Perpetuating Bad Housing Policy
Perhaps the worst feature of the bailouts and the stimulus has been that, whatever their merits as short terms fixes, they have done nothing to improve economic policy over the long haul; indeed, they compound past mistakes.
Here is a good example:
For months, troubled homeowners seeking to lower their mortgage payments under a federal plan have complained about bureaucratic bungling, ceaseless frustration and confusion. On Thursday, the Obama administration declared that the $75 billion program is finally providing broad relief after it pressured mortgage companies to move faster to modify more loans.
Five hundred thousand troubled homeowners have had their loan payments lowered on a trial basis under the Making Home Affordable Program.
The crucial words in the story are “$75 billion” and “pressured.”
No one should object if a lender, without subsidy and without pressure, renegotiates a mortgage loan. That can make sense for both lender and borrower because the foreclosure process is costly.
But Treasury’s attempt to subsidize and coerce loan modifications is fundamentally misguided. It means many homeowners will stay in homes, for now, that they cannot really afford, merely postponing the day of reckoning.
Treasury’s policy is also misguided because it presumes that everyone who owned a house before the meltdown should remain a homeowner. Likewise, Treasury’s view assumes that all the housing construction over the past decade made good economic sense.
Both presumptions are wrong. U.S. policy exerted enormous pressure for increased mortgage lending in the years leading up to the crisis, thereby generating too much housing construction, too much home ownership and inflated housing prices.
The right policy for the U.S. economy is to stop preventing foreclosures, to stop subsidizing mortgages, and to let the housing market adjust on its own. Otherwise, we will soon see a repeat of the fall of 2008.
Weekend Links
- Bush-era surveillance powers are set to expire at the end of this year. Julian Sanchez explores the efforts to revise the PATRIOT Act.
- More on the medical professionals who aided in acts of torture.
- Doug Bandow: Ireland is holding a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty on Friday. If the Irish say yes, the European Union will be stronger. But will anyone notice?
- The aftermath of “Cash for Clunkers” hits automakers. Looks like it just might have been the “dumbest program ever” after all.
- Podcast: “Three Felonies a Day“
CAP’s Proposal to Add ‘Public Members’ to Corporate Boards Is Flawed
Today the Center for American Progress rolled out its proposal that we add “public directors” to the boards of companies that have been bailed out by the government. CAP scholar Emma Coleman Jordan argues that “public directors will provide a corrective to the boards of the financial institutions that helped cause the crisis.”
One has to wonder whether Ms. Jordan has ever heard of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. If she had, she might recall that a substantial number of the board members of Fannie and Freddie were so-called “public” members appointed by the President. Perhaps she can ask CAP adjunct scholar and former Fannie Mae executive Ellen Seidman to review the history of those companies for her.
Republicans Just as Guilty of Flawed Keynesian Thinking
The core of Keynesian economic policy is that the government must come in and replace reductions in private sector demand with public sector demand, therefore bringing overall demand back to its previous level. One of the many flaws in this thinking is in assuming that the previous level of demand was “correct” and getting us back to that level is the appropriate policy response.
Take the example of the housing market and the government response. The primary response of Republicans in Washington has been to offer tax credits and other incentives to replace the drop in demand for housing. Witness Senator Johnny Isakson’s recent comments on why we need to extend the $8,000 homebuyer tax credit: “If you take that kind of business out of what’s already a very weak housing market, you do nothing but protract and extend the recession.”
This analysis could not be more wrong. The tax credit largely acts to keep housing prices from falling further. However, that is how markets are supposed to clear in an environment of excess supply. If there’s too much housing, the way to address that is to allow housing prices to fall, which attracts buyers back into the market.
We should also recognize that the tax credit does not help the buyer, it helps the seller, by allowing the seller to charge that much more for the price of the home.
Reform Needed, but Obama Plan Would Result in More Financial Crises, not Less
Today President Obama took his financial reform plan to the airwaves. While there is no doubt our financial system is in need of financial reform, the President’s plan would make bailouts a permanent feature of the regulatory landscape. Rather than ending “too big to fail” — the President wants us to believe that with additional discretion and power, the same Federal Reserve that missed the boat last time will save us next time.
The truth is that the President’s plan will result in a small number of companies being viewed by debtholders as “too big to fail”. These companies would see their funding costs decline, allowing them to gain market-share at the expense of their rivals, making these firms even larger. Greater concentration in our financial services industry is the last thing we need, yet the Obama plan all but guarantees it.
