Is the U.S. Trade Representative a Closet Free Trader?
Not to get him in trouble with his boss, but U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk has been sounding like a free trader lately. I’m beginning to think Ambassador Kirk consumes the analyses we produce over here at the Cato Institute’s Herbert A. Stiefel Center for Trade Policy Studies. Well, let me rephrase: that he consumes the meat of our analyses, but still hides the vegetables under the picked-over potatoes.
Still, that’s pretty commendable for a Washington policymaker.
Just the other day, Ambassador Kirk lamented how policymakers do a poor job selling trade agreements to a skeptical public. Inside U.S. Trade [$] paraphrased Kirk as saying:
[P]oliticians must ‘talk about trade differently’ and demonstrate how trade policy is directly responsible for sustaining economic growth and creating jobs. If the focus is only on how trade deals will improve supply chains for businesses, for instance, that is not enough to build the base for support for trade deals.
That is a sound criticism. The typical, mercantilist arguments that tout the benefits of exports and rationalize imports as necessary evils are foolish and self-defeating—particularly in a country that will run trade deficits into the distant future as its economy continues to grow and attract greater amounts of foreign investment. The freedom to engage in commerce with whom and how one chooses, and the impact of import competition are the real benefits of freer trade.
Like some others in town, we at Cato advocate free trade. But unlike most, we advocate free trade here in the United States—not just over there in foreign countries. Free trade requires more than getting other governments to eliminate their barriers to U.S. exports; it requires getting the U.S. government to eliminate its barriers to U.S. imports from abroad. The latter is the real objective of free trade advocacy and the well-spring of most of its benefits.
But the economic benefits of imports rarely make the Washington “free trade advocate’s” Top-10 list of talking points, nor do they officially register in the minds of trade negotiators, whose chief aims are to secure for their exporters the greatest possible access to foreign markets, while simultaneously conceding to foreigners as little access as possible to the domestic market. “Import” is a four-letter word in the Washington trade policy community.
That’s why Ambassador Kirk’s recent comments have me thinking: epiphany?
In a statement responding to the WTO Appellate Body ruling last week that China’s export restrictions on nine raw materials were not in conformity with that country’s WTO commitments, Ambassador Kirk made the point that U.S. firms that use those raw materials will be better able to compete once those restrictions are lifted.
Today’s decision ensures that core manufacturing industries in this country can get the materials they need to produce and compete on a level playing field.
The USTR had previously made the following point:
These raw material inputs are used to make many processed products in a number of primary manufacturing industries, including steel, aluminum and various chemical industries. These products, in turn become essential components in even more numerous downstream products.
Technically, Ambassador Kirk is not engaging in profanity—he doesn’t use the word import. But his argument against Chinese export restrictions is just as applicable to U.S. import restrictions. Removing restrictions—whether the export variety imposed by foreign governments or the import variety imposed by our own—reduces input prices, lowers domestic production costs, enables more competitive final-goods pricing and, thus, greater profits for U.S.-based producers.
So let’s take Ambassador Kirk’s sound logic and see if it might apply elsewhere in the realm of U.S. trade policy. If the U.S. government thought it worthwhile to take China to the WTO over the restrictions it imposes on raw material exports because those restrictions hurt U.S. producers, then why does the same U.S. government impose its own restrictions on imports of some of the very same raw materials? That’s right. The United States maintains antidumping duties on magnesium, silicon metal, and coke (all raw materials subject to Chinese export restrictions).
If Ambassador Kirk ate the vegetables as well as the meat of Cato’s trade policy analyses, he would recognize that his logic provides a compelling case for antidumping reforms, such as one requiring the administering authorities to consider the economic impact of antidumping measures on producers in downstream industries, such as magnesium-cast automobile parts producers, manufacturers of silicones used in solar panels, and even steel producers, who require coke for their blast furnaces.
We will know that the ambassador has eaten his free-trade vegetables when he starts sounding like former USTR Robert Zoellick who once hoped for the Doha Round of trade negotiations that it would “[T]urn every corner store in America into a duty-free shop.”
