Uh-Oh: Bipartisan Housing Commission Announced
The words “bipartisan” and “commission” usually send a chill down my spine. I felt such a chill when I learned that the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) had formed a Housing Commission to “address the long-term challenges facing a struggling housing sector.” My initial reaction was confirmed when I read that it would be chaired by former government officials and politicians of the establishment type:
- Christopher “Kit” Bond – former U.S. senator (R-MO)
- Henry Cisneros – Housing and Urban Development (HUD) secretary under President Bill Clinton
- Mel Martinez – former U.S. senator (R-FL) and HUD secretary under President George W. Bush
- George Mitchell – former Senate majority leader (D-ME) and BPC co-founder
The most disturbing name is Henry Cisneros. Policies implemented by Cisneros’s HUD helped lead to the housing bubble and bust (see this section on Cisneros from a Cato essay on HUD Scandals). What’s next, Dick Cheney on a hunting safety commission?
Christopher “Kit” Bond, former appropriator and proud porker, hangs himself with his statement on the BPC’s website:
Since serving as Missouri’s Governor, and then as a United States Senator, I have worked to be an advocate for improving public housing and advancing community development. Some of my proudest achievements are helping shape housing policy and programs in homelessness, rural housing, public housing, HOPE VI, and affordable housing. None of these successes would have been possible without strong partners on the other side of the aisle.
In fact, my fellow Commission Co-Chair, and former HUD Secretary, Henry Cisneros and I, were referred to in a 1996 Wall Street Journal article as the ‘Odd Couple’ of federal housing policy – a moniker I still wear as a badge of honor. Though it was a different time in our nation’s history, Henry and I were then – as we are now – committed to coming together to address long-ignored problems with immense implications.
The federal government’s abysmal record on housing (see these Cato essays here for more) is a poster child for government failure. But not only does Bond consider his support for these programs to be among his “proudest” achievements, he actually states that collaborating with Cisneros back in the 1990s is a “badge of honor.”
I’m not sure what Mel Martinez has going for him on housing policy other than that his relatively short tenure as HUD secretary under Bush wasn’t marred by scandal like his successor’s, Alphonso Jackson. At least Martinez acknowledges that the Bush administration continued the Clinton administration’s misplaced emphasis on expanding homeownership.
As for George Mitchell, his claim to federal housing policy fame is that he authored the creation of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit. Here’s what a Cato essay on public housing has to say about the LIHTC:
Another response to the failure of traditional public housing has been the creation of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit in 1986, which currently subsidizes construction or rehabilitation of roughly 70,000 units of low-income housing each year. This is another failed attempt to manipulate markets, and it has a variety of negative effects. For one thing, the structure of the tax credit program encourages the location of projects in particularly low-income areas, thus exacerbating the concentration of poverty in cities, just as traditional public housing did. Also, the method of allocating tax credits to the states results in many subsidies going to areas of the country where few housing affordability problems exist.
Further, the projects built under the LIHTC program have income caps for tenants, which create the same disincentive effects for personal advancement that traditional welfare programs do. Finally, the program essentially functions as a subsidy program for developers. Economists Edward Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko argue that developers effectively pocket the $4 billion or so in annual federal tax credits, while the rents in buildings constructed under the program are generally no lower than they would have been in the absence of the program.
In a nutshell: an establishment commission is planning to “reform the nation’s housing policy by crafting a package of realistic and actionable policy recommendations” for the Beltway establishment’s consideration. Hold onto your wallets, taxpayers.
Are We Building Enough Housing?
One of the primary reasons the labor market remains weak is that construction activity is relatively low, resulting in a reduced demand for construction workers. My friends in the building industry argue that because housing starts are at historic lows, we are actually not building enough housing. While I’m open to that as a possibility, and believe it to be the case in select markets, nationally the evidence suggests otherwise.
