A Perfect Storm of Regulatory Ignorance
Does the government know what it’s doing, can it know what it’s doing, in financial regulation? In the latest issue of Cato Policy Report, Jeffrey Friedman doubts it:
You are familiar by now with the role of the Federal Reserve in stimulating the housing boom; the role of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in encouraging low equity mortgages; and the role of the Community Reinvestment Act in mandating loans to “subprime” borrowers, meaning those who were poor credit risks. So you may think that the government caused the financial crisis. But you don’t know the half of it. And neither does the government….
Omniscience cannot be expected of human beings. One really would have had to be a god to master the millions of pages in the Federal Register — not to mention the pages of the Register’s state, local, and now international counterparts — so one could pick out the specific group of regulations, issued in different fields over the course of decades, that would end up conspiring to create the greatest banking crisis since the Great Depression. This storm may have been perfect, therefore, but it may not prove to be rare. New regulations are bound to interact unexpectedly with old ones if the regulators, being human, are ignorant of the old ones and of their effects….
This premise would be questionable enough even if we started with a blank legal slate. But we don’t. And there is no conceivable way that we, the people — or our agents in government — can know how to solve the problems of modern societies when our efforts have, in fact, been preceded by generations of previous efforts that have littered the ground with a tangle of rules so thick that we can’t possibly know what they all say, let alone how they might interact to create another perfect storm.
Read the whole thing — about moral hazard, banking regulations, and the “perfect storm of ignorance” that happened and will happen again — here in PDF. Less attractive HTML version here. Jeffrey Friedman is editor of Critical Review and of Causes of the Financial Crisis, forthcoming from the University of Pennsylvania Press.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; General
Wednesday Links
- David Boaz debates at The Economist: Is Obama failing? “In many ways, Obama has just doubled down on George W. Bush’s policies of bailouts, takeovers, expanded Fed powers and nationalizations. In a recession he is adding debt, taxes and regulation to the burdens already felt by business.” Readers can vote and join the debate.
- Ever wonder why weather forecasters can get things so wrong?
- Looking for a primer on the causes of the financial crisis? The new Cato Policy Report has answers.
- Podcast: “Citizens United and SpeechNow.org” featuring Steve Simpson of the Institute of Justice.
Five Decades of Federal Spending
The chart below shows federal spending in three component parts over the last five decades. It includes Obama’s proposed spending in 2011. Here are a few thoughts on the recent spending trends:
Defense: In the post-9/11 years, defense spending bumped up to a higher plateau of around 4 percent of GDP. But now we have jumped to an even higher level of around 4.9 percent of GDP.
Interest: The Federal Reserve’s easy money policies reduced federal interest payments in recent years. That is coming to an end. Obama’s budget shows that interest payments will start rising rapidly next year and hit 3 percent of GDP by 2015. And that’s an optimistic projection.
Nondefense: This category includes all other federal spending. After a steady decline during the Clinton years to 12.9 percent of GDP, President Bush pushed up nondefense spending to a higher plateau of around 14.5 percent. Then came the recession and financial crisis, and the Bush-Obama tag team hiked spending to an even higher level of around 19 percent of GDP. That level of nondefense spending is almost double the level in 1970 measured as a share of the economy.
Financial Fiasco: ‘Best Books of 2009′
Johan Norberg’s Financial Fiasco: How America’s Infatuation with Homeownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis has been named one of the best books of 2009 by the Spectator, Britain’s most important political affairs magazine. Excerpt:
Ever since the crash, I have been waiting for Johan Norberg to write about it — and finally, this year, he has obliged. I have three copies of his first book, In Defence of Globalisation, with varying degrees of annotation. I have already started to deface Financial Fiasco, his book showing how governments created this mess. The American government pumped up the housing bubble — and then there was a collective delusion that the market was rational. As Norberg says, the market is no more than a collection of humans who fall prey to hubris. And their hubris was imagining that computer models had eliminated risk: that the boom would not be followed by a bust.
It previously got an excellent review in the Financial Times. It’s enough to make you think that the elite British press are smarter than the elite American press.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
Wednesday Links
- A real stimulus: To create jobs, repeal the corporate-income tax.
- As if times weren’t hard enough: The individual mandate on health insurance would impose high implicit taxes on low-wage workers. For more on this, read the new Cato study on burdens the health care legislation will place on the poor.
