A Plug for Financial Fiasco
The distinguished Harvard economist Richard N. Cooper, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, praises Johan Norberg’s Financial Fiasco: How America’s Infatuation With Homeownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis in Foreign Affairs:
The economic crisis of 2008-9 will no doubt spawn dozens of books. Here are two good early ones….
Norberg, a knowledgeable Swede, provides a much more detailed account of the broader events of 2007-9, from the useful perspective of a non-American. He finds plenty of blame with all the major players in the U.S. financial system: politicians, who thoughtlessly pushed homeownership on thousands who could not afford it; mortgage loan originators, who relaxed credit standards; securitizers, who packaged poor-quality mortgage loans as though these were conventional loans; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which endowed the leading rating agencies with oligopoly powers; the rating agencies, which knowingly overrated securitized mortgages and their derivatives; and investors, who let the ratings substitute for due diligence. Senior management in large parts of the financial community lacked an attribute essential to any well-functioning financial market: integrity. But solutions, Norberg warns, do not lie in greater regulation or public ownership. Politicians and bureaucrats are not immune from the “short-termism” that plagues private firms.
The other book he praises, by the way, is Paul Krugman’s The Return of Depression Economics. And oddly, his list of Norberg’s villains doesn’t include one implied in the title: the Federal Reserve Bank, which issued the “easy money” that allowed the boom to happen. Purchase Financial Fiasco here or on Kindle.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
The Fed and Policy Uncertainty
How and when should the Fed unwind the enormous monetary expansion it undertook in response to the financial crisis and recession? The WSJ reports [$]:
As the Federal Reserve’s next meeting approaches in early November, an internal debate is brewing about how and when to signal the possibility of interest-rate increases.
The Fed has said since March that it will keep rates very low for an “extended period.” Long before it raises rates, however, it will need to change that public signal to financial markets.
Because the recovery is so young and is expected to be so weak, many central bank officials are comfortable, for now, keeping rates very low. But they are beginning to strategize about how to walk away from the “extended period” language.
My suggestion is that the Fed announce a path of gradual increases in the federal funds rate, say beginning next year and lasting for two years, until the rate is at some “normal level.”
This approach is different than what the Fed is likely to undertake; it will probably want to maximize “discretion,” the ability to adjust on the fly as conditions unfold.
My approach maximizes predictability and reassurance: it commits the Fed to shrinking the money supply and heading off future inflation. This reassures markets and takes substantial uncertainty out of the picture.
The problem with my approach is the pre-commitment: everyone knows the Fed could abandon a pre-announced path.
But such an announcement might still give markets useful guidance, and the Fed would know that any deviation would itself upset markets, and this might encourage adherence to the pre-commitment.
C/P Libertarianism, from A to Z
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; General
Federal Reserve as Cash Cow
Scheduled for consideration before the House Financial Services Committee this week is a draft bill creating a Consumer Financial Protection Agency.
While there is a lot wrong with the bill — after all it is based on the premise that somehow consumers were tricked into not making a downpayment or re-financing thousands out of their homes, and then walking away — perhaps the most important provision, and the least discussed, is funding the agency by a transfer of cash from the Federal Reserve. Section 119 of the bill requires the Federal Reserve to transfer an amount equal to 10 percent of its expenses to the new agency’s Director.
This I believe is the first time in history that Congress is using the Federal Reserve to simply fund another agency. Why stop there, how about have the Fed just prints trillions of dollars to pay for the rest of the government? If Congress believes this agency will benefit the public, then the agency should be funded by the public, by a direct appropriations raised by taxes.
Of course after watching Ben Bernanke turn the Fed’s balance sheet into a slush fund for Wall Street, it was only going to be a matter of time before someone in Congress decided to use that slush fund for their own purposes. So much for transparency in government.
New Paper: Would a Stricter Fed Policy and Financial Regulation Have Averted the Financial Crisis?