More on the Ex-Im Bank
But I realize that my recent call to “X Out the Ex-Im Bank” will be facing some very entrenched interests in Washington, and some well-funded lobby groups. The Bank has historically attracted bipartisan support, and a renewal of its charter sailed through the House Committee on Financial Services earlier this year. The Washington establishment loves this program.
My friend and long-time Ex-Im Bank supporter Gary Hufbauer of the Peterson Institute for International Economics published a critique a few weeks ago of my analysis, and calls for a doubling of Ex-Im’s authorization cap (from $100 billion to $200 billion). His piece is a fair characterization of my arguments, and at least Gary tries to counter them with actual facts and analysis (not always a given in an increasingly poisonous trade policy environment). But it seems to me that Gary focuses his critique on my assessment of the effectiveness of the Bank. That’s fair enough, of course, but I tried in my paper to make the point that the efficiency or efficacy of the Ex-Im Bank’s activities is kind of irrelevant. The important point, which Gary did not address, is that it is simply not the proper role of the federal government to be in this business at all, even if they can operate “efficiently” (which I do not concede in any case). Where in the Constitution is the federal government authorized to be involved in the export credit business (a business, by the way, that benefits mainly large, profitable companies)?
My opposition to the Bank, in other words, is at a more fundamental level. On an empirical level—and this is where Gary’s critique is focused—can markets work well enough in trade finance, and if not, can government intervention work better? Gary points to the Bank’s low default rate as evidence that private markets are missing good opportunities:
These figures suggest that the Ex-Im Bank plays a large role in facilitating exports to countries that encounter reluctance from private banks but nonetheless are not ‘bad risks.” Judging by its low default rate, the Ex-Im Bank’s risk assessment seems more correct than the private market.
But I would argue that its low default rate suggests the Ex-Im Bank’s backing is unnecessary. We don’t know that private credit wasn’t available to finance those exports. And even if it wasn’t, private credit not always being available on terms that the trading partners would like does not necessarily signify market failure. So a finance company missed an opportunity that may have paid out. So what? Maybe they had even better opportunities available to them that we (and bureaucratic Washington) don’t know about, or they simply wanted to hold on to their capital for future investment or to meet new reserve standards. The would-be exporter might miss out, but government intervention to direct that private capital (either through mandates, or siphoning it through the Ex-Im Bank) would come at another producer’s or bank shareholders’ expense.
Gary argues that:
Ex-Im’s capability should be strengthened so that the United States can respond when official finance offered by other countries violates the principles of fair competition…Successful multilateral negotiations…are certainly a superior option to tit-for-tat retaliation…[but]…without sufficient leverage…it is difficult to see what will bring China and India to the negotiating table.
But will China and India (and others) see higher Ex-Im funding as “leverage” to bring them to the table, or will it be seen as just the next step in the escalating arms race of subsidized export credit? I suspect, and fear, the latter.
Yet More U.S. Trade Policy Incoherence
In hailing this week’s ruling by a World Trade Organization dispute settlement panel that certain Chinese government restrictions on raw material exports violate China’s WTO commitments, U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk made the point that such restrictions hurt U.S. manufacturers who rely on those imported raw materials.
Today’s panel report represents a significant victory for manufacturers and workers in the United States and the rest of the world. The panel’s findings are also an important confirmation of fundamental principles underlying the global trading system. All WTO Members – whether developed or developing – need non-discriminatory access to raw material supplies in order to grow and thrive.
And, simultaneously, by artificially increasing domestic supply, the same export restrictions advantage Chinese manufacturing consumers of those materials.
China’s extensive use of export restraints for protectionist economic gain is deeply troubling. China’s policies provide substantial competitive advantages for downstream Chinese industries at the expense of non-Chinese users of these materials.
And here’s how the USTR website described the central issues of the case:
China maintains a number of measures that restrain exports of raw material inputs for which it is the top, or near top, world producer. These measures skew the playing field against the United States and other countries by creating substantial competitive benefits for downstream Chinese producers that use the inputs in the production and export of numerous processed steel, aluminum and chemical products and a wide range of further processed products…These raw material inputs are used to make many processed products in a number of primary manufacturing industries, including steel, aluminum and various chemical industries. These products, in turn become essential components in even more numerous downstream products.