- Hot off the press: New issue of Regulation magazine looks at lessons from the financial crisis and property rights.
- Even though the government is running massive deficits, interest rates and inflation are low. So, what’s the problem?
- Podcast: “Bernanke’s Conceit” featuring Mark A. Calabria.
Government-Subsidized Risk Is a Bad Idea
Kudos to Nicki Kurokawa, a former Cato employee, for this short but substantive video explaining “moral hazard.” She notes that government-subsidized risk played a pernicious role in the housing bubble and financial crisis, and warns that “too big to fail” may create similar problems in the future.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Regulatory Studies
University of Michigan Study Confirms Link between Financial Bailout and Corruption
Since Senators engaged in open extortion and bribery to enact Reid’s government-run health care plan, it is hardly newsworthy that Washington is riddled with corruption. But the magnitude of sleaze is probably far greater than most people realize. There is a new study from a couple of academics at the University of Michigan, who found significant relationships between lobbying and bailout money, as well as a greater chance of getting bailouts depending on a bank’s ties with either the Federal Reserve or key members of Congress. Hopefully, people across America will draw the obvious conclusion and realize that big government is inherently corrupting, as discussed in this video. Reuters has the details on this latest example of big government and malfeasance:
U.S. banks that spent more money on lobbying were more likely to get government bailout money, according to a study released on Monday. Banks whose executives served on Federal Reserve boards were more likely to receive government bailout funds from the Troubled Asset Relief Program, according to the study from Ran Duchin and Denis Sosyura, professors at the University of Michigan’s Ross School of Business. Banks with headquarters in the district of a U.S. House of Representatives member who serves on a committee or subcommittee relating to TARP also received more funds. Political influence was most helpful for poorly performing banks, the study found. “Political connections play an important role in a firm’s access to capital,” Sosyura, a University of Michigan assistant professor of finance, said in a statement. Banks with an executive who sat on the board of a Federal Reserve Bank were 31 percent more likely to get bailouts through TARP’s Capital Purchase Program, the study showed. Banks with ties to a finance committee member were 26 percent more likely to get capital purchase program funds.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics
Good News on Housing!
The Wall Street Journal reports that some mortgage insurers and lenders are beginning to relax their down-payment requirements, so that buyers in some parts of the country can now borrow 95% instead of 90% of a property’s value. Buyers who can’t come up with even a 5% down payment can turn to the Federal Housing Administration, which will make loans with as little as a 3.5% down payment. Unsurprisingly, the FHA is increasing its market share.
Meanwhile, the Treasury department is pressuring mortgage companies to reduce payments for many more troubled homeowners, averting foreclosures. So, good news: people who lack income and assets will be able to take out loans to buy houses, and if they can’t make the payments they signed up for, the government will pressure their lenders to accept lower monthly payments in return. We’re back on the road to easy, universal homeownership.
It’s the Obama Economy Now
Undoubtedly President Obama inherited an economic mess. Also undoubtedly, he’s made it worse. Barring substantial revisions to recent job loss estimates, we have now crossed the line where as many jobs have been lost during this recession under President Obama as under President Bush. From the start of the recession, in December 2007, until President Obama took the oath of office at the end of January 2009, there have been 3.36 million nonfarm payroll jobs lost. From February 2009 until now there have been about 3.36 million nonfarm payroll jobs lost (estimates from ADP employment report).
Even during the best of times, the economy experiences substantial job loss. However, we consider those times good because the labor market is also creating lots of jobs, so that job losses are offset by job gains. The early parts of a recession are generally characterized by large increases in job losses, with minor declines in job creation. Eventually the job losses moderate and job creation picks up, bringing us out of the recession. We are arguably past the worst of the job losses. What has escaped us is job creation.
And it is on the job creation front that Obama takes ownership of the economy. While there are certainly problems in the credit markets, the major reason behind the lack of job creation is the massive uncertainty being generated by Washington. For any employer today, it is almost impossible to estimate what the future health care costs of new hires will be. It’s impossible to gauge what your environment costs are going to be. Same with the costs of the 90 new workplace rules that the Department of Labor promised would be forthcoming over the next year.
Sadly this administration learned the wrong lesson from the defeat of the Clinton health care plan. The history lesson they should have learned is that Clinton inherited a recession as well (as did Bush for that matter), but that job creation was weak until the Clinton health care plan stalled.