Many commentators have argued that if the Federal Reserve had followed a stricter monetary policy earlier this decade when the housing bubble was forming, and if Congress had not deregulated banking but had imposed tighter financial standards, the housing boom and bust—and the subsequent financial crisis and recession—would have been averted.
In a new study, Cato scholars Jagadeesh Gokhale and Peter Van Doren investigate those claims and dispute them.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
CAP’s Proposal to Add ‘Public Members’ to Corporate Boards Is Flawed
Today the Center for American Progress rolled out its proposal that we add “public directors” to the boards of companies that have been bailed out by the government. CAP scholar Emma Coleman Jordan argues that “public directors will provide a corrective to the boards of the financial institutions that helped cause the crisis.”
One has to wonder whether Ms. Jordan has ever heard of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. If she had, she might recall that a substantial number of the board members of Fannie and Freddie were so-called “public” members appointed by the President. Perhaps she can ask CAP adjunct scholar and former Fannie Mae executive Ellen Seidman to review the history of those companies for her.
Reform Needed, but Obama Plan Would Result in More Financial Crises, not Less
Today President Obama took his financial reform plan to the airwaves. While there is no doubt our financial system is in need of financial reform, the President’s plan would make bailouts a permanent feature of the regulatory landscape. Rather than ending “too big to fail” — the President wants us to believe that with additional discretion and power, the same Federal Reserve that missed the boat last time will save us next time.
The truth is that the President’s plan will result in a small number of companies being viewed by debtholders as “too big to fail”. These companies would see their funding costs decline, allowing them to gain market-share at the expense of their rivals, making these firms even larger. Greater concentration in our financial services industry is the last thing we need, yet the Obama plan all but guarantees it.
Obama also chooses myth’s over facts. The President claims that de-regulation and competition among regulators caused the crisis. The facts could not be more different. Those institutions at the center of the crisis — Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman –could not choose their regulator.
The President’s plan chooses convenient targets and protects entrenched interests, rather than address the true underlying causes of the crisis. At no time have we heard the President discuss the expansionary monetary policies that helped fuel the bubble. Nor has the President talked about the global imbalances — the global savings glut that poured surplus savings from the rest of the world into the US. But then the President appears to hope that loose monetary policy and continued American consumption funded by China will get him out of his own political problems with the economy. It is especially striking that the President makes little mention of the housing bubble, as if it was only the bust that was the problem.
The President continues to say he inherited this crisis. While true, he did not inherit the same individuals — Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke — who were at the center of creating the crisis. All Obama needs to do is find a position for Hank Paulson and he will have completely re-assembled the Bush financial team.
Without real reform — fixing Fannie and Freddie, scaling back the massive subsidies for leverage in our tax code, loose monetary policy – it will only be a matter of time before the next crisis hits. If we implement the President’s plan, we will, however, guarantee that the next crisis will be even larger and severe than the current one.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Regulatory Studies
No, the Fed Did Not Stabilize the Economy
Commenting on a recent article of mine in The Wall Street Journal, Peter Gartside claims that:
Prior to 1913, the U.S. annual gross domestic product changes oscillated between extremes of approximately plus or minus 15%. After the establishment of the Federal Reserve Board, the limits of GDP oscillations narrowed to approximately plus or minus 6%.
You may well wonder where he got that idea, since there are no official estimates of gross domestic product (GDP) for years before 1929. In the early 1960s, however, John Kendrick and Simon Kuznets bravely attempted to construct such estimates for gross national product (GNP). That would be close enough to modern GDP data were it not for the primitive statistics and technology they had to work with.
The table (after the jump) shows these heroic old estimates for real GNP from 1889 to 1914. In that period, there was only one year (1908) in which the drop in GNP exceeded 6% and none that remotely approaches the “minus 15%” figure of Mr. Garstide’s imagination.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Tax and Budget Policy
Embracing Bushonomics, Obama Re-appoints Bernanke
In re-appointing Bernanke to another four year term as Fed chairman, President Obama completes his embrace of bailouts, easy money and deficits as the defining characteristics of his economic agenda.