First of all, the monthly supply of new homes — that is the time that would be required to sell off the current inventory — is still relatively high at just under seven months, as shown in the following figure. Granted this is significantly below the 12 month peak we saw at the beginning of 2009. So without a doubt this number is moving in the right direction, but it still has a little ways to go. I will be far more optmistic about the housing market when we get to around five months’ new supply.
Is Housing Holding Back Inflation?
Today the Bureau of Labor Statistics released the consumer price index (CPI) numbers for April, which generally gives us the best picture of inflation. The headline number is that between April 2010 and April 2011, consumer prices increased 3.2 percent, as measured by the CPI. Obviously this is well above 2 percent, the number Ben Bernanke defines as “price stability.” Setting aside the reasonableness of that definition, there is definitely some mild inflation in the economy.
Also of interest in the April numbers is that if you subtract housing, which makes up over 40% of the weight of the CPI, then prices increased 4.2 percent — twice Bernanke’s measure of stability. What has always been problematic of the housing component is that its largest piece is an estimate of what owners would pay themselves if they rented their own residence. This estimate makes up about a fourth of the CPI. As the chart below demonstrates, for much of 2010, the direction in this number was actually negative, which held down CPI over the last year. The current annualized figure for owner’s rent is 0.9 from April 2010 to April 2011. Oddly enough, this is below the actual increase in rents, which was 1.3. For most homeowners, the real cost of housing — their mortgage payment — has likely been flat, not decreasing. So whatever benefit there has been to declining housing costs, most consumers are unlikely to feel any benefit from those declines, if they are actually real.
While the primary driver of CPI has been energy costs, food prices have also garnered considerable attention. Excluding food from the CPI does not change the headline number, although this is due to the fact that the cost of eating out has been rising considerably slower than the cost of eating at home. So as along as you’ve been eating out every night, you’ve apparently been fine. This touches upon what is one of the less recognized features of current inflation trends: the regressive nature of these prices increases. If you rent, then you’ve seen costs increase more than if you own. If you mostly eat at home, then you’ve seen prices increase more than if you dine out a lot. If you have a lot of leisure time, the you’ve gained by the decrease in reaction prices. While I don’t think one’s position on inflation should be driven purely by distributional concerns, the fact that working middle-income households have been hit harder by recent inflation trends than higher-income households should cut against the claims that inflation is somehow good for the poor or working class.
Do We Need China to Fund Our Mortgage Market?
Earlier this week I repeatedly heard the claim that if the federal government does not guarantee credit risk in the mortgage market, foreigners won’t buy U.S. mortgage-related debt. Before we test whether that claim is true, let’s first determine just how important are foreign investors in the U.S. mortgage market.
For the most part, foreign investors do not hold U.S. mortgages directly, but either hold Fannie and Freddie debt and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) or hold private-label MBS. As the private-label securities lack a government guarantee, we can ignore that segment of the market. The chart below depicts the percentage share of foreign ownership of these securities in recent years:
The chart illustrates that, at times (particularly around the peak of the recent housing bubble), foreign investors have been large providers of capital to the GSEs. In 2007, over 20% of GSE debt was held outside the United States, double the percentage from only a few years earlier. The increase was driven almost exclusively by purchases by foreign governments (mostly central banks for the purpose of currency manipulation). In 2007, this amounted to just over $1.5 trillion.
However, if we went back and looked at a year prior to the super-heated housing market — say 2003 — then this total is about $650 billion. Given that U.S. commercial banks now have about $1 trillion in cash sitting on their balance sheets, it appears that domestic sources could completely fund the U.S. mortgage market without any foreign funds.
Another Day in the Life of the IRS
A previous post of mine at International Liberty addressed the debate over whether Republicans should trim the IRS’s budget. The following case study should convince everyone that the answer is a resounding yes.
First, some background from a Joe Nocera column in the New York Times. The federal government made a rather troubling decision a few years ago to investigate, prosecute, and ultimately imprison a random home-loan borrower named Charlie Engle for the crime of mortgage fraud.
