the perception that illegal immigrants have unleashed a crime wave in Arizona.

One of the clinching arguments for Arizona’s tough new law aimed at illegal immigration has been the perception in that state that crime has been rising, and that undocumented workers are largely to blame. Yet the Journal reports that the incidence of violent crime in Phoenix last year plunged 16.6 percent compared to 2008, a rate of decline that was three times the national average.

According to the Phoenix Police Department, the downward trend in crime has continued into 2010 even as the “illegal immigrant crime wave” story reverberates on cable TV and talk radio. As the Journal story reports:

In Phoenix, police spokesman Trent Crump said, “Despite all the hype, in every single reportable crime category, we’re significantly down.” Mr. Crump said Phoenix’s most recent data for 2010 indicated still lower crime. For the first quarter of 2010, violent crime was down 17% overall in the city, while homicides were down 38% and robberies 27%, compared with the same period in 2009.

Arizona’s major cities all registered declines. A perceived rise in crime is one reason often cited by proponents of a new law intended to crack down on illegal immigration. The number of kidnappings reported in Phoenix, which hit 368 in 2008, was also down, though police officials didn’t have exact figures.

The new crime figures confirm what I wrote in a column in today’s Washington Times under the headline, “Unfounded fear of immigrant crime grips Arizona,” and what I explored in a longer think piece, “Higher Immigration, Lower Crime,” in Commentary magazine a few months ago.

The president and Congress need to fix our immigration system, but we need to do it in the right way and for the right reasons.

New Crime Stats Contradict Anti-Immigrant Hype is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The SCOTUS Blog reports this morning that the United States Supreme Court has agreed to hear an appeal of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in the Arizona k-12 scholarship tax credit case. This is great news, and paves the way for the Court to ultimately overturn the 9th Circuit’s credulity-straining legal misadventure.

For the details, see the Cato brief in this case, which was joined by the American Federation for Children and Foundation for Educational Choice.

Supreme Court Will Hear Appeal of School Choice Case is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

I’m a bit late to the immigration party — in part because I’ve been traveling on my Obamacare debate tour and in part because the Kagan Supreme Court nomination and end-of-term Supreme Court decisions have sucked away all my time.  Still, I do have a few things to add beyond Dan Griswold’s excellent points about what real immigration reform would look like and why Arizona’s new law, love it or hate it, at least has the benefit of raising the need for such fundamental reform into the national political discussion.  (Jeffrey Miron also offers some sensible suggestions, and Roger Pilon points out that doing nothing is simply not tenable as a matter of policy or politics.)

First, the Arizona law — which I’ve actually read, unlike the attorney general and the secretary of homeland security – is carefully crafted so as not to go beyond the scope of federal law and so, as Dan alludes in his thoughtful podcast (drawing on discussions with Roger), is probably constitutional.  Here are the key things it does:

1. Creates the new state crime of “trespassing by illegal aliens,” which essentially consists of being in the state in violation of federal immigration laws as determined by an officer or agency authorized by the federal government to verify immigration status;
2. Sets out that no official or agency of the state or its political subdivisions (county, city, etc.) ”may adopt a policy that limits the enforcement of federal laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law;”
3. State (and local) law enforcement officials shall make a “reasonable attempt . . . when practicable, to determine the immigration status” of any person with whom they have made “lawful contact . . . where reasonable suspicion exists that the [detained] person is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States;”
4. If an alien who is unlawfully in the United States is convicted of violating any state or local law [including the new "trespassing by illegal aliens"], the alien “shall be transferred immediately [on discharge from imprisonment or assessment of fine for the offense] to the custody of the [federal immigration authorities];”
5. A police officer “may lawfully stop any person who is operating a motor vehicle of the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the person is in violation of any civil traffic law and [the the pre-existing law against human smuggling];”
6. Makes it illegal to stop to hire or pick up passengers for work if the vehicle “blocks or impedes the normal  movement of traffic;”
7. Makes it illegal for an illegal alien to knowingly apply for work, solicit work in a public place, or perform work as an employee or independent contractor;
8. Makes it illegal for anyone violating the law (including the new illegal hiring law, as well as pre-existing prohibitions on hiring illegal aliens) to transport, move, conceal, or harbor persons who the alleged violator knows to be illegally in the United States, as well as to encourage or induce aliens to come to Arizona illegally;
9. Provides an entrapment defense to the pre-existing crime of employing illegal aliens (whether knowingly or intentionally); and
10. Authorizes the immobilization or impoundment of vehicles used to committ various vehicle-related offenses relating to illegal aliens.

None of these provisions, on their face, appear to be unconstitutional, in the sense of Arizona intruding on federal authority over immigration policy.  Indeed, as reported last week by the Washington Post, this conclusion is backed by a 2002 memo from the Office of Legal Counsel — the Department of Justice unit that acts as the executive branch’s “outside counsel.”  This memo concludes: first, that states have “inherent power” to make arrests for violating federal law and, second, ”federal statutes should be presumed not to preempt this arrest authority.”  OLC memos are not law themselves but they are the DOJ’s official position on various legal issue.  Having said that, an OLC memo can at any time be withdrawn or replaced — as indeed the 2002 memo replaced an earlier 1996 memo on the subject (or, more famously, Jack Goldsmith withdrew the so-called “torture memos”).  And, of course, Congress could pass a law saying states shall not enforce federal immigration laws.