Obama also chooses myth’s over facts. The President claims that de-regulation and competition among regulators caused the crisis. The facts could not be more different. Those institutions at the center of the crisis — Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bear Stearns, Lehman –could not choose their regulator.
The President’s plan chooses convenient targets and protects entrenched interests, rather than address the true underlying causes of the crisis. At no time have we heard the President discuss the expansionary monetary policies that helped fuel the bubble. Nor has the President talked about the global imbalances — the global savings glut that poured surplus savings from the rest of the world into the US. But then the President appears to hope that loose monetary policy and continued American consumption funded by China will get him out of his own political problems with the economy. It is especially striking that the President makes little mention of the housing bubble, as if it was only the bust that was the problem.
The President continues to say he inherited this crisis. While true, he did not inherit the same individuals — Tim Geithner and Ben Bernanke — who were at the center of creating the crisis. All Obama needs to do is find a position for Hank Paulson and he will have completely re-assembled the Bush financial team.
Without real reform — fixing Fannie and Freddie, scaling back the massive subsidies for leverage in our tax code, loose monetary policy – it will only be a matter of time before the next crisis hits. If we implement the President’s plan, we will, however, guarantee that the next crisis will be even larger and severe than the current one.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Regulatory Studies
Housing Bailouts: Lessons Not Learned
The housing boom and bust that occurred earlier in this decade resulted from efforts by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac — the government sponsored enterprises with implicit backing from taxpayers — to extend mortgage credit to high-risk borrowers. This lending did not impose appropriate conditions on borrower income and assets, and it included loans with minimal down payments. We know how that turned out.
Did U.S. policymakers learn their lessons from this debacle and stop subsidizing mortgage lending to risky borrowers? NO. Instead, the Federal Housing Authority lept into the breach:
The FHA insures private lenders against defaults on certain home mortgages, an inducement to make such loans. Insurance from the New Deal-era agency has enabled lending to buyers who can’t make a big down payment or who want to refinance but have little equity. Most private lenders have sharply curtailed credit to those borrowers.
In the past two years, the number of loans insured by the FHA has soared and its market share reached 23% in the second quarter, up from 2.7% in 2006, according to Inside Mortgage Finance. FHA-backed loans outstanding totaled $429 billion in fiscal 2008, a number projected to hit $627 billion this year.
And what is the result of this surge in FHA insurance?
The Federal Housing Administration, hit by increasing mortgage-related losses, is in danger of seeing its reserves fall below the level demanded by Congress, according to government officials, in a development that could raise concerns about whether the agency needs a taxpayer bailout.
This is madness. Repeat after me: TANSTAAFL (There ain’t no such thing as a free lunch).
C/P Libertarianism, from A to Z
HUD Helps to Set the Ground for Next Round of Mortgage Fraud
Just when you were thinking it was safe to go back into the mortgage market, today’s Wall Street Journal is highlighting the next source of mortgage fraud, the Federal Housing Administration’s (FHA) reserve mortgage program. In a typical reverse mortgage, the bank sends the borrower a monthly check (or a lump sum payment at the beginning of the loan).
It seems that some creative individuals have figured they could deed a run-down house to an elderly individual, and then get a reserve mortgage on that property; leaving them with the cash and the government with the run-down worthless property. Of course, this requires getting an appraiser to go along with the value of the home, but since the Clinton HUD decided to do away with FHA control of appraisers and let the lender pick the appraiser, that sadly hasn’t been much of an obstacle.
The great thing for lenders is that if the loan goes bad, or the value of the house falls below the mortgage amount, FHA – backed by the taxpayer – picks up the tab. Of course, the borrower is required to pay an insurance premium to cover any potential shortfalls. But just like in any other federal insurance program, when these’s a shortfall beyond funds collected via premiums, we taxpayers are left on the hook. I could go on about what a great job Washington does running insurance programs; suffice to say, Washington does a pretty poor job.
If Washington were serious about cracking down on predatory lending and mortgage fraud, Congress should end the practice of allowing lenders to put 100% of their losses to the taxpayer. Maybe that would provide the correct incentives for the lender to actually make sound loans.
Embracing Bushonomics, Obama Re-appoints Bernanke
In re-appointing Bernanke to another four year term as Fed chairman, President Obama completes his embrace of bailouts, easy money and deficits as the defining characteristics of his economic agenda.
Bernanke, along with Secretary Geithner (then New York Fed president) were the prime movers behind the bailouts of AIG and Bear Stearns. Rather than “saving capitalism,” these bailouts only spread panic at considerable cost to the taxpayer. As evidenced in his “financial reform” proposal, Obama does not see bailouts as the problem, but instead believes an expanded Fed is the solution to all that is wrong with the financial sector. Bernanke also played a central role as the Fed governor most in favor of easy money in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble — a policy that directly contributed to the housing bubble. And rather than take steps to offset the “global savings glut” forcing down rates, Bernanke used it as a rationale for inaction.