Mr. Engle is far from blameless in this saga, but I noted in another post that it was rather odd that the government would target a nobody while letting all the big fish swim away. This episode certainly paints a picture of a government that has one set of rules for ordinary people, but an entirely different set of rules for the political elite and those who make big campaign contributions to that ruling class.
But I also noted that I’m not a lawyer or legal expert and was unsure about the degree to which the big players actually broke laws, or whether they simply made stupid business decisions (often encouraged by bad government policy).
The most upsetting part of the story, though, is how the government wound up targeting Mr. Engle. It turns out that an IRS agent, Robert Norlander, must have been competing for the IRS’s Bully-of-the-Year Award because here are some of the things he did:
Is Buying a House with Cash Bad?
The Washington Post reported today that the increase in January home sales was driven mainly by an increase in all-cash sales. Whereas I would have thought increasing sales, especially driven by cash buyers, was a sign of market strength; the Post and the National Association of Realtors portrayed this as a bad thing. NAR chief economist Lawrence Yun went so far as to call this portion of the market “unhealthy.”
Of course, what NAR and the rest of the real estate lobby were complaining about was that home sales and prices were not being driven by easy credit. For the housing industry, it would seem that the “correct” house price is the price that is propped up by loose credit.
Yun goes on to say that ”investors are taking the advantage of conditions to purchase undervalued homes.” I used to work with Yun, he’s a smart guy, but I don’t think anyone is smart enough to say that the homes being sold are ”undervalued.” Consider that most non-industry forecasters are projecting further price declines.
More cash sales actually means less future foreclosures, because the cash buyers start out with 100% equity from day one. They are very unlikely to walk away, regardless of the future path of prices. Cash buyers also pay prices that are closer to reflecting the fundamentals of supply and demand, which are ultimately driven by income and demographics.
What the high percentage of cash borrowers, at 37 percent, says to me, is that there is a significant demand for housing that isn’t dependent upon massive taxpayer subsidies to the mortgage industry.
Five Lessons from Ireland
The news is going from bad to worse for Ireland. The Irish Independent is reporting that the Swiss Central Bank no longer will accept Irish government bonds as collateral. The story also notes that one of the world’s largest bond firms, PIMCO, is no longer purchasing debt issued by the Irish government.
And this is happening even though (or perhaps because?) Ireland received a big bailout from the European Union and the International Monetary Fund (and the IMF’s involvement means American taxpayers are picking up part of the tab).
I’ve already commented on Ireland’s woes, and opined about similar problems afflicting the rest of Europe, but the continuing deterioration of the Emerald Isle deserves further analysis so that American policy makers hopefully grasp the right lessons. Here are five things we should learn from the mess in Ireland.
Reflections on a Mortgage Summit
Yesterday the Treasury and HUD hosted a “Conference on the Future of Mortgage Finance.” It was an invite-only of Washington insiders. Somehow I found myself on the invite list, which was almost enough to make me believe that the Administration was finally serious about reforming Fannie and Freddie.
After getting over the nausea of being in a room full of people who I personally knew bore some responsibility for the mess we are in, I was then shocked that, compared to the rest of the room, Treasury Secretary Geithner came across as the radical. On one hand Geithner was very clear that the Administration was going to push for some sort of government guarantee, but also that the current structure, particularly Fannie and Freddie, were broken. He also went as far as admitting that Fannie and Freddie were a cause of the crisis.
Such statements only became radical in contrast to the rest of the room. Maybe about 80 percent of the attendees were blindly and violently attached to the status quo. Most offensive to those us who fight for free markets was that the industry representatives were the most vocal advocates for the status quo. To even suggest that lenders should bear the risk of loans they make was crazy to this group. It was a clear reminder that being pro-market and pro-business are generally two very different things. In fairness, not all lenders were busy plotting to find ways to profit while dumping their risk onto the taxpayer; some, such as Wells Fargo, were far more supportive of the private sector actually bearing the risk.
