How Does It Feel to Be at the Table Now?
On Monday, the Obama administration held a well-publicized love-fest with lobbyists for the health care industry. It turns out that rather than a “game-changer,” the event was a fraud. And the industry got burned.
At the time, President Obama called it a “a watershed event in the long and elusive quest for health care reform“:
Over the next 10 years — from 2010 to 2019 — [these industry lobbyists] are pledging to cut the rate of growth of national health care spending by 1.5 percentage points each year — an amount that’s equal to over $2 trillion.
By an amazing coincidence, $2 trillion is just enough to pay for Obama’s proposed government takeover of the health care sector.
Yet The New York Times reports that isn’t the magnitude of spending reductions the lobbyists thought they were supporting:
Hospitals and insurance companies said Thursday that President Obama had substantially overstated their promise earlier this week to reduce the growth of health spending… [C]onfusion swirled in Washington as the companies’ trade associations raced to tamp down angst among members around the country.
Health care leaders who attended the meeting…say they agreed to slow health spending in a more gradual way and did not pledge specific year-by-year cuts…
My initial reaction to Monday’s fairly transparent media stunt was: “I smell a rat. Lobbyists never advocate less revenue for their members. Ever.” The lobbyists are proving me right, albeit slowly. (Take your time, guys. I don’t mind.)
Toles on Obama/Health-Care-Lobbyist Media Stunt
Today’s Washington Post has a terrific editorial cartoon about this week’s announcement by President Obama and health care industry lobbyists that they’re all willing to reduce health care spending growth by 1.5 percentage points.
A Not So Happy Anniversary for the “Massachusetts Model”
Three years ago yesterday, then-Governor Mitt Romney signed into law the most far reaching state health care reform plan to date. At the time, we warned that the plan, with its individual and employer mandates, new regulatory bureaucracy (the Connector), and middle-class subsidies would result in “a slow but steady spiral downward toward a government-run health care system.” Sadly, three years later, those predictions appear to be coming true.
- While the state has reduced the number of residents without health insurance, some 200,000 people remain uninsured. Moreover, the increase in the number of insured is primarily due to the state’s generous subsidies, not the celebrated individual mandate.
- Health care costs continue to rise much faster than the nationally. Since the program became law, total state health care spending has increased by 23 percent. Insurance premiums have been increasing by 10-12 percent per year, nearly double the national average.
- New regulation and bureaucracy is limiting consumer choice and adding to costs.
- Program costs have skyrocketed. Despite tax increases, the program faces huge deficits in the future. As a result, the state is considering caps on insurance premiums, cuts in reimbursements to providers, and even the possibility of a “global budget” on health care spending.
- A shortage of providers, combined with increased demand, is increasing waiting times to see a physician, especially primary care providers.
With the “Massachusetts model” being frequently cited as a blueprint for state or national health care reform, it is important to recognize that giving the government greater control over our health care system will have grave consequences for taxpayers, providers, and health care consumers. That is the lesson of the Massachusetts model.
CER: A (Slightly) Different Perspective
My colleague, Michael Cannon, makes several good points about comparative effectiveness research (CER), both in his letter to USA Today and in his excellent paper on the subject. I strongly agree with him that we should not reflexively oppose CER—much of health care spending is wasteful or unnecessary, and it makes sense, therefore, to test and develop information on the effectiveness of various treatments and technology, giving consumers tools to evaluate the value of the care they receive. There is also a case for the use of CER in taxpayer-funded programs like Medicare and Medicaid. Taxpayers should not have to subsidize health care that has not proven effective, nor can Medicare and Medicaid pay for every possible treatment regardless of cost-effectiveness.
However, I am more skeptical in general about CER than he is for several reasons.
- First, “quality” and “value” are not unidimensional terms. In fact, such concepts are highly idiosyncratic with every individual having different ideas of what “quality” and “value” means to them, based on such things as a person’s pain tolerance, lifestyle, feeling about hospitalization, desire to return to work, and so forth. For example, a surgeon may tell you that the only way to ensure a cure for prostate cancer is a radical prostectomy. But that procedure’s side-effects can severely impact quality of life – so some people prefer a procedure with a lower survival rate, but fewer side effects. Who is better suited to determine which of those procedures represents “quality” and “value,” a government board or the person directly affected?
- Second, comparative effectiveness research too often has a tendency to gear its results toward the “average” patient. But many patients are outliers, whose response to any particular treatment, for either good or ill, can vary significantly from the average. This matters little when the research is simply informative. However, if the research becomes the basis for more prescriptive requirements, for example prohibiting reimbursements for some types of treatment, the impact on patient outliers could be severe.
- Third, comparative effectiveness research can create a time lag for the introduction of new technologies, drugs, and procedures. The FDA, for example, has already caused delays in introducing drugs that have resulted in unnecessary deaths. Depending on how the final program is structured, comparative effectiveness research could create another layer of bureaucracy and testing between the development of a new drug, for example, and its introduction into the health care system. One only has to look at the difficulty in expanding Medicaid drug formularies to see how this could become a problem.
The advocates of government-sponsored CER clearly intend for it to be used as a basis for rationing care, not just in government programs, but for private insurance as well.
Cannon points out that government-sponsored CER is likely to be corrupted under pressure from special interest lobbies and politicians. I couldn’t agree more. Government-sponsored CER, therefore, is liable to yield the worst of all possible worlds, not only rationing, but rationing that is based on special interest lobbying rather than science.
Health care, is of course, a finite good. Therefore, it will always be rationed in some fashion. But, it is far better if the rationing agent is the consumer himself, rather than the government or any other arbitrary agent. The private sector is already undertaking CER. To the degree that consumers, insurers, and providers make use of this information, that is a good thing. If consumers don’t like how an insurance company, for example, uses CER in determining its reimbursement policy, he or she can choose a different insurer.
Government-imposed fiat rationing allows for no such choice. Therefore, we should oppose any government involvement in CER, and any efforts by the government to use CER to restrict reimbursement, especially in private insurance plans.
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