Bernanke, along with Secretary Geithner (then New York Fed president) were the prime movers behind the bailouts of AIG and Bear Stearns. Rather than “saving capitalism,” these bailouts only spread panic at considerable cost to the taxpayer. As evidenced in his “financial reform” proposal, Obama does not see bailouts as the problem, but instead believes an expanded Fed is the solution to all that is wrong with the financial sector. Bernanke also played a central role as the Fed governor most in favor of easy money in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble — a policy that directly contributed to the housing bubble. And rather than take steps to offset the “global savings glut” forcing down rates, Bernanke used it as a rationale for inaction.
Perhaps worse than Bush and Obama’s rewarding of failure in the private sector via bailouts is the continued rewarding of failure in the public sector. The actors at institutions such as the Federal Reserve bear considerable responsibility for the current state of the economy. Re-appointing Bernanke sends the worst possible message to both the American public and to government in general: not only will failure be tolerated, it will be rewarded.
Would Summers Be Any Worse than Bernanke?
As I have argued elsewhere, Bernanke’s record as both a Fed governor and Chair suggest we be better off with a new Fed Chair come January 2010, when Bernanke’s term as Chair expires. Outside of those who believe the bailouts have saved capitalism, two very reasonable arguments are put forth for keeping Bernanke at the helm: 1) in a time of crisis, the markets need certainty and dislike change; and 2) the alternatives, such as Larry Summers, would be worse. Both these points have real merit, however I believe in both cases the pros of change outweigh the cons of staying the course with Bernanke. I will save the “certainty” debate for another time, for now, let’s ask ourselves: Would Summers really be any worse than Bernanke?
Before I make the case for Summers, I do want to make clear, President Obama, and the country, would best be served by a “Carter picks Volcker” type moment. Go outside the Administration, go beyond the usual circle of easy-money, new Keynesians. The Fed lacks creditability in two (at least two) important areas: bailouts and inflation. And one doesn’t even need to go outside of the Federal Reserve System to find candidates. Topping my list would be Jeff Lacker (Richmond Fed), Gary Stern (Minn Fed) and Charles Plosser (Philly Fed). Any of these three know the workings of the Fed, have the respect of the Fed staff, and have taken strong positions on both “too big to fail” and easy money. In the case of Gary Stern, it would seem especially appropriate, as his early warnings (see his 2004 book on bank bailouts) were largely ignored and dismissed. If we want to reward and promote those who got it right, these guys are at the top of the list.
But let’s reasonably suppose that Obama wants someone close, someone he personally knows and will stick with tradition by picking a member of his own administration. Without going into any detail, picking Romer would offer little substantial difference with keeping Bernanke. The case for Summers is essentially that here is one instance where his enormous ego would be an asset. One easily gets the sense that when Summers sits next to President Obama, Summers is thinking to himself just how lucky the President is to be sitting next to Larry Summers. One can call Summers lots of things, starstruck is not one of them. Given what we now need most in a Fed Chair is true independence, from especially the Administration but also from Congress, Summers is the only qualified economist close to the President who displays even the slightest streak of independent thinking. Bernanke, in contrast, has endlessly pandered to the Administration and to Congressional Democrats. Summers has been willing on occasion to actually defend the sanctity of contract (remember the debates over the AIG bonuses), a rarity on the Left, and more than Bernanke was willing to say.
So forced to choose between Bernanke and Summers, the need for an independent Fed Chair willing to take on the Administration and Congress, when appropriate, makes Summers a far better choice. That said, here’s to encouraging Obama go outside his comfort zone and pick someone who has the will to remove excess liquidity from the system before the next bubble gets going.