Most of those who were not industry insiders were housing and community advocates. While this group did seem a little less self-interested, they appear to have learned little about the risks of over-expanding homeownership. Repeatedly, access to homeownership, as if it could solve every social ill, was pushed as the primary goal. A few dissenters reminded us that rental is a viable option too, although they were mainly looking to continue/expand Fannie and Freddie’s support of the multifamily rental market.
If the Administration was hoping that this group was going to come up with answers, then they must have been sorely disappointed. If Obama is serious about taking the taxpayer off the hook for risk in the mortgage market, then he is going to have to take on the special interests. My fear is that the event was just the beginning of how health care reform played out: cut a deal with the industry, pay off the Democratic base, and screw the taxpayer. Let’s hope we actually see some change on this one.
Two Cheers for the U.S. Economy
Two articles in today’s Wall Street Journal deal with the housing sector. They complement each other. Journal reporters note that “Industry Speeds Recovery, And Housing Slows It Down.” The story notes that that “ground-breaking for new homes and applications for building permits both plunged last month.” Meanwhile, U.S. industrial output showed strong growth in May.
Bravo for both numbers, which are inter-related. The headline (over which reporters have no control) reflects conceptual confusion. U.S. industrial production is strong at least in part because construction of new homes is weak. The bloated home sector is no longer absorbing a disproportionate share of economic resources. The new homeowners tax credit has mercifully expired, ending that bit of misguided stimulus.
David Wessel’s article, “Rethinking Home Ownership,” further clarifies the reallocation of resources taking place in the U.S. economy. Beginning in the 1990s, the federal government adopted a number of policies to stimulate home ownership. As Wessel makes clear, it was a bipartisan effort. Home ownership rates rose from around 65% to a peak of 69.4% in 2004. It was an unsustainable policy, a true asset bubble.
Home ownership rates have now fallen back to where they began, or even below. The experience of the 1990s and early 2000s in housing demonstrates why government stimulus is not a permanent source of demand, nor the path to sustainable economic growth. Lest we forget, the folly of these programs is measured not just in housing numbers, but in shattered dreams and hopes and ruined lives. And the terrible financial crisis to which these programs contributed
Cisneros Rewriting HUD History
In a recent speech to real estate interests, former Clinton HUD secretary Henry Cisneros preposterously claimed that the recent housing meltdown “occurred not out of a governmental push, but out of a hijacking of the homeownership process by some unscrupulous interests.”
The only criticisms Cisneros could muster for the government’s housing policies over the past 20 years were that regulations weren’t tough enough and it should have focused more on rental subsidies.
The reality is that Cisneros-era HUD regulations and policies directly contributed to the housing bubble and subsequent burst as a Cato essay on HUD scandals illustrates:
- Cisneros’s HUD pursued legal action against mortgage lenders who supposedly declined higher percentages of loans for minorities than whites. As a result of such political pressure, lenders begin lowering their lending standards.
- On Cisneros’s watch, the Community Reinvestment Act was used to pressure lenders into making more loans to moderate-income borrowers by allowing regulators to deny merger approvals for banks with low CRA ratings. The result was that banks began issuing more loans to otherwise uncreditworthy borrowers, while purchasing more CRA mortgage-backed securities. More importantly, these lax standards quickly spread to prime and subprime mortgage markets.
- The Clinton administration’s National Homeownership Strategy, prepared under Cisneros’s direction, advocated “financing strategies, fueled by creativity and resources of the public and private sectors, to help homebuyers that lack cash to buy a home or income to make the payments.” In other words, his policies encouraged the behavior that he now calls “unscrupulous.”
- Cisneros’s HUD also put Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac under constant pressure to facilitate more lending to “underserved” markets. It was under Cisneros’s direction that HUD agreed to allow Fannie and Freddie credit toward its “affordable housing” targets by buying subprime mortgages. Fannie and Freddie are now under government conservatorship and will cost taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars.
