Sotomayor Displays a Lack of Deep Thinking
It strikes me that Sotomayor has been fairly forthright in her responses to questioning, not hiding too much behind the tired cliché that she can’t answer a question because it could lead to prejudging a case—certainly far less than Ruth Bader Ginsburg and even John Roberts. Still, on several important issues, such as property rights, national security law, abortion, and even her overall judicial philosophy, she has appeared disingenuous in saying that she has no firm views on the subject—hiding behind precedent again and again as if first principles didn’t exist. In other words, she says a lot—displaying a broad knowledge of cases and legal doctrine—without answering larger questions. She answers questions about what the law should be with what the law is, questions about what the Constitution says with what the Supreme Court has said about the Constitution.
This would be barely appropriate for a nominee to a lower court, who is, of course, bound by precedent. But senators rightly want to know a Supreme Court nominee’s preferred legal theories, what her view of the Constitution is unencumbered by others’ attempts to interpret that document.
The more Sotomayor speaks, the more it becomes clear that these types of nonanswers, this inability to see (or lack of desire to express) a big picture view, is her own essence. It continues a pattern that is evident from her judicial opinions, which are mostly unremarkable and, in the neutral sense of that term, unimpressive. For all her career success and a personal story we should all celebrate, she is an average judge who apparently gives little thought to the broad swath of law and where her rulings fit into that.
That is, Sonia Sotomayor is not a Cass Sunstein or Larry Tribe or Elana Kagan or (fellow circuit judge) Diane Wood. She is not a scholar or an ideologue. Her liberality is reflexive and warmed-over, a product of the post-modern educational environment that formed her in the 1970s—complete with ethnic activism—but not an intellectual edifice. This does not mean she isn’t a danger to liberty and the rule of law, or that her votes and opinions won’t harm the Constitution. But it does indicate that, for all her bluster about being a “wise Latina,” she is little more than a left-leaning empty robe.
CP Townhall
Update on the Sotomayor Hearings
After yesterday’s bloviating—much reduced by Joe Biden’s departure from the committee—today we’ve gotten into some good stuff. Sotomayor is obviously well-prepared. She speaks in measured, dulcet tones, showing little emotion.
Judiciary Committee Chairman Leahy gave her the opportunity to explain herself on Ricci and on the “wise Latina” comment—which she has repeated in public speeches at least six times going back 15 years—and then built up the nominee’s background as a prosecutor and trial judge. Ranking Member Sessions and Senator Hatch (himself a former chairman of the committee) pounded Sotomayor on Ricci, asking her how she reconciles a race-based decision with clear Supreme Court precedent—and how her panel decided the case in two paragraphs despite the weighty statutory and constitutional questions.
Sessions in particular pointed out the inconsistency between her statement yesterday that she was guided by “fidelity to the law” and her history of calling the appellate courts as being the place where “policy is made” and profession of inability to find an objective approach of the law divorced from a judge’s ethnicity or gender. Sotomayor’s responses were not convincing; rather than agreeing with Justice O’Connor’s statement that a wise old man and a wise old woman would come out the same way on the law, the “wise Latina” comment plainly means the exact opposite.
And so the back-and-forth continues. One refreshing thing I will note is that only twice has the nominee said she can’t answer a question or elaborate on a response: on abortion, saying Griswold, Roe, and Casey are settled law; and on guns, declining to discuss whether the constitutional right to bear arms can be used to strike down state (as opposed to federal) laws. The former is a clear—but not unexpected—cop-out because, unlike a lower court judge, the Supreme Court justice revisits the nature and scope of rights all the time. The latter is actually the correct response in light of the three cert petitions pending before the Court in the latest round of Second Amendment litigation. Still, her discussion of the Second Amendment left much to be desired given her ruling in Maloney; as Jillian Bandes pointed out recently, you can’t discuss incorporation without a solid understanding of Presser.
CP Townhall
More on Sotomayor
Cato adjunct scholars on Judge Sotomayor:
- Harvey Silverglate looks at the Supreme Court nominee’s free speech record.
- Richard Epstein compares the libertarian and conservative criteria for Supreme Court nominees.
Today’s Wall Street Journal reports that Sotomayor’s record on criminal justice issues put her to the right of David Souter. Good grief — that would mean that for Sotomayer just about all the barriers on state power come tumbling down: structural safeguards like enumerated powers, non-delegation, separation of powers and the limits pertaining to police and prosecutorial powers.