Until employers and investors feel it is safe once again to put their businesses and investments at risk, and Washington ends its war on the productive elements of our society, we will not have significant private sector job growth.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; General
Does CRA Undermine Bank Safety?
A recent policy forum here at Cato discussed the role of the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) in the financial crisis. While the forum focused on the federal push for ever expanding homeownership to marginal borrowers, the analysis did not touch directly upon the question of whether CRA lending undermines bank safety.
Fortunately this is a question that one economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas bothered to ask. While his research findings were available before the crisis, they were clearly ignored.
In a peer-reviewed published article, appearing in the journal Economic Inquiry, economist Jeff Gunther concludes that there is “evidence to suggest that a greater focus on lending in low-income neighborhoods helps CRA ratings but comes at the expense of safety and soundness.” Specifically he finds an inverse relationship between CRA ratings and safety/soundness, as measured by CAMEL ratings.
In another study Gunther finds that increases in bank capital are associated with an increase substandard CRA ratings. Apparently bank CRA examiners prefer that capital to be lend out, rather than serve as a cushion in times of financial distress.
Given the current attempts in Washington to expand CRA, it seems some people never learn. One can always argue over how CRA should work, but the evidence is quite clear how it has worked, once again proving: there’s no free lunch.
Thursday Links
- A few questions for Ben Bernanke: “Perhaps the most important question Bernanke should answer is: how will he re-build and maintain an independent Fed?”
- Before considering Bernanke’s role in containing the financial crisis, Congress should investigate the role of Fed policy in allowing the housing bubble to grow.
- Prepare to pay more: Today, an average insurance policy can cost about $2,985 for an individual or $6,328 for a family. Under the Senate bill, those premiums will increase to $5,800 for an individual worker and $15,200 for a family plan by 2016.
- Why the White House “jobs summit” is unnecessary.
- Made on Earth: How global economic integration renders trade policy obsolete.
- Podcast: “ObamaCare the Budget Buster.” More, here.
Homeownership Myths
In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Professor Joseph Gyourko, chair of the Wharton School’s Real Estate Department, lists what he sees as the five biggest myths about homeownership. Given the central role of federal housing policy, particularly Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, in our recent financial crisis, it is worth following Professor Gyourko’s suggestion and question whether a national policy of ownership, all the time for everyone, really makes sense.
Professor Gyourko’s five myths:
1. Housing is a great long-term investment.
2. The homebuyer tax credit makes buying a house more affordable.
3. Homeowners are better citizens.
4. It’s safe to buy a house with a very low downpayment.
5. Owning is always cheaper than renting.
You’ll have to read the op-ed to see his explanations. An important qualification on his analysis is that in many cases what can be good for the buyer, such as putting no money down, may not be good for the economy if it results in additional foreclosures.
A Plug for Financial Fiasco
The distinguished Harvard economist Richard N. Cooper, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, praises Johan Norberg’s Financial Fiasco: How America’s Infatuation With Homeownership and Easy Money Created the Economic Crisis in Foreign Affairs:
The economic crisis of 2008-9 will no doubt spawn dozens of books. Here are two good early ones….
Norberg, a knowledgeable Swede, provides a much more detailed account of the broader events of 2007-9, from the useful perspective of a non-American. He finds plenty of blame with all the major players in the U.S. financial system: politicians, who thoughtlessly pushed homeownership on thousands who could not afford it; mortgage loan originators, who relaxed credit standards; securitizers, who packaged poor-quality mortgage loans as though these were conventional loans; the Securities and Exchange Commission, which endowed the leading rating agencies with oligopoly powers; the rating agencies, which knowingly overrated securitized mortgages and their derivatives; and investors, who let the ratings substitute for due diligence. Senior management in large parts of the financial community lacked an attribute essential to any well-functioning financial market: integrity. But solutions, Norberg warns, do not lie in greater regulation or public ownership. Politicians and bureaucrats are not immune from the “short-termism” that plagues private firms.
The other book he praises, by the way, is Paul Krugman’s The Return of Depression Economics. And oddly, his list of Norberg’s villains doesn’t include one implied in the title: the Federal Reserve Bank, which issued the “easy money” that allowed the boom to happen. Purchase Financial Fiasco here or on Kindle.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
The Fed and Policy Uncertainty
How and when should the Fed unwind the enormous monetary expansion it undertook in response to the financial crisis and recession? The WSJ reports [$]:
As the Federal Reserve’s next meeting approaches in early November, an internal debate is brewing about how and when to signal the possibility of interest-rate increases.