Perhaps worse than Bush and Obama’s rewarding of failure in the private sector via bailouts is the continued rewarding of failure in the public sector. The actors at institutions such as the Federal Reserve bear considerable responsibility for the current state of the economy. Re-appointing Bernanke sends the worst possible message to both the American public and to government in general: not only will failure be tolerated, it will be rewarded.
Does the Left Know We Had a Housing Bubble?
Over the last week, speaking at a variety of events, I heard three different representatives of the Left; first a Democrat US Senator, then a senior member of the Obama Administration, and finally a “consumer” advocate, all repeat the same narrative: all was fine in the housing market until predatory lenders forced hard-working honest families into foreclosure, which reduced house prices, bringing the economy to a crash. That’s correct, apparently the Left believes we all would still be seeing double-digit home price appreciation if it wasn’t for those evil lenders.
Undoubtedly foreclosures, especially those that result in houses that remain vacant for a considerable amount of time, have an adverse impact on surrounding property values. Many constitute a serious eye-sore and provide a haven for criminal activity. But did foreclosures really drive down prices, or were foreclosures first driven by price declines resulting from a bursting housing bubble? While causality is always difficult to establish with certainty, we do know that the rate of house price appreciation peaked and started declining about 18 months before the dramatic up-turn in mortgage delinquencies. If one prefers a more rigorous test, economists at the Boston Fed have directly tested if prices first drove foreclosures or whether foreclosures drove prices. Their results conclude that its was declining prices that matter, and that the price effect of foreclosures is minimal.
Why does any of this ultimately matter? Because if we craft policies to avoid the adverse impacts of the next property bubble based upon a narrative of “consumer protection” — as is being pushed by the Obama Administration, we will do little to avoid the creation of the next housing bubble and its damaging aftermath. Instead we should be focusing attention on those policies that contributed to the creation of the housing bubble: expansionary monetary policy and the Federal government’s blind pursuit of ever-expanding home-ownership rates at any cost.
End the Credit Rating Monopoly
Earlier this week, SEC Chair Mary Shapiro appeared before Congress to suggest ways to fix the failings in our credit rating agencies. Sadly her proposals miss the market, although that shouldn’t be so surprising as her suggestions appear to rest upon a misunderstanding of the problem.
The thrust of the SEC’s current approach is more disclosure, such as releasing “pre-ratings” that debt issuers may get before final issuance. Additional disclosure of ratings methodology and assumptions is likely to be useless. Almost all that information was available during the building housing bubble. The problem is that the rating agencies had little incentive to go beyond the consensus forecasts of increasing to at most modest declines in home prices. These same assumptions were the foundation of almost all government economic forecasting as well, yet few believe that forcing CBO or OMB to disclosure more of their forecasts will cure our budget imbalances. What is needed is a change in incentives.
Shocking News: Fannie Mae Is Losing More Money
Yes, I know. It’s hard to believe. Fannie Mae continues to lose money and, even more surprisingly, isn’t likely to ever pay taxpayers back for all of the billions that it already has squandered. Rather, it says it will need more bail-out funds — probably another $110 billion this year alone.
Fannie Mae reported yesterday that it lost $23.2 billion in the first three months of the year as mortgage defaults increasingly spread from risky loans to the far-larger portfolio of loans to borrowers who have been considered safe.
The massive loss prompts a $19 billion investment from the government to keep the firm solvent, on top of a $15 billion investment of taxpayer money earlier this year.
The sobering earnings report was a reminder of the far-reaching implications of the government’s takeover in September of Fannie Mae and the smaller Freddie Mac. Losses have proved unrelenting; the firms’ appetite for tens of billions of dollars in taxpayer aid hasn’t subsided; and taxpayer money invested in the companies, analysts said, is probably lost forever because the prospects for repayment are slim.
But the government remains committed to keeping the companies afloat, because it is relying on them to help reverse the continuing slide in the housing market and keep mortgage rates low.
Even as the government bailout of banks appears to be leveling off, the federal rescue of Fannie and Freddie is rapidly growing more expensive. Fannie Mae said that the losses will continue through at least much of the year and that it “therefore will be required to obtain additional funding from the Treasury.” Analysts are estimating that the company could need at least $110 billion.