Cisneros now serves as the executive chairman of an institutional investment company focused on urban real estate. Might that explain why Cisneros is now a fan of subsidizing rental housing?
“Unscrupulous” would be a good word to describe the millions of dollars Cisneros has made in the real estate industry following his exit from government.
From the Cato essay:
In 2001, Cisneros joined the board of Fannie Mae’s biggest client: the now notorious Countrywide Financial, the company that was center stage in the subprime lending scandals of recent years. When the housing bubble was inflating, Countrywide and KB took full advantage of the liberalized lending standards fueled by Cisneros’s HUD. In addition to the money he received as a KB director, Cisneros’s company, in which he held a 65 percent stake, received $1.24 million in consulting fees from KB in 2002.
When Cisneros stepped down from Countrywide’s board in 2007, he called it a “well-managed company” and said that he had “enormous confidence” in its leadership. Clearly, those statements were baloney—Cisneros was trying to escape before the crash. Just days before his resignation, Countrywide announced a $1.2 billion loss, and reported that a third of its borrowers were late on mortgage payments. According to SEC records, Cisneros’s position at Countrywide had earned him a $360,000 salary in 2006 and $5 million in stock sales since 2001.
Congress Begins Conference on Financial Regulation
Today begins the televised political theatre that Barney Frank has been waiting months for: the first public meeting of the House and Senate conferees on the two financial regulation bills. While there are a handful of important differences between the House and Senate bills, these differences are overshadowed by what the bills have in common. The most important, and tragic, commonality is that both bills ignore the real causes of the financial crisis and focus on convenient political targets.
As our financial system was brought to its knees by an exploding housing bubble, fueled by government mandates and distortions, one would think, just maybe, that Congress would roll back these distortions. Despite their role in contributing to the crisis and the size of their bailout, however, neither bill barely mentions Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Except, of course, to continue their favored and privileged status, such as their exemption from a proposed new “consumer protection” agency. What we really need is a new “taxpayer protection” agency.
Nor will either bill change the government’s meddling in what is probably the most important price in the economy: the interest rate. Given the overwhelming evidence that loose monetary policy was a direct cause of the housing bubble, one might expect Congress to spend time and effort preventing the Fed from creating another bubble. Not only does Congress ignore the issue, the Senate won’t even allow GAO to look at the Fed’s conduct of monetary policy.
Instead of spending the next few weeks gazing into the camera, Congress should stop and gaze into the mirror. This was a crisis conceived and born in Washington DC. The Rayburn building serving as the proverbial back-seat of the housing bubble.
Guess Who’s Behind the New Fire-Sprinkler Mandates
California just adopted effective next year a requirement that all new one- and two-family dwellings include indoor sprinkler systems. Other states are debating similar mandates, spurred by changes to national building code standards. Earlier legal mandates have required the inclusion of smoke alarms and carbon monoxide alarms, but the cost of those devices is relatively minor, whereas full-blown sprinkler systems add measurably to the cost of a new home, as well as posing challenges in such areas as maintenance, aesthetics, and risk of property damage through accidental activation.
It will surprise not a single reader of these columns, I suspect, to learn that the fire sprinkler industry has been a major force in pushing the new mandate. As for the opposition, home builders have managed to mount a bit of resistance — New Jersey, for example, saw the current depressed state of the residential construction business as reason to postpone its mandate for a year. But the builders are pretty much on their own in the fight, since future buyers of new homes are a group with no organized political presence whatsoever.
Real estate blogger Christopher Fountain writes that he’s “never heard of a home buyer voluntarily ordering this equipment when building a house, so it sounds to me like one more instance of people who know better dictating to those who don’t.” Exactly. A South Carolina paper quotes a state official as saying if buyers feel priced out of the new home market by the cost of the mandate, they have other ways to save money “such as choosing less expensive flooring or countertops, or not installing yard sprinklers”. Easy to make someone else’s budget decisions for them, isn’t it? And shouldn’t the “affordable housing” community be taking more of an interest?
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