The Fed has said since March that it will keep rates very low for an “extended period.” Long before it raises rates, however, it will need to change that public signal to financial markets.
Because the recovery is so young and is expected to be so weak, many central bank officials are comfortable, for now, keeping rates very low. But they are beginning to strategize about how to walk away from the “extended period” language.
My suggestion is that the Fed announce a path of gradual increases in the federal funds rate, say beginning next year and lasting for two years, until the rate is at some “normal level.”
This approach is different than what the Fed is likely to undertake; it will probably want to maximize “discretion,” the ability to adjust on the fly as conditions unfold.
My approach maximizes predictability and reassurance: it commits the Fed to shrinking the money supply and heading off future inflation. This reassures markets and takes substantial uncertainty out of the picture.
The problem with my approach is the pre-commitment: everyone knows the Fed could abandon a pre-announced path.
But such an announcement might still give markets useful guidance, and the Fed would know that any deviation would itself upset markets, and this might encourage adherence to the pre-commitment.
C/P Libertarianism, from A to Z
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; General
U.S. Cutting Pay for Bailed Out Company Executives
According to reports, executives from bailed out companies Citigroup, Bank of America, GM, Chrysler, GMAC, Chrysler Financial and AIG are going to see major pay cuts this year, which will be enforced by the president’s “pay czar,” Kenneth R. Feinberg. WaPo:
NEW YORK — The Obama administration plans to order companies that have received exceptionally large amounts of bailout money from the government to slash compensation for their highest-paid executives by about half on average, according to people familiar with the long-awaited decision.
The administration will also curtail many corporate perks, including the use of corporate jets for personal travel, chauffeured drivers and country club fee reimbursement, people familiar with the matter have said. Individual perks worth more than $25,000 have received particular scrutiny.
The American people have every right to be upset about generous compensation packages for executives at financial firms that are being kept alive by subsidies and bailouts.
But their ire should be directed at the bailouts, because that is the policy that redistributes money from the average taxpayer and puts it in the pockets of incompetent executives. Unfortunately, rather than deal with the underlying problems of bailouts and intervention, some politicians want to impose controls on salaries. This might be a tolerable second-best (or probably fifth-best) outcome if the compensation limits only applied to companies mooching off the taxpayers, but some politicians want to use the financial crisis as an excuse to regulate compensation at firms that do not have their snouts in the public trough.
This would be a big mistake. So long as rich people make money using non-coercive means, politicians should butt out. It should not matter whether we are talking about Tiger Woods, Brad Pitt, or a corporate CEO. The market should determine compensation, not political deal making. Markets don’t produce perfect outcomes, to be sure, but political intervention invariably produces terrible outcomes.
I debate this further on CNBC:
C/P The Hill
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; General
What Caused the Crisis?
Last night National Government Radio promoted a documentary on National Government TV about the financial crisis of 2008, which concludes that the problem was . . . not enough government.
If the “Frontline” episode mentioned any of the ways that government created the crisis — cheap money from the central bank, tax laws that encourage debt over equity, government regulation that pressured lenders to issue mortgages to borrowers who wouldn’t be able to pay them back — NPR didn’t mention it.
For information on those causes, take a look at this paper by Lawrence H. White or get the new book Financial Fiasco by Johan Norberg, which Amity Shlaes called “a masterwork in miniature.” Available in hardcover or immediately as an e-book. Or on Kindle!
And for a warning about the dangers lurking in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, see this 2004 paper by Lawrence J. White.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
New Paper: Would a Stricter Fed Policy and Financial Regulation Have Averted the Financial Crisis?
Many commentators have argued that if the Federal Reserve had followed a stricter monetary policy earlier this decade when the housing bubble was forming, and if Congress had not deregulated banking but had imposed tighter financial standards, the housing boom and bust—and the subsequent financial crisis and recession—would have been averted.
In a new study, Cato scholars Jagadeesh Gokhale and Peter Van Doren investigate those claims and dispute them.
Filed under: Cato Publications; Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy
Fixing Fannie Is Essential
This past week witnessed continued debate in congressional committees over changes to our financial regulatory system. Perhaps catching the most attention was Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s appearance before House Financial Services.