Freddie Mac, which has been in worse financial shape than Fannie Mae and has obtained $45 billion in taxpayer funding, will report earnings in coming days.
The response of policymakers in the administration and Congress to this fiscal debacle? Silence. No surprise there, since many of them helped create the very programs that continue to bleed taxpayers dry.
Alas, this isn’t the first time that the federal government has promoted a housing boom and bust. Instead, writes Steven Malanga in Investor’s Business Daily:
This cycle goes back nearly 100 years. In 1922, Commerce Secretary Herbert Hoover launched the “Own Your Own Home” campaign, hailed as unique in the nation’s history.
Responding to a small dip in homeownership rates, Hoover urged “the great lending institutions, the construction industry, the great real estate men … to counteract the growing menace” of tenancy.
He pressed builders to turn to residential construction. He called for new rules that would let nationally chartered banks devote a greater share of their lending to residential properties.
Congress responded in 1927, and the freed-up banks dived into the market, despite signs that it was overheating.
The great national effort seemed to pay off. From mid-1927 to mid-1929, national banks’ mortgage lending increased 45%. The country was becoming “a nation of homeowners,” the Times exulted.
But as homeownership grew, so did the rate of foreclosures, from just 2% of commercial bank mortgages in 1922 to 11% in 1927.
This happened just as the stock market bubble of the late ’20s was inflating dangerously. Soon after the October 1929 Wall Street crash, the housing market began to collapse. Defaults exploded; by 1933, some 1,000 homes were foreclosing every day.
The “Own Your Own Home” campaign had trapped many Americans in mortgages beyond their reach.
Financial institutions were exposed as well. Their mortgage loans outstanding more than doubled from the early 1920s to 1930 — $9.2 billion to $22.6 billion — one reason that about 750 financial institutions failed in 1930 alone.
The only serious option is to close down all of the money-wasting federal programs and laws designed to subsidize home ownership. A stake through the hearts of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Housing Administration, and Community Reinvestment Act, to start. Otherwise the cycle is bound to be repeated, again to great cost for the ever-suffering taxpayers.
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics; Tax and Budget Policy
All-Star Lineup in New York
Cato is planning a seminar in New York on April 30 with an all-star lineup of speakers: Nat Hentoff, our new senior fellow and perhaps the leading First Amendment advocate of the past generation. Top climate scientist Pat Michaels. Peter Schiff, the financial guru who spent 2006 and 2007 failing to persuade people that the U.S. housing and financial markets were on the verge of collapse. And Freeman Dyson, one of the world’s top scientists and the subject of a recent New York Times Magazine profile for his “heretical” views on global warming. Check out the program:
- 11:05–11:35 a.m. Nat Hentoff —Keynote Address: An Endangered Native Species: The First Amendment
- 11:35–11:55 a.m. Pat Michaels —Climate of Extremes: Global Warming Science They Don’t Want You to Know
- 11:55 a.m.–12:15 p.m. Peter Schiff —Economic Crisis: A Government Failure
- 12:30–2:00 p.m. Freeman Dyson —Luncheon Address: Climate Disaster, Safe Nukes, and Other Myths
Register for the event here ($100 per person).
Tarred by TARP
Government-backed equity was offered to adequately capitalized banks in order to remove the “stigma” from banks receiving TARP funds, and the management of these institutions took the bait and accepted the money.
Surprise, surprise: now they discover that the money came with strings.
Some banks want to pay back the TARP money to extricate themselves from government restrictions on compensation and pressure to make loans the banks view as unprofitable. Treasury Secretary Geithner has made it clear that the decision to pay back the funds early won’t be left to the banks, but to the Treasury: “My basic obligation is to make sure the system as a whole … has the ability to provide the credit that recovery requires.”
The banking system has thus become a tool for the government to further its policies. And the bankers themselves put their institutions in that position. While taxpayers may understandably feel the bankers got their comeuppance, there are at least two major problems with the Bush/Obama policy.
First, Mr. Geithner has misdiagnosed the problem.
We are in recovery from the effects of the bursting of a massive housing and finance bubble funded by debt. That boom in turn financed a consumption binge of monumental proportions.
The only resolution of a spending binge is restraint in the form of saving. Recovery requires not more credit and another boom, but a dose of economic sobriety.
Individuals and firms know that and are de-leveraging – unwinding what they now realize is excessive debt. That will take the rest of this year and the better part of 2010. Overall, credit is down because demand is down.
