North Korea Reprises Its Role as International Beggar
The death of North Korea’s Kim Jong-il put relations with the rest of the world on hold. But Pyongyang has stirred, reprising its role as international beggar.
The new regime, at least nominally headed by Kim’s 28-year-old son, Kim Jong-un, issued its first statement regarding relations with Washington. The United States should send more than 300,000 tons of previously promised food aid and end economic sanctions to “build confidence” with the North. In return, the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea might be willing to suspend its uranium enrichment program. The United States, Japan and South Korea stated yesterday that a “path is open” to restarting the six-party talks to address the concern over the North’s nuclear program.
Pyongyang seemed particularly aggrieved that the Obama administration would link humanitarian assistance to security issues. Shocking!
As Yogi Berra famously said, it is déjà vu all over again. North Korea makes agreement. North Korea gets aid. North Korea breaks agreement. North Korea blames West. North Korea offers to negotiate agreement. And the cycle starts again.
No one knows what to do with the DPRK. So far regime elites have preferred even impoverished stability over anything more than pro forma reform. The death of Kim Jong-il creates an opportunity for change, but there is no obvious constituency for revolution among the party apparatchiks and military officers who dominate the system.
That almost certainly means that Pyongyang is not prepared to negotiate away its existing nuclear capability. Only two men have ruled the North in the past 63 years; Kim Jong-un has none of their authority, and there are several plausible claimants for the throne. None is likely to be so foolish to alienate the military by campaigning to give away its ultimate weapon.
It still is worth talking with North Korea. Despite good reason for skepticism, lesser objectives might be achievable—limits on missile development, withdrawal of advanced conventional units, even caps on nuclear capabilities. Moreover, the DPRK appears to moderate its behavior while engaged in negotiations.
However, Washington should not pay for more promises. And the U.S. should not provide inducements just to get Pyongyang to talk. America has much to offer—diplomatic relations, end of sanctions, access to international aid, military withdrawal from the South. If confidence is to be rebuilt, it must be rebuilt on both sides.
Washington should make no exception for food aid. The suffering of the North Korean people is tragic, but it remains the result of conscious policies adopted by the North Korean regime. In fact, that is what “Juche,” the oft-proclaimed policy of self-reliance, is all about.
Moreover, the DPRK would view any government assistance as political affirmation. And any assistance would bolster a system under siege, aiding the government as it attempts to demonstrate its power and wealth this year during its centenary celebrations of founder Kim Il-sung’s birth. If the North needs more help, let it go to China, which already is keeping this desolate land afloat economically.
Refusing to engage other nations rarely makes sense, even in the case of North Korea, despite the monstrous nature of the regime. However engagement does not mean appeasement. In the future, Washington should restrict its rewards to the North for acting, not promising.
Weekend Links
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- Podcast: “Obama: Kinder Bud to Federalism?” featuring Aaron Houston of the Marijuana Policy Project.
What’s New in Pakistan?
This weekend, protesters supporting Pakistani opposition leader Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) clashed with police in riot gear in downtown Lahore. The sight of lawyers being tear-gassed is shocking to many Americans. But what should be more shocking—yet extremely more complicated to work through as explained below—is America’s continued backing of Pakistan’s unpopular president, Asif Ali Zardari, who continues to obstruct his democratic opposition and (until recently) the reappointment of ousted Chief Justice Iftikar Chaudrhy.
It’s easy for people in the West to dismiss these demonstrations as the outgrowth of the country’s petty political infighting. But Americans must recognize that historically, U.S. policy and assistance has either enhanced the position of Pakistan’s military at the expense of its civilian leaders, or has helped domestic civilian leaders more popular within Washington than within their home country. Throughout the Cold War and up to the present day, these domestically unpopular figures devoted more government resources toward themselves, their own political parties, and their own bureaucratic expansion rather than toward economic and social reforms to modernize and better educate Pakistan’s population. Consequently, Pakistani citizens began to blame American aid and support for their own deteriorating situation.
Certainly Pakistan’s domestic power struggles and ceaseless political infighting will continue to overshadow a menace more sinister than legislative rivals—i.e.-the Taliban, al Qaeda and other militant groups sweeping through large swaths of Pakistani territory.
But for long-term stability, U.S. policymakers must jettison the idea that a foreign leader’s denunciation of America means that leader poses a direct threat to U.S. interests. What America should want most is stability and continuity, particularly within Pakistan if we want to prevent the convergence of global terrorism and nuclear proliferation. Thus, in a perverse way, Sharif’s condemnation of the United States, coupled with his unwavering support for restoring judges sacked by Musharraf, has shored up his support within Pakistan, and his rise to power may actually bring solidity to the country.
The question of whether the military will step back in is much more complicated. Last August when the military backed away from politics, that move was based on political expediency (a desire to repair its tarnished image) rather than on political principle (a desire to restore the country’s democratic rights). If people in the military begin to feel that the country is slipping out of control they would attempt to retake power. There are, however, two main reasons why the military would not try to reassert its authority: 1) political pressure from Washington (the belief that with the military focused on governing, it would take its focus off combating the insurgency); and 2) pragmatism (after all, if Pakistanis are in an uproar over Sharif, imagine the protests that would ensue if army generals tried to impose martial law).
But when it comes to foreign policy, anything is possible, and Pakistan’s government has swung like a pendulum between military dictators and electoral democracies throughout its 61-year history. Because civilian leaders do not have a monopoly on government decision-making, U.S. policymakers must cultivate relations with both the civilians and the military, as civilians may be in power one day and the military in power the next.
Pakistan’s army is on standby ahead of today’s planned sit-in by lawyers in Islamabad, and authorities warn that such a protest would paralyze the government. The best U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton can do is work with both Zardari and Sharif to arrive at a negotiated settlement to restoring judges and ending the political deadlock. But overall, Pakistan’s long-term success depends on the strength of its civilian institutions and the public’s repudiation of extremism. In this respect, America must be committed to strengthening cooperation not only with the Pakistani Government but with the Pakistani people.
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