This Month at Cato Unbound: A Little Foundational Theory
The October, 2011 issue of Cato Unbound tackles some of the foundational questions of political theory: how do we recognize justice? If it’s not utopia, is it still good enough to command our respect? Or allegiance? How do we know? Who are the members of the political community? How are they chosen? What counts as a “reason” for political action?
If all of this sounds abstract, rest assured that lead essayist Gerald Gaus is both lucid and engaging. He writes:
Liberalism’s founding insight was the recognition in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that controversial religious truths could not be the basis of coercive laws and public policies. The task is now to apply this insight to philosophizing about justice itself. This is an extraordinarily difficult lesson for many. Can it really be that I should not endeavor to ensure that my society conforms to my “knowledge” of justice? (Compare: can it really be that my “knowledge” of God’s will should not structure the social order?)
Gaus argues for a “range of justice”—a range of theories that, while perhaps not perfect by anyone’s standards, are still close enough to demand our respect, especially given the large benefits that come from freely engaged social cooperation.
Discussing with him this month are a panel of three other prominent social theorists. Richard Arneson argues that we tolerate one another not because we’re all pretty close to rational (clearly a lot of us aren’t!)—but because intolerance breeds atrocity. Eric Mack argues that classical liberalism is no mere contending sect; it is the right approach to politics, because it offers the greatest leeway for individuals to choose their own ends in life. And Peter J. Boettke argues that any social system that neglects private property will fail to produce a cooperative society in any sense; without market exchange, individuals will fall into strife over scarce resources.
Obviously I won’t be able to do justice to their arguments here, so please do check out Cato Unbound, where discussion will continue through the end of the month.
Cato Unbound: Are Men in Decline?
This month’s Cato Unbound looks at the intersection of education, work, and gender, and asks: Are men in decline? As women have advanced in education, the workplace, and even politics, some fear that the emerging new economy—or perhaps some other factors—are dragging men down. We’ve all heard talk of the Mancession, and it’s well known that men are in the minority now on many college campuses. How long will the trend continue?
Lead essayist Kay Hymowitz makes the case for male decline; Jessica Bennett, Amanda Hess, and Myriam Miedzian give reasons to be skeptical. Hymowitz replies to her critics. (Men, alas, were so far in decline that I couldn’t find a single one to write for this issue.)
The conversation is just getting started, so be sure to drop by again or subscribe to Cato Unbound so you’ll never miss a post.
This Month at Cato Unbound—What’s Wrong with Expert Predictions
This month’s Cato Unbound looks at the failure of expert forecasting.
When I was very young my father received a book of expert predictions edited by David Wallechinsky, Amy Wallace, and Irving Wallace, titled simply The Book of Predictions. How’d they do? Awfully.
Virtually no one predicted the peaceful end of the Soviet empire. The next big technology was still outer space, not information. Nuclear war and overpopulation vied with exotic environmental disasters to do us in. Want to print a document? Your computer can do that! Just walk to the end of your street, where you’ll find a device called a “printer.” I’ve kept the book, and I’ve been interested in the failure of expert prediction ever since.
This month at Cato Unbound, experts—sorry, we had to—Dan Gardner and Philip Tetlock lay out the evidence against forecasting, along with suggestions for how to improve it. But they conclude that many forms of forecasting, even those that once seemed just on the horizon, will perhaps always remain a dream:
Natural science has discovered in the past half-century that the dream of ever-growing predictive mastery of a deterministic universe may well be just that, a dream. There increasingly appear to be fundamental limits to what we can ever hope to predict. Take the earthquake in Japan. Once upon a time, scientists were confident that as their understanding of geology advanced, so would their ability to predict such disasters. No longer. As with so many natural phenomena, earthquakes are the product of what scientists call “complex systems,” or systems which are more than the sum of their parts. Complex systems are often stable not because there is nothing going on within them but because they contain many dynamic forces pushing against each other in just the right combination to keep everything in place. The stability produced by these interlocking forces can often withstand shocks but even a tiny change in some internal conditional at just the right spot and just the right moment can throw off the internal forces just enough to destabilize the system—and the ground beneath our feet that has been so stable for so long suddenly buckles and heaves in the violent spasm we call an earthquake. Barring new insights that shatter existing paradigms, it will forever be impossible to make time-and-place predictions in such complex systems. The best we can hope to do is get a sense of the probabilities involved. And even that is a tall order.
Human systems like economies are complex systems, with all that entails. And bear in mind that human systems are not made of sand, rock, snowflakes, and the other stuff that behaves so unpredictably in natural systems. They’re made of people: self-aware beings who see, think, talk, and attempt to predict each other’s behavior—and who are continually adapting to each other’s efforts to predict each other’s behavior, adding layer after layer of new calculations and new complexity. All this adds new barriers to accurate prediction.
June 2011 Cato Unbound: Targeted Killing and the Rule of Law
When can the executive lawfully kill?