For more background, go here and here.
Haywood v. Drown
The Supreme Court ruling in Haywood v. Drown got lost in the news last week, but it was an important constitutional case involving the principle of federalism. The issue concerned the extent to which the central government can commandeer state judicial systems. Unfortunately, by a narrow 5-4 vote, the Court gave the central government a green light.
Justice Clarence Thomas filed another one of his sober, scholarly opinions in dissent and I think he makes the case rather well. Excerpt:
The Court holds that New York Correction Law Annotated §24, which divests New York’s state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over suits seeking money damages from correction officers, violates the Supremacy Clause ofthe Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, because it requires the dismissal of federal actions brought in state court under42 U. S. C. §1983. I disagree. Because neither the Constitution nor our precedent requires New York to open its courts to §1983 federal actions, I respectfully dissent.
Although the majority decides this case on the basis of the Supremacy Clause, see ante, at 5–13, the proper starting point is Article III of the Constitution. Article III, §1, provides that “[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.” The history of the drafting and ratification of this Article establishes that it leaves untouched the States’ plenary authority to decide whether their local courts will have subject-matter jurisdiction over federal causes of action.
Until this setback, the Court’s conservatives were doing well in this corner of the law. In New York v. United States (1992), the Court ruled that state legislatures were not subject to federal direction. In Printz v. United States (1997), the Court ruled that state executive officers were not subject to federal direction. This case stood for the proposition that state courts are not subject to federal direction. Alas, Justice Anthony Kennedy joined the liberals to subordinate the states to federal control.
Here’s a practical example to illustrate the problem. It’s bad enough when Congress wants to pass a law like the Americans with Disabilities Act (pdf)–a law that will create a flood of litigation. But what if Congress goes a step further and writes the law in such as way as to say ”take all those time-consuming lawsuits to the state courts. Federal judges and personnel can’t be bothered with that stuff!” So state courts get clogged or state lawmakers must raise taxes to alleviate the added burden, which blurs accountability. That’s what is likely to happen. Or, to be precise, continue to happen with increasing frequency. The feds have permission to foist costs on to the states.
But, to be clear, the main issue here is the proper division of federal and state authority. Even if Congress were to get around the problem of unfunded mandates by throwing money at the states, each state should retain control over its judiciary. As Justice Thomas notes, the issue of federal supremacy is too often distorted by liberals. Within its proper sphere, the feds are supreme. Liberals want supremacy and federal authority that is plenary. Wrong. Obama’s Supreme Court nominee should be asked about federalism and the doctrine of enumerated powers at the confirmation hearings.
Filed under: General; Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties; Regulatory Studies
Judge Sonia Sotomayor’s Philosophy of Judging
Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals has been mentioned as a possible Supreme Court nominee. She also has been caught on tape explaining her view of a judge’s role. Reports the Washington Post:
As White House press secretary Robert Gibbs put it, Obama is looking for “somebody who understands how being a judge affects Americans’ everyday lives.”
Congressional conservatives have reacted anxiously to that qualification, fearing that it means a nominee who is more interested in making the law than in interpreting it.
One possible candidate for the seat, Judge Sonia Sotomayor of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit, appeared to walk close to that line in a video that emerged yesterday. Sotomayor would be the first Latino and the third woman to serve on the high court.
Speaking at Duke University in 2005, Sotomayor said, “All of the legal defense funds out there, they’re looking for people with court of appeals experience” because “the court of appeals is where policy is made.”
She then sought to soften the statement, adding lightly, “I know this is on tape and I should never say that, because we don’t make law, I know. Um, okay. I know. I’m not promoting it, I’m not advocating it.” The audience laughed as she brushed off the statement, perhaps sarcastically.
Making policy. Yes, it is indisputable that that’s what judges often do. But is that what they are supposed to do?
President Barack Obama seems to think so, when he talks about the importance of “empathy” in judges. (With whom do I empathize in this First Amendment case: the U.S. Attorney General or the New York Times? I vote for the Times!) However, the Senate might want to debate this issue before approving someone to fill Justice David Souter’s vacancy, especially if the nominee shares the president’s apparent view that empathy is a substitute for jurisprudence in interpreting the law and Constitution.
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