Gallup Poll: Federal Reserve Makes the IRS Look Good
A recent Gallup Poll surveyed the public’s impression of how various federal agencies were doing their job. Of the agencies evaluated, on the bottom was the Federal Reserve Board. Only 30 percent of the respondents rated the Fed’s performance as either excellent or good. I can understand now why Chairman Bernanke felt the need to take his act on the road. Even the IRS managed to get 40 percent of respondents to see its job performance as excellent or good. A majority of the public, 57 percent, sees the Fed’s current performance as either poor or fair.
The result is not just driven by a general public disdain for federal agencies; over a majority of respondents thought such agencies as the Center for Disease Control, NASA and the FBI were doing an excellent or good job.
Nor is the result driven by public ignorance or indifference to the Fed; only a few years ago, back in 2003, 53 percent of Americans said the Federal Reserve was doing an excellent or good job and only 5% called its job performance poor. But then, the Fed was also giving us negative real interest rates at that time as well. Perhaps there’s a good reason to insulate the Fed from short-term public and political pressures. Let’s hope Chairman Bernanke does not read these results as an excuse for repeating the Fed’s 2003 monetary policies.
Don’t Bail Out Bernanke
Here is the message members of Congress should send to Ben Bernanke during the Fed chief’s annual Capitol Hill testimony this week: He is fighting for his job. With his term up in January of next year, Bernanke needs to be called to account for the Fed’s many questionable actions during the financial turmoil of the past year.
Even while correctly identifying the “global savings glut,” Bernanke sat by and did nothing about the unsustainable build-up of leverage in the housing market—the “bubble” which famously burst in late 2008. Bernanke also used Fed financing to bail out Bear Stearns and AIG—hotly political moves which should rightfully have been left to Congress—and oversaw the massive expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet from about $900 billion to over $2 trillion. Under Bernanke, the Fed has transcended monetary policy and bank supervision into the world of fiscal policy.
While thus politicizing the Fed on one hand, Bernanke has sought to insulate the bank from congressional pressures by appeasing majority Democrats with various new credit regulations. Both the recently proposed credit card and mortgage rules unnecessarily restrict credit and increase the litigation risk facing banks, while doing nothing to roll back some of the irresponsible lending policies that exacerbated the housing bubble.
Bernanke’s pandering to the Left on misguided “consumer protections,” and the absence of any debate over the Fed’s role in the housing bubble, raise serious questions as to whether Bernanke understands the causes of the current financial crisis. We cannot hope to avoid the next financial crisis without a Fed chairman who understands the current one.
Is an Independent Fed Better?
Rep. Ron Paul now has a majority of the House of Representatives supporting his bill for an independent audit of the Federal Reserve System. He presented his case at a Cato Policy Forum recently, with vigorous responses from Bert Ely and Gilbert Schwartz.
Now more than 200 economists have signed a petition calling on Congress to “defend the independence of the Federal Reserve System as a foundation of U.S. economic stability.” The petition seems implicitly a rebuttal to Paul’s bill.
Allan Meltzer, a leading monetary scholar and frequent participant in Cato’s annual monetary conferences, declined to sign the petition and explained why: “I wrote them back and said, ‘the Fed has rarely been independent and it strikes me that being independent is very unlikely’” in the current environment.
Cato senior fellow Gerald O’Driscoll adds:
it is not the critics of the Fed who threaten its independence, but the Fed’s own actions. Its intervention in the economy is unprecedented in size and scope. It is inevitable that those actions would lead to calls for further Congressional oversight and control.
One of the lessons here is that once you create powerful government agencies, from tax-funded schools to central banks, there are no perfect libertarian rules for how they should be run. The way to protect freedom is to let people make their own decisions in civil society. Schools have to decide what to teach, offending the values of some parents and taxpayers. The Fed can be independent and unaccountable and undemocratic, or it can be subject to the political whims of elected officials; neither is a very attractive prospect.
What Fed Independence?
More than 250 economists have signed an “Open Letter to Congress and the Executive Branch” calling upon them to “defend the independence of the Federal Reserve System as a foundation of U.S. economic stability.”