The rule of law itself depends on getting the answer right. Clearly that answer can’t be “never,” because then even defensive wars would be impossible. And it can’t be “whenever,” because that would be the very antithesis of lawful government. As F. A. Hayek wrote, “if a law gave the government unlimited power to act as it pleased, all its actions would be legal, but it would certainly not be under the rule of law” (p. 205).
The answer must be “sometimes”—but which times are those? In wartime? In peacetime? Against aliens? What about citizens? What role do the courts play? And what about the legislature?
In answer to these questions, Cato Unbound lead essayist Ryan Alford draws on the Anglo-American constitutional tradition, arguing that the killing of a citizen or subject without judicial authorization was so far opposed to our traditional legal safeguards that the American Founders didn’t even bother to prohibit it in the Constitution. And yet, he argues, the case of Anwar al-Awlaqi shows that our government now claims this power anyway. The themes of his essay are explored in much more detail in his forthcoming article in the Utah Law Review.
To discuss with him this month, we’ve lined up a panel of legal and historical experts: John C. Dehn of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, Gregory McNeal of Pepperdine University, and Carlton Larson of the University of California at Davis. Each will offer a commentary on Alford’s essay, followed by a discussion among the four on this timely and important subject. Be sure to stop by often, or just subscribe to Cato Unbound‘s RSS feed.
As always, Cato Unbound readers are encouraged to take up our themes, and enter into the conversation on their own websites and blogs, or at other venues. Trackbacks are enabled. We also welcome your letters and may publish them at our option. Send them to jkuznicki at cato.org
Peace by the Numbers
If you follow the news, you might never guess that we’re living in a remarkably peaceful era. But we are. The long-term trends say that war is on the decline—combat fatalities, too. If we value world peace, we shouldn’t be complaining. We should be figuring out why these things are happening—and asking how we can keep them going.
Peace, of course, doesn’t often make the news. There’s nothing dramatic to report. Peace doesn’t explode. It doesn’t kill people. It makes for lousy TV.
I’m hoping, however, that peace makes a good topic at Cato Unbound. This month’s lead essay is by Andrew Mack, director of the Human Security Report Project at Simon Fraser University. If we live in a more secure world, he asks, why is it?
Please join us throughout the month for an empirical discussion of peace and war, the demographics of each, and what it is that makes our era an unusually peaceful one.
Cato Unbound: Property, the State, Libertarians, and the Left
Talk between libertarians and the left usually follows one of two scripts, each of which frustrates me.
In the first script, both sides find things that they can safely dislike together — war, eminent domain, small business licensing — while carefully avoiding all the contentious areas. They’re a lot like that recently divorced couple at the Christmas party you’ve just attended, chattering as much as they dare… but mostly about the weather.
In the second script, someone yells “Taxation is theft!” or “You hate the poor!” and it’s not long before someone gets a drink thrown in their face. Perhaps also like that Christmas party you’ve just attended.
If I may say so myself, this month’s Cato Unbound has been quite different. The disagreements have been sharp, but well-informed and polite. (Even the libertarians are disagreeing among themselves; it’s a good sign that our movement isn’t just a set of dogmatic propositions, as some have claimed.)
As readers may already know, the December issue is about the role of property rights in social democracy. Discussants Daniel Klein, David D. Friedman, Ilya Somin, and Matthias Matthijs are arguing about whether social democracy entails the concept of overlordship — that is, the idea that the state must be the final, true owner of all property in a social democracy. If it’s not explicitly and by declaration, then at least it’s implicitly and by inference from its actions.
Klein shows that social democrats were once quite explicit on the point, and did indeed portray themselves as would-be overlords. Today they have to be cagier, but the claim remains logically implicit, he says.
Friedman argues that property has existed without the state, and perhaps even before the dawn of the human race. The state might claim any number of things, but we should judge it by what it actually accomplishes.
Somin suggests that today’s social democrats aren’t really overlords; they’re pragmatists without much in the way of theoretical principles at all.
And Matthijs actually is a social democrat. A proud one, by the look of it. He’s even European! Rights aren’t meaningful unless something enforces them, he argues, and the state does the work we all depend on. In this sense, all rights are artificial; all rights are created by the state. And he’s gamely defending his claims against a barrage of libertarian criticism.
Is your blood boiling? Or are you giggling behind your hand? Either way, grab yourself another egg nog, promise not to throw it at anyone, and go read the discussion for yourself.
Deirdre McCloskey at Cato Unbound
This month’s Cato Unbound features a lead essay by economist and polymath Deirdre McCloskey. Though she’s been professionally associated with the Chicago School, her ideas are anything but predictable, and she’s been one of the strongest critics of the mainstream of her discipline.
Economic activity, she argues, is driven primarily by forces outside of conventional economic theory. Sure, there’s supply and demand, and we all know the story, and there’s nothing terribly wrong with it, at least as far as it goes. Elaborations on the model aren’t wrong either — externalities, transaction costs, asymmetrical information, problems of coordination and public goods — these too are fine, as far as they go.
Where she disagrees is in her claim that a whole lot of things have to happen inside people’s minds before these things become terribly interesting to talk about. The decision to enter a marketplace, or to behave in ways that we might call “a market,” or even just the decision to look for economic incentives, all depend on some fairly deep value judgments. The creation of a highly market-driven society implies a commitment to a set of values.