I agree.
But what you won’t find in the USTR’s statements is any acknowledgement that the U.S. government, in defiance of Ambassador Kirk’s logic, maintains import restrictions on three of the nine raw materials at issue in the China WTO case. That’s right! While arguing correctly that Chinese restrictions on exports of magnesium, silicon metal, and coke raise production costs and subsequently reduce U.S. manufacturing competitiveness, the U.S. government maintains antidumping restrictions on the same inputs, which raises U.S. production costs and reduces U.S. manufacturing competitiveness. (See pages 14-17 of this new Cato paper to learn what happened to certain U.S. industrial consumers of these raw materials)
How can such dissonance persist, you ask? Under the U.S. antidumping law, manufacturing consumers of subject imports have no legal standing to participate in the proceedings. In fact, the U.S. administering agencies are forbidden by statute from even considering the impact of antidumping duties on the downstream, consuming industries. Nor is an assessment of the costs of prospective antidumping restrictions on the broader economy permitted to carry any weight under the statute.
Trade Agreements Promote U.S. Manufacturing Exports
Do trade agreements promote trade? The answer appears to be yes. In a new Cato Free Trade Bulletin released today, I examine the record of trade agreements the United States has signed with 14 other nations during the past decade.
The impact of those agreements on U.S. trade is a timely subject because Congress may soon consider pending free-trade agreements (FTAs) with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama. Opponents of such deals often argue that they open the U.S. economy to unfair competition from low-wage countries, displacing U.S. manufacturing. Advocates argue the agreements do open the U.S. market further to imports, but they open markets abroad even wider for U.S. exports.
Based on actual post-agreement trade flows, I found that both total imports and exports with the 14 countries grew faster than overall U.S. trade since each agreement went into effect. For politicians obsessed with manufacturing exports, the study should be especially encouraging. Here is a key finding:
Politically sensitive manufacturing trade with the 14 FTA partners has expanded more rapidly than overall U.S. manufacturing trade, especially on the export side. U.S. manufacturing exports to the recent FTA partners were 10.5 percent higher in 2010 compared to our overall export growth since each agreement was signed. That represents an additional $8 billion in manufacturing exports.
I’ll be discussing the three pending trade agreements alongside William Lane of Caterpillar Inc. at a Cato Hill Briefing on Wednesday of this week. Along with the new study on the past FTAs, I’ll be talking about our recent studies on the Columbia and Korea agreements.
The (Beginning of the) End of the Shameful U.S. Cotton Deal?
Heartening news from the Appropriations Committee yesterday: they voted to cut aid to farmers generally, and to make significant changes to an egregious cotton program. But first, some background. You’ll recall the embarrassing deal made by the Obama administration last year to head off Brazil’s right to impede American exports in retaliation for WTO-illegal cotton support. The United States is, in other words, now sending almost $150m worth of “technical assistance” and “capacity building” funds to Brazil, just so we can continue to subsidize American cotton growers without penalty (so much for U.S. promotion of the rule of law in international commercial relations). Rep. Ron Kind (D-WI) tried to end that deal earlier this year, but to no avail. Big Ag’s friends in Congress argued, unfortunately successfully, that any changes to the cotton bribes should be dealt with in the context of the 2012 Farm Bill, and by the agriculture committees (good luck with that).
But yesterday, the Appropriations Committee approved by voice vote an amendment from Rep. Jeff Flake (R-AZ) to take the fiscal 2013 payment to Brazil from funds that would normally go to supporting U.S. cotton growers. According to an article [$] in the Congressional Quarterly, Rep. Flake argued that “American cotton growers should pay the bill since the United States was making the payment on their behalf.” Well played, sir. Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) filed an amendment that would send the FY2012 cotton payment to the Women’s, Infants and Children nutrition program instead.
The Committee also voted to lower the income eligibility cap to $250,000 AGI.
The CQ article did contain this worrying footnote, however:
Support for the amendments may be tenuous — especially if lawmakers cannot hide behind the anonymity of a voice vote. After winning the voice vote in committee, Flake sought a roll call, prompting appropriators of both parties to suggest that he did not need the recorded vote. Flake took their advice and demurred.