Allan Meltzer is not a signatory to the petition and he has explained why not. The Fed has frequently not shown independence in the past, and there is no reason to expect it to do so reliably in the future. Professor Meltzer has just completed a multi-volume history of the Fed and knows all-too-well of the Fed’s willingness to accommodate the policies of administrations from FDRs to Lyndon Johnson’s.
I would add that the Fed’s behavior under Chairman Bernanke breaks new ground in aligning the central bank’s policy with Treasury’s. Much of what the Fed has done, first under Bush/Paulson, and now under Obama/Geithner, involves credit allocation. Since that ultimately involves the provision of public money for private purpose, it is pre-eminently fiscal policy. Central bank independence is a fuzzy concept. If it means anything, however, it is that monetary policy is conducted independently of Treasury’s fiscal policy.
In short, it is not the critics of the Fed who threaten its independence, but the Fed’s own actions. Its intervention in the economy is unprecedented in size and scope. It is inevitable that those actions would lead to calls for further Congressional oversight and control. The Fed is a creature of Congress and ultimately answerable to that body.
The petition raises legitimate concerns about whether the Fed will be able to tighten monetary policy when the time comes, and exit from its interventions in credit markets. But it is precisely the Fed’s own recent actions that raise those problems. Critics of recent Fed policy actions have for some time complained that the Fed has no exit strategy. Apparently the critics are now going to be blamed for the Fed’s inability to extricate itself from its interventions.
Cross-posted at ThinkMarkets
Bernanke’s Part in the Housing Bubble
Recent weeks have seen a swirl of speculation over whether President Obama will or will not re-appoint Ben Bernanke to the Chairmanship of the Federal Reserve Board, when his current term as Chair expires in January 2010. Almost all of the debate has centered on his actions as Chairman. This narrow focus misses an important piece: his actions, and words, as a Fed governor during the build-up of the housing bubble.
What should have been Bernanke’s greatest strength as a Fed governor and later chair, his understanding of monetary theory and his knowledge of the Great Depression, has ended up being a weakness. While correct in his analysis of the role of “debt deflation” — where the deflation increases the real burden of debts and correspondingly weakens the balance sheet of both households and businesses — in the deepening of the Great Depression; his obsession with slaying the Great White Whale of Deflation provided intellectual cover for the Fed’s ignoring and contributing to the housing bubble. Like the proverbial general, he was fighting yesterday’s battle, rather than today’s.
While core inflation was moderate and increasing at a decreasing rate between 2001 and 2005, this measure ignores the dramatic up-tick in house prices during those years. First, housing makes up the single largest expense for most households, ignoring housing, especially after one subtracts out energy and food from the definition of inflation, gives a narrow and distorted picture of inflation. Even if one were to focus solely on rents, the 2000s were an era of increasing housing costs.
Separate from the impact of housing prices on inflation is the role which housing plays as the collateral for the primary piece of household debt: a mortgage. Even were the US to suffer a bout of mild deflation and the real burden of their mortgages increased, this would likely have little impact on household balance sheets in an environment of increasing home prices.
Admittedly Bernanke was then only a “governor” and not yet Chair of the Fed, but he was the Fed’s loudest voice when it came to combating deflation and arguing for lower rates. Additionally there have been zero public acknowledgements by either Bernanke or the Fed that its policy earlier this decade contributed to the housing bubble and financial crisis. Without admitting to the occasional mistake, we have no way of judging whether Bernanke has learned from any of his mistakes, and hence less likely to repeat them.
In weighing Bernanke’s record at the Fed, judgement should not solely consider his actions as Chair, but also consider his words and deeds while the housing bubble was inflating. How one responds to a impending disaster is as important as to how one helps to clean up after the disaster has struck.
Support for Federal Reserve Audit Increasing
Last week Cato hosted a policy forum on “Bringing Transparency to the Federal Reserve,” featuring Congressman Ron Paul. As mentioned in CQ Politics, Rep. Paul’s bill, HR 1207, has been gaining considerable momentum in the House, with currently 244 co-sponsors, ranging from John Boehner to John Conyers Jr. In fact, the Senate companion bill was introduced by Senator Bernie Sanders.
Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke discussed the very topic of Federal Reserve Transparency at Cato’s annual monetary conference in the Fall of 2007.
After praising moves toward greater transparency at the Fed, Bernanke argued that “monetary policy makers are public servants whose decisions affect the life of every citizen; consequently, in a democratic society, they have a responsibility to give the people and their elected representatives a full and compelling rationale for the decisions they make.”
Chairman Bernanke also goes on to argue that “improving the public’s understanding of the central bank’s objectives and policy strategies reduces economic and financial uncertainty and thereby allows businesses and households to make more-informed decisions.” Bernanke’s full remarks can be found in the Spring 2008 issue of the Cato Journal.
Over the last two years, we have seen an almost tripling of the Federal Reserve’s balance sheet to $2.3 trillion, resulting from the bailouts of AIG and Bear Stearns and the creation of 14 new lending programs.
Our recent forum, and Rep. Paul’s bill, bring much needed debate and focus to the issue of Fed’s inner-workings.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics
Beginning of the End for Bernanke
Fed Chairman Bernanke’s term as Chair ends in January 2010. So far President Obama has offered Bernanke praise for his performance, but little else. After last week’s House Oversight Committee hearing focusing on Bernanke’s role in Bank of America’s purchase of Merrill Lynch, it is now readily apparent that the Chairman has few supporters on Capitol Hill. While his nomination will not be subject to the approval of the House of Representatives, or any of its Committees, the Senate Banking Committee’s reaction to Treasury Secretary Geithner’s plan to extend the Fed’s power serves as a useful proxy in gauging that Committee’s view of the Fed’s recent performance.
Several recent polls show President Obama to be broadly popular with the American public, while the public holds some concern over the scope and cost of his policies. His policy that garners the least support has been his bailout and support for the auto industry. It is no secret that the American public was not enthusiastic about the bailouts at the time, and is even less so now. With Hank Paulson having left the stage, Bernanke is now the public face of corporate bailouts. While having Bernanke around may offer President Obama a convenient target for the public’s anger over bailouts, re-appointing Bernanke would finally force Obama’s hand — so far he’s managed to support the bailouts with little fallout, as Bush and others have taken the blame. Re-appointing Bernanke makes him Obama’s pick.
In addition to political risk to President Obama, one can assume that many Senate Democrats are not looking forward to having to vote for the man who bailed out AIG. It is a fair bet that many Republican Senators would not vote for Bernanke’s re-appointment, leaving it up to the Democrats to secure his re-appointment.
Whatever the merits, or flaws, in his performance as Federal Reserve Chair, support for Bernanke’s re-appointment is becoming a proxy for one’s support, or opposition, to corporate bailouts.
Ron Paul at Cato: ‘Audit the Fed’
When Texas Congressman and former Republican presidential candidate Ron Paul speaks about transparency in the Federal Reserve, he sums up his argument with one simple question. Why not?
“Why in the world should this much power be given to a Federal Reserve that has the authority to create $1 trillion secretly?” Ron Paul asked a standing room-only crowd today at the Cato Institute.
Paul was on a panel of speakers, including Gilbert Schwartz, former associate general counsel to the Federal Reserve, to discuss a new bill that will audit the Fed for the first time in its history. This comes at a time when the Fed’s balance sheet has almost tripled, from just over $800 billion before the financial crisis to almost $2.3 trillion now.
“We will only win when the people wake up and realize that transparency is what we need,” said Paul. “When we know exactly what’s happening, there will be monetary reform.”
Watch the rest of Paul’s comments below:
Now Is Not the Time to Reduce Credit Card Availability
With the House having passed credit card legislation and the Senate scheduled to take up its own bill this week, one questions keeps coming back to me: What’s the hurry?