Sadly missing from all the noise this week was any discussion over reforming those entities at the center of the housing bubble and mortgage meltdown: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.
While many, including Bernanke, have identified the “global savings glut” as a prime force behind the historically low interest rates that drove the housing bubble, often missed in this analysis is the critical role played by Fannie and Freddie as channels of that savings glut. After all, the Chinese Central Bank was not plowing its reserves into Countrywide stock; it was putting hundreds of billions of its dollar reserves into Fannie and Freddie debt. Fannie and Freddie were the vehicle that carried excess world savings into the United States.
Had this massive flow of global capital been invested in productive activities, or even just prime mortgages, it is unlikely tha we would have seen such a large housing bubble. Instead, what did Fannie and Freddie do with its Chinese funds? It invested those funds in the subprime mortgage market. At the height of the bubble, Fannie and Freddie purchased over 40 percent of private-label subprime mortgage-backed securities. Fannie and Freddie also used those funds to lower the underwriting standards of the “prime” whole mortgages it purchased, turning much of the Alt-A and subprime market into what looked to the world like prime mortgages.
Given the massive leverage (at one point Freddie was leveraged 200 to 1) and shoddy credit quality of mortgages on their books, why were the Chinese and other investors so willing to trust their money to Fannie and Freddie? Because they were continually told by U.S. officials that their losses would be covered. At the end of the day, Fannie and Freddie were not bailed out in order to save our housing market; they were bailed out in order to protect the Chinese Central Bank from taking any losses on its Fannie/Freddie investments. Adding insult to injury is the fact that the Chinese accumulated these large dollar holdings in order to suppress the value of their currency, enabling Chinese products to be more competitive with American-made products.
While foreign investors have been willing to put considerable money into Wall Street, without the implied guarantees of Fannie and Freddie, trillions of dollars of global capital flows would not have been funneled into the U.S. subprime mortgage market. As Washington seems intent on continuing to mortgage America’s future to the Chinese, that at minimum it seems that fixing Fannie and Freddie might help insure that something more productive is done with that borrowing.
Monday Links
- Obama spoke on Wall Street today about increasing regulation of the American financial system. But did deregulation really cause the financial crisis?
- Burnt rubber: Obama’s decision to slap a 35 percent tariff on Chinese tires whiffs of senseless protectionism.
- According to the Economic Freedom in the World report, the U.S. was ranked the second-freest economy in 2000. It has fallen to 6th place this year.
- A bold exit strategy for Afghanistan.
- Why it’s time for the U.S. to start doing less abroad.
- Podcast: China’s economy is on track to be larger than the U.S. economy in a few years. Trade expert Dan Griswold says, “So what?”
If I Only Had a Crisis
Bloomberg News points out that President Obama needs a health-care crisis in order to impose a health-care “solution”:
President Barack Obama returns to Washington next week in search of one thing that can revive his health-care overhaul: a sense of crisis….
“At the moment, except for the people without insurance, we’re not in a health-care crisis,” said Stephen Wayne, a professor of government at Georgetown University in Washington. “You do need a crisis to generate movement in Congress and to help build a consensus.”
This administration has used Naomi Klein’s book The Shock Doctrine as a manual. Klein said in an interview that
The Shock Doctrine is a political strategy that the Republican right has been perfecting over the past 35 years to use for various different kinds of shocks. They could be wars, natural disasters, economic crises, anything that sends a society into a state of shock to push through what economists call ‘economic shock therapy’ – rapid-fire, pro-corporate policies that they couldn’t get through if people weren’t in a state of fear and panic.
Whether or not that’s true about the “right-wing” policies that she purported to analyze, the Obama admininstration has taken it to heart. Rahm Emanuel said, “You never want a serious crisis to go to waste. And this crisis provides the opportunity for us to do things that you could not do before” such as taking control of the financial, energy, information and healthcare industries. Vice President Joe Biden, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and the president himself all echoed Emanuel’s exultation about the opportunities presented by crisis.
The financial crisis turned out to be shocking enough to let the federal government extend the power of the Federal Reserve, nationalize two automobile companies, spend $700 billion on corporate bailouts and another $787 billion on pork and “stimulus,” and inject a trillion dollars of inflationary credit into the economy. But now people are balking at further expansions of government, and the administration is longing for just a little more crisis to serve as a further opportunity.
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