Second, notwithstanding the new law’s facial constitutionality, state or local law enforcement officials could use it to behave in a way that intrudes on federal prerogatives or violates constitutionally protected individual rights.  That circumstance could give rise to an “as-applied” legal challenge.  If police officers stop Hispanic motorists on pretextual grounds just to ask for their papers, for example, that would constitute a Fourth Amendment violation.  Notably, however, the sections relating to state enforcement of federal immigration laws contains a provision specifying: “This section shall be implemented in a manner consistent with federal laws regulating immigration, protecting the civil rights of all persons and respecting the privileges and immunities of United States citizens.”

Third, just because the law is constitutional doesn’t necessarily mean it’s good policy (just like not everything that some people say is good policy — like Obamacare, or torture during interrogations – is necessarily constitutional).  There are many arguments against the Arizona law unrelated to civil liberties or racial profiling concerns, including that it misdirects state and local resources away from more pressing priorities (such as violent crime); that it’s driven by misguided fears of crime (when crime has actually been dropping in Arizona, and nationally the foreign-born commit crimes at lesser rates than the native-born); and that an “enforcement-first” mentality gets things backwards in that we should first reform and expand the ways people can come here legally and then take action against those who still come illegally.  Similarly, there are many arguments in favor of the Arizona law not based in racism, or political opportunism, or misapplied economics. 

Fourth, the boycotts of Arizona adopted by city councils around the country — at last count, Berkeley, Boston, El Paso, Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, St. Paul, and West Hollywood have all passed resolutions restricting official travel, investment, and/or contracts with the Grand Canyon State – are likely themselves unconstitutional.  That is, unlike private individuals, organizations, and businesses, states (and their political subdivisions) cannot erect barriers to trade against other states.   Preventing such interstate discrimination was, of course, one of the original purposes of the Constitution and, specifically, its Commerce Clause (which grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce).  We often discuss the Commerce Clause in terms of Congress incorrectly invoking it to justify legislation not having anything to do with either commerce or interstate activities — such as, again, the individual health care mandate — but just the same it protects economic liberty by forestalling trade wars.  (Technically, the issue here is the “dormant” Commerce Clause in that cities are intruding on the boycott-less regime Congress has established by not passing boycott laws.)  Lo and behold, Gary Pierce of the Arizona Corporation Commission sent a letter to L.A. Mayor Antonio Villaraigosa threatening to cut-off the 25 percent of its electricity that the City of Angels gets from its eastern neighbor.  “I am confident that Arizona’s utilities would be happy to take those electrons off your hands,” the commissioner says.  Stopping this sort of tit-for-tat silliness — along with being able to better muster national armies — is why we got rid of the Articles of Confederation.

In short, the Arizona immigration law presents a tremendously complex issue, as the Arizona Republic has recognized, that does not lend itself to easy calls or soundbites.  I myself am not certain how I would have voted if I didn’t have the third option (as Arizona doesn’t) of imminent federal reform — to the disconsolation of state legislators around the country who have asked me what they can do to placate a (legitimately) aggrieved public besides enactiong Arizona-style laws.

President Obama and Congress, pass comprehensive immigration reform now!

A Legal Analysis of the New Arizona Immigration Law is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

Mexican President Felipe Calderon comes to the United States and registers his objection to the recently enacted law in Arizona during a press conference and in a few sentences in an address to Congress.

Bill Bennett calls Calderon’s actions a “catastrophe.”

Neoconservatives like Bennett do not see the drug war and the Iraq war policies as catastrophes.

Enough said.

A Neocon’s ‘Catastrophe’ is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog

The Supreme Court is expected to decide tomorrow whether to summarily overturn a Ninth Circuit Court ruling, hear an appeal of that ruling, or let the Ninth Circuit’s decision stand. The case involves Arizona’s k-12 scholarship tax credit program that helps families afford private schooling, which the Ninth Circuit found last year to violate the First Amendment.

Before the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision, I predicted that it would rule against the tax credit program, and that it would eventually be overturned by the Supreme Court. The first part of that prediction came to pass, and I still expect the second part to as well. For the reasons why SCOTUS will overturn the Ninth Circuit, see Cato’s brief in the case. 

Ilya Shapiro (with whom I co-wrote that brief) draws attention today to a great column by George Will in which Will likens the Ninth Circuit to a “stimulus package” for the Supreme Court. It’s a funny analogy, but it’s too benign. It’s more accurate to see the Ninth Circuit as a Denial of Service Attack on American justice. A D.O.S. is a computer attack that prevents Internet surfers from accessing a particular website/server by flooding it with spurious requests. By failing to take Supreme Court precedents seriously, as the Ninth Circuit routinely does, it creates a torrent of ridiculous rulings that demand the Supreme Court’s attention, thereby preventing the nation’s highest court from taking other important cases.

If there is a way for SCOTUS to reprimand the Ninth Circuit for spuriously consuming the nation’s most important legal resources, it would be in the interest of justice for it to do so.

The Ninth Circuit as a Denial of Service Attack on American Justice is a post from Cato @ Liberty - Cato Institute Blog