We are in the midst of a recession, which will not turn around until consumer spending turns around—so why reduce the availability of consumer credit now? And the Federal Reserve has already proposed a rule that would address many of Congress’ supposed concerns. The Fed rule will be implemented July 2010. Were Congress to get a bill to the president by Memorial Day, as he has asked, the Federal Reserve and the industry still couldn’t implement it before maybe January, if they were lucky.
Congress should keep in mind that credit cards have been a significant source of consumer liquidity during this downturn. While few of us want to have to cover our basic living expenses on our credit card, that option is certainly better than going without those basic needs. The wide availability of credit cards has helped to significantly maintain some level of consumer purchasing, even while confidence and other indicators have nosedived.
It was the massive under-pricing of risk, often at the urging of Washington, that brought on our current financial market crisis. To now pressure credit card companies not to raise their fees or more accurately price credit risk, will only reduce the availability of credit while undermining the financial viability of the companies, ultimately prolonging the recession and potentially increasing the cost of bank bailouts to the taxpayer.
As Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner has repeatedly said, some of the biggest credit card issuers will not be allowed to fail (think Citibank, American Express, Capital One, KepCorp) should they suffer significant losses to their credit card portfolios. Will taxpayers ultimately be the ones covering those losses?
Congress should also further examine the wisdom of restricting credit to college students under the age of 21. Outside of the obvious age discrimination, why treat adults between the ages of 18 and 21 any differently from those above 21? The basic premise of college is making sacrifices today in order to have a wealthier tomorrow—accordingly being able to borrow against that better tomorrow should be an option for any college student. Just as some small number of college students don’t benefit from college, some don’t benefit from credit cards, but throwing the “baby out with the bathwater” hardly seems the idea solution.
Bank ‘Stress Tests’ Need Transparency
As the bank stress tests are released, it is vital that the public receive specific and detailed information on each financial institution. The Administration’s and the Federal Reserve’s continued policy of attempting to disguise the differing health of each bank has been a failure. What is best for the taxpayer and the investing public is sufficient information to separate the good banks from the bad.
For those institutions which lack sufficient capital to remain solvent, they should seek private capital or else be closed and resolved. Too many taxpayer dollars have already been wasted keeping alive failed institutions. The Administration’s policy of keeping failed institutions on taxpayer-financed life-support only serves to retard the market’s ability to move assets away from those who do not, or cannot, make productive use of them toward those who can. It is time to remember that the unparalleled wealth-creating engine of the market depends as much on allowing failure as it does in encouraging success.
Banks passing the stress tests should be allowed and encouraged to re-pay their TARP funds as soon as possible, and with no additional strings attached. More importantly, the Administration should use any returned TARP funds to pay-down the increasing government debt, rather than be diverted to bailing-out other failed companies.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics
In Ensuring Credit Card Holders’ ‘Rights,’ Congress May Actually Take Away Their Credit
With a vote expected today on the so-called Credit Card Holders’ Bill of Rights, the U.S. House is poised to follow up on President Obama’s finger-wagging rhetoric about fees and other perceived sins of the credit industry.
But Congress should keep in mind that credit cards have been a significant source of consumer liquidity during this downturn. Now is the worst time to push measures that would curtail the availability of consumer credit, and that is exactly what the Credit Card Holders’ Bill of Rights will do.
While few of us want to have to cover our basic living expenses on our credit card, that option is certainly better than going without those basic needs. The wide availability of credit cards has helped to significantly maintain some level of consumer purchasing during this downturn.
It was the massive under-pricing of risk, often at the urging of Washington, that brought on our current financial market crisis. To now pressure credit card companies not to raise their fees or more accurately price credit risk, will only reduce the availability of credit while undermining the financial viability of the companies, ultimately prolonging the recession and potentially increasing the cost of bank bailouts to the taxpayer.
The Federal Reserve recently issued regulations targeting practices in the credit card industry. While this regulation was itself overkill, it should be given an opportunity to work, and be modified if it results in significant contraction of credit. It is far easier to go back and change harmful regulations than legislation.
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