What values are we talking about? Here’s a sample:
The Big Economic Story of our times has not been the Great Recession of 2007–2009, unpleasant though it was. And the important moral is not the one that was drawn in the journals of opinion during 2009 — about how very rotten the Great Recession shows economics to be, and especially an economics of free markets. Failure to predict recessions is not what is wrong with economics, whether free-market economics or not. Such prediction is anyway impossible: if economists were so smart as to be able to predict recessions they would be rich. They’re not. No science can predict its own future, which is what predicting business cycles entails. Economists are among the molecules their theory of cycles is supposed to predict. No can do — not in a society in which the molecules are watching and arbitraging.
The important flaw in economics, I argue here, is not its mathematical and necessarily mistaken theory of future business cycles, but its materialist and unnecessarily mistaken theory of past growth. The Big Economic Story of our own times is that the Chinese in 1978 and then the Indians in 1991 adopted liberal ideas in the economy, and came to attribute a dignity and a liberty to the bourgeoisie formerly denied. And then China and India exploded in economic growth. The important moral, therefore, is that in achieving a pretty good life for the mass of humankind, and a chance at a fully human existence, ideas have mattered more than the usual material causes.
A society that denigrates small businesses, small landowners, entrepreneurship, thrift, and innovation will see less of each. It will have different laws, customs, and institutions. Its resources will be used differently. Even its class structure will be different.
Societies that make a place for the artisan, the entrepreneur, the innovator — societies that see these people as valuable — will prosper. That’s the essence of the argument, anyway, and I’m only disappointed that we can’t present it in more detail (McCloskey is in the middle of a four-book series on this one very big idea).
Through the rest of the week, we have a lineup of notable response essayists, including U.C. Davis’s Gregory Clark, science journalist Matt Ridley, and Yale University’s Jonathan Feinstein. Be sure to stop by often, or just subscribe to our RSS feed.
Slippery Slopes and the New Paternalism
At Cato Unbound this month, economist and Cato adjunct scholar Glen Whitman discusses “soft” paternalism — the attempt to manage consumers’ choices in such a way that their “real” preferences come forward.
One often-cited example takes place in the cafeteria: Put fruit and healthy snacks up front, and people will be more likely to choose them. Put the chocolate cake first, and that’s what they pick instead. Paternalism, the argument runs, lies on a continuum, and some forms of it are really quite harmless. It’s not (or not only) a boot stamping on a human face forever. It’s also the nice lady at the cafeteria, who helps you pick out healthy food. Healthy food is what you really wanted anyway. So what could be wrong with that?
Whitman, however, turns the argument around a bit: Legislators, too, suffer from bias. What if paternalistic legislation proves sort of like that chocolate cake? By placing it up front, and by making it look appealing, legislators may choose it too often, and they may neglect the healthier — but to them less appealing — choice of freedom. What if a little paternalism now turns into a lot of paternalism later? And where are our “real” preferences, anyway? Whitman offers arguments for why a slippery slope may very well exist here, and examples of how the theory of soft paternalism has developed teeth in practice.
Joining him later this week will be noted economists Richard Thaler, Jonathan Klick, and Shane Frederick, for a discussion that should last through the next couple of weeks. Be sure to stop by often and see it develop.
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Weekend Links
- Health care insurance mandates: Why it is unconstitutional for the government to force you to purchase a product you don’t want to buy.
- Should malpractice reform be included in the pending health care bill?
- The end of globalization? Cato’s trade policy expert Daniel Griswold debates.
- Doug Bandow on the minaret ban in Switzerland: “Swiss voters underestimated the impact on religious liberty when they voted to ban minaret construction. But Muslims whose nations persecute Christians, Jews, and other religious minorities have no standing to complain. The Islamic world needs to respect religious liberty at home before lecturing the West about intolerance, racism, hatred and Islamophobia.”
- More debate over Hayek and spontaneous order at Cato Unbound.
- Podcast: “Obama’s nation-building in Afghanistan“
Tuesday Links
- Patrick Michaels on Copenhagen: “Expect a lot of heat, not much light, and a punt right into our next election.”
- Why the Supreme Court should strike down the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board: “Imagine a government agency with the authority to create and enforce laws, prosecute and adjudicate violations, and impose criminal penalties. Then throw in the power to levy taxes to pay for all the above. And for good measure, make the agency independent of political oversight.”
- Discussing Hayek over at Cato Unbound: Four problems with spontaneous order.
- Podcast: “Obama’s Patriot Act Duplicity.”
Monday Links
- How the European Union can bring peace to the Middle East.
- Nat Hentoff on the health care debate: “We do not elect the president and Congress to decide how short our lives will be. That decision is way above their pay grades.”
- Video: What can autism teach us about economics?
- Cato’s Malou Innocent debates the troop build up in Afghanistan.
- Over at Cato Unbound, experts discuss the positive and negative outcomes of modernity.
- Podcast: Driverless cars? They aren’t as far away as you think.
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