Second, and even more disturbing: it appears that the Obama Administration wants to control the financial sector in order to gain control over what Lenin called the “Commanding Heights” of the U.S. economy: the major industries and sources of employment. The auto industry is a prime example, and one in which the administration has involved itself directly. It is also pressuring major recipients of TARP funds to ease the terms of the loans they have made to firms such as Chrysler. Treasury is attempting to use the banks to conduct fiscal policy through credit allocation.
The bankers taking TARP funds got their firms into a mess and deserve no sympathy. Anyone believing in free markets, however, must oppose this power grab by the Obama Administration.
Let the banks pay the funds back and let it be a lesson for CEOs and their stockholders: If you take government funds, you have taken on an unreliable business partner.
Solve the Financial Crisis (and Make Some Serious Money)
Peter Van Doren and I have been puzzling over this very interesting NYT op-ed on home foreclosures by Yale economist John Geanakoplos and Boston University law professor Susan Koniak. If G&K’s story is right, then shouldn’t there be an opportunity for some clever financiers to help struggling homeowners keep their houses, help banks and other investors repair their balance sheets — and the financiers could help themselves to piles of cash in the process?
G&K argue that all three parties to a home mortgage — the homeowner, the lender, and the loan servicer who works as a go-between — currently face grim financial prospects:
- Many homeowners are “underwater” — that is, they owe more on their mortgages than their homes are now worth. According to First American Core Logic, some 20% of mortgages were underwater as of December 2008. The percentage varies greatly from state to state, with 55% of mortgages underwater in Nevada, but only 7% in New York. The homeowners who are underwater include not just those who purchased with little down payment, but also many people who put down the traditional 20 percent when they bought in 2005 or 2006, at the peak of the real estate bubble. According to Case-Shiller index data, house prices nationwide have fallen 27% (as of December) from their May 2006 peak. Some local markets have experienced more dramatic declines, highlighted by Phoenix’s 46% slide. Rental prices are now far below many homeowners’ monthly mortgage payments, and lots of underwater homeowners will have to make payments for years before they have some equity stake in their homes. Many of those homeowners would rather default and risk foreclosure. G&K’s op-ed includes this figure showing that defaults increase dramatically as homeowners sink further and further underwater. Given their current options, default is rational.
- The mortgage lender faces heavy losses if the home enters foreclosure. According to G&K, ”the subprime bond market now trades as if it expects only 25 percent back on a loan when there is a foreclosure.”
- The servicer also is at risk. According to G&K, the servicer is obligated to continue paying the lender its monthly payment even if the borrower is in default. That obligation only lifts at foreclosure.
Because of the servicer’s obligation, the servicer has strong incentive to push for quick foreclosure. However, the homeowner and the mortgage lender would likely benefit from a loan modification — even a significant write-down of principal — because that would keep the homeowner in his house and it would deliver a better return to the lender than the 75% loss from foreclosure. G&K thus argue that government, instead of continuing to bail out the banking industry and struggling homeowners (and putting taxpayers on the hook for hundreds of billions of dollars), should simply require that the lenders write down the mortgage principal.
But is government action needed? Couldn’t some private actors accomplish the same thing — and make some serious scratch in the process?
Filed under: Finance, Banking & Monetary Policy; Government and Politics
Homeless Scare Numbers
The National Center on Family Homelessness has generated headlines today by releasing a report that claims “one in 50 children is homeless in the United States every year.” That would be a total of 1.5 million homeless children, a truly shocking figure. The number is all the more shocking because the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development says there actually only 671,000 people were homeless in 2007 (the last year for which data is available), of which only about 249,000 were people in families. Assuming even one adult per family would mean there were around 166,000 homeless children, far too many, but also far fewer than 1.5 million.
What accounts for the discrepancy? First, the National Center uses an incredibly broad definition of homeless. For example, in addition to those we usually think of as homeless (those living in shelters or on the streets), they also include people “Sharing the housing of other persons due to loss of housing, economic hardship, or a similar reason.” Under this definition, when your out-of-work in-law crashes on your couch, he’s homeless. The National Center also includes people “living in motels, hotels, trailer parks, or camping grounds,” children awaiting foster care placement, and children of migratory farm workers. And, a child needs only to fall into one of these categories for a single day to qualify as homeless.
Second, this study, like the HUD study as well, are not actual counts of the homeless, but estimates and extrapolations based on reports by various government agencies. The Census Bureau does attempt to do an actual head count of the homeless (170,000 in 2000), but that estimate is both out-of-date and generally criticized as an undercount. Still, going from that estimate to 1.5 million homeless children seems quite a stretch.
Homelessness is clearly a problem, and for the children involved, a tragedy, but scare headlines are a poor substitute for thoughtful public policy.
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