Leglislators are usually shy about publicizing their positions only when they think it could get them in political hot water, so let’s not uncork the champagne yet.
Media Miss Real News in Latest Trade Report
This morning’s report from the U.S. Department of Commerce that the pesky trade deficit shrank unexpectedly in October is being hailed in the media as “good news” for the economy, while the real news behind the numbers remains buried.
According to the latest monthly trade report, exports of U.S. goods rose in October compared to September, while imports declined slightly. Rising exports are good news in anybody’s book, but according to the conventional Keynesian and mercantilist logic, falling imports must also be good for the economy because that means consumers are spending more on domestically produced goods, right? Wrong.
In the real world, that assumption is almost always false, as I did my best to document a few weeks back in an op-ed titled, “Are rising imports a boon or bane to the economy?”
The real news in the report is the spectacular rise of U.S. exports to China. Year to date, U.S. exports to China are up 34 percent compared to the same period in 2009. That compares to a 21 percent increase in U.S. exports to the rest of the world excluding China. China is now the no. 3 market for U.S. exports, behind only our NAFTA partners Canada and Mexico, and by far the fastest growing major market.
The politically inflammatory bilateral trade deficit with China is also up 20 percent so far this year, but our trade deficit with the rest of the world excluding China is up 38 percent.
Yet Sens. Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., and Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., are still talking about pushing a bill during the lame-duck session that would authorized the same Commerce Department to assess duties on imports from China because of its undervalued currency. A cheaper Chinese currency relative to the U.S. dollar supposedly inhibits U.S. exports to China while tempting American consumers to buy even more of those useful consumer goods assembled in China. [For the record, U.S. imports from China so far this year have grown, too, but at a rate slightly below imports from the rest of the world.]
To anyone taking an objective look at the numbers, this morning’s trade report shows that whatever the wisdom of China’s currency policy, it has not been a real obstacle to robust U.S. export growth, nor has it fueled an extraordinary growth in our bilateral trade balance with China. Members of Congress should drop their obsession with China trade and move on to more urgent matters.
China Bill All about Saving Lawmakers’ Jobs
The House is expected to vote today on a bill that would allow U.S. companies to petition the Commerce Department for protective tariffs against imports from countries with “misaligned currencies.” Everybody knows the bill is aimed squarely at China.
Advocates of the legislation say it is about jobs, and they are partly right. The bill is about saving the jobs of incumbent lawmakers who are desperate to appear tough on China trade, which they blame for the loss of U.S. manufacturing jobs.
As my colleague Dan Ikenson and I have argued at length, in blog posts, op-eds, and longer studies,
- A stronger Chinese currency will not put a major dent in our large bilateral trade deficit with China, certainly not any time in the near future.
- The bilateral deficit with China and America’s overall trade deficit is not a drag on growth or a barrier to manufacturing exports and output.
- U.S. manufacturing has not been decimated by trade. In fact it has been expanding as American producers move up the value chain to more sophisticated, high-tech products.
- Provoking a needless trade spat with China will jeopardize the healthy export success American companies have enjoyed in China’s fast-growing market.
Let’s hope cooler, wiser heads in the Senate and the White House save us from this election-season folly.
Prominent Economists Debate Trade Deficits
Following Dan’s and David’s recent posts on the trade deficit and its (ir)relevance, allow me to draw readers’ attention to the Economist’s “By Invitation” blog, where invited prominent economists debate topical economic issues.
One of their current questions is: Should governments take any steps to boost exports? That’s an important topic, and an especially timely one given the Obama administration’s ‘National Export Initiative,’ a five-year plan to double U.S. exports. All of us here at Cato’s trade center have previously expressed skepticism about the feasiblity and/or wisdom of that plan, and Dan Ikenson blogged earlier today about the administration’s apparent incoherence in pursuit of that goal.
The Economist‘s debate talks about industrial policy and export promotion in the abstract, rather than the NEI per se, but I recommend checking it out. Scott Sumner and Laurence Kotlikoff make especially good sense.
Mexican Retaliation for U.S. Truck Ban is Proper
The Mexican government announced yesterday that it will expand the list of U.S. products subject to punitive import duties in retaliation for a brazen, 15-year-long refusal of the United States to honor its NAFTA commitment to allow Mexican long-haul trucks to compete in the U.S. market. Given continued U.S. intransigence on the issue, Mexico’s decision is understandable, if not laudable.
The dispute is not very complicated. Under the terms of the deal, Mexican trucks were to have been able to compete in U.S. border states by 1995, and throughout the United States by 2000. But President Clinton, at the behest of the Teamsters union, suspended implementation of the trucking provision on the grounds that Mexican trucks weren’t safe enough for U.S. highways.
By 1998, the Mexicans had had enough, and brought a formal complaint under the NAFTA dispute settlement system, and in 2001, prevailed with a unanimous panel decision that found the United States in violation of the agreement, and ruled that Mexican trucks meeting U.S. safety standards had to be given access to the U.S. market.
In response to the NAFTA decision, Congress stipulated 22 safety requirements that Mexican trucks had to satisfy in order to gain access to the U.S. market. But before the U.S. Department of Transportation could grant any permits to Mexican truckers, in 2002, environmental and labor groups filed a lawsuit to block implementation on the grounds that the regulations violated U.S. environmental law.
In 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously struck down the truck ban, and soon after a government pilot program was developed to allow a limited number of Mexican trucks to serve the U.S. market. But funding for the pilot program was cut off by a Teamsters-friendly Congress in 2008, which effectively put the U.S. market off limits to Mexican trucks once again—and the United States squarely in violation of its NAFTA obligations, again.
In August 2009, after it became apparent that the administration and Congress preferred the economic cost of the trucking ban to the political cost of crossing the Teamsters, the Mexican government tried to change the equation by imposing $2.4 billion in retaliatory duties on about 90 U.S. products. A Mexican trucking association also filed a $6-billion lawsuit against the U.S. government.
But with no discernible progress toward resolution over the past year, the Mexican government announced yesterday that it will expand the list of U.S. products subject to punitive, retaliatory duties in an effort to convince Congress and the administration to finally live up to America’s word.
The Mexican government is right to retaliate—and to expand the list of products subject to punitive duties. Of course, retaliation hurts innocents, like U.S. businesses and workers, and Mexican businesses and consumers, who have nothing to do with the central dispute. And it increases the amount of red tape and the role of governments in international trade. But retaliation—when authorized by agreement and properly targeted—can also be an effective tool in promoting trade liberalization, reducing red tape, and diminishing the impositions of government.
It is by changing the political calculus that retaliation can be effective. Thus far, U.S. politicians have found the economic costs of the Mexican trucking ban and the retaliation to be tolerable (for themselves)—at least relative to the expected political costs from doing the right thing by ending the ban. By expanding the list to include other products, like oranges, the Mexicans hope to impress upon other U.S. interests, like the citrus industry in a very important swing state, that they have dogs in this fight as well.
Between the rising costs on the economic side of the equation and the diminishing political benefits on the other, support among politicians for the truck ban should dissipate.
The Obama administration’s failure to connect the dots is surprising. Its fealty to the Teamsters directly undermines the lofty goals of its National Export Initiative—which seeks to double U.S. exports in five years. On trade policy, the administration appears yet to fully grasp that the hip bone’s connected to the thigh bone, the thigh bone’s connected to the knee bone, the knee bone’s connected to the ankle bone, etc. When you restrict imports (in the immediate case, imports of Mexican trucking services), you restrict exports.
The rising economic and political costs of the truck ban suggest that something’s going to have to give soon. By amplifying the stakes, the Mexicans are right to hasten that day.
The Half-a-Loaf National Export Initiative
In his State of the Union address this year, President Obama announced a goal of doubling U.S. exports in five years. The “National Export Initiative” has since become the centerpiece of his administration’s trade policy, complete with its own Executive Order, organizational structure, and dedicated website.
Although I would be happy to see exports double in five years, I am skeptical of efforts to enshrine that goal as a national imperative. I worry that Five Year Plans and the setting of export targets puts the United States on the slippery slope to industrial policy, which is being touted nowadays with growing vim and vigor by columnists, politicians and other analysts who wish the United States were more like China.
But the economic straight jacket of industrial policy is not an imminent outcome of the NEI. And some of the reforms under consideration are sensible. For example, efforts to clarify, simplify, and streamline U.S. export control procedures are likely to reduce regulatory obstacles and spur meaningful export growth without imposing new burdens or diverting resources from elsewhere in the economy. Likewise, the administration’s discovery of the virtues of passing the long-pending bilateral trade agreements with South Korea, Colombia, and Panama could lead to the reduction or elimination of artificial barriers to U.S. exports in a variety of economic sectors.
But while we might rejoice in export-led economic growth, the National Export Initiative suffers from myopia, as it institutionalizes public misperceptions about how trade bestows its benefits on consumers and businesses. Just take a look at the program’s eight focus priorities:
U.S. Antidumping Regime Restrains U.S. Export Growth
In honor of World Trade Week—and for its decreed purpose of educating Americans about trade—this post is about U.S. trade policy working at cross-purposes with other policies or goals of the administration. So numerous are these examples of trade policy dissonance, that a committed wonk could devote an entire website to the task of documenting them.
If the administration were serious about making trade policy work—rather than just paying it lip service—it would compile its own exhaustive list of laws, regulations, policies, and practices that actually undermine its stated objectives of facilitating economic growth, investment, and job creation through expanded trade opportunities. Then, it would make the changes necessary to ensure that our policies are paddling in the same direction. But that is not happening—at least as far as I can see.
The Good Side of Bad News in Europe
What does the Greco-Euro currency/debt crisis mean for the U.S. economy?
Nearly everyone except the uniquely wise economist John Cochrane assumes very bad “contagion” effects –on U.S. banks, exports and particularly U.S. manufacturing.
This echoes identical anxieties while the world went through a far more dramatic Asian currency crisis after July 1997, and a Russian debt crisis the following May.
The most widely ignored effect of that crisis, however, was to depress foreign demand for oil, and thus slash oil prices to U.S. buyers from $25 a barrel in early 1997 to $11 by the end of 1998.
Oil is a major input into the manufacturing process (e.g., chemicals and plastics), and a major cost of distribution (trucks, trains and airplanes). It is also a major determinant of the cost of all energy sources used in making other goods such as aluminum and paper. When marginal costs go down, it becomes profitable to expand production.
At the height of the Asian/Russian crises, the table below shows that U.S. manufacturing output rose by more than 10 percent. It’s an ill wind that doesn’t blow somebody some good.
Looking at the same phenomenon from the other side, every recession but one (1960) was preceded by a big increase in the price of oil. For oil importers like the U.S., cheaper oil is definitely better.
During the last big foreign currency/debt crisis, the real growth of U.S. Gross Domestic Purchases (the home-grown portion of GDP) jumped by 4.7% in 1997 and 5.5% in 1998. Yet the Fed cut interest rates three times in October and November of 1998 because of what was happening in other countries.
The table show what happened to the price of oil and to U.S. manufacturing from June 1997 to December 1998. The middle column is the price of a barrel of West Texas crude, and the column to the right is the U.S. industrial production index for the manufacturing sector.
1997-06 19.17 87.80
1997-07 19.63 88.12
1997-08 19.93 89.69
1997-09 19.79 90.45
1997-10 21.26 90.98
1997-11 20.17 92.05
1997-12 18.32 92.52
1998-01 16.71 93.36
1998-02 16.06 93.31
1998-03 15.02 93.13
1998-04 15.44 93.68
1998-05 14.86 94.25
1998-06 13.66 93.53
1998-07 14.08 92.96
1998-08 13.36 95.40
1998-09 14.95 95.11
1998-10 14.39 95.96
1998-11 12.85 96.08
1998-12 11.28 96.63
In recent weeks, as the debt and currency problems in Euroland hit the front page, the price of crude oil fell by about 20 percent.
Once again, as in 1997-98, everyone may be watching the wrong ball in the wrong court.
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