Should You Need a License to Hang Curtains?
The latest example of liberty-reducing occupational licensing schemes comes to us from Florida, where a law restricts the practice of interior design to people the state has licensed. Those wishing to pursue this occupation must first undergo an onerous process ostensibly in the name of “public safety.”
In reality, the law serves as an anti-competition measure that protects Florida’s current cohort of interior designers. Our friends at the Institute for Justice have pursued a lawsuit against the law but lost their appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.
Cato has now joined the Pacific Legal Foundation on an amicus brief asking the Supreme Court to review that ruling. The lower court got it wrong not just with respect to the right to earn a living, however, but also on First Amendment grounds.
That is, interior design, as a form of artistic expression, is historically protected by the First Amendment. Indeed, interior designers are measured primarily on the value of their aesthetic expression, not for any technical knowledge or expertise. This type of artistry is a matter of taste, and the designer and client usually arrive at the end result through collaboration and according to personal preferences. Thus, the designer-client relationship has little in common with traditionally regulated professions such as medicine, law and finance, where bad advice can have real and far-reaching consequences—but even then, the Supreme Court has emphasized the First Amendment implications of placing “prior restraints” on expression through burdensome licensing schemes.
Instead of following that precedent, however, the circuit court carved out a constitutionally unprotected exception for “direct personalized speech with clients.” Florida’s “public safety” justification is similarly weak, given that the state has presented no evidence of any bona fide concerns that substantiate a burdensome licensing scheme that includes six years of higher education and a painstaking exam—instead relying on cursory allegations that, for example, licensed designers are more adept at ensuring that fixture placements do not violate building codes.
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling disregarded the infinite array of auxiliary occupations the Florida law subjects to possible criminal sanctions: wedding planners, branding consultants, sellers of retail display racks, retail business consultants, corporate art consultants, and even theater-set designers could all get swept in. The state has already taken enforcement actions against a wide spectrum of people who are not interior designers, including office furniture dealers, restaurant equipment suppliers, flooring companies, wall covering companies, fabric vendors, builders, real estate developers, remodelers, accessories retailers, antique dealers, drafting services, lighting companies, kitchen designers, workrooms, carpet companies, art dealers, stagers, yacht designers, and even a florist. This dragnet effect also suggests that the law is too broad to survive constitutional scrutiny.
The Court will likely decide by the end of the year (or early 2012) whether to take this case of Locke v. Shore.
Race-Based Tax Exemptions Are Unconstitutional
Hawaii continues to think that it’s not quite part of the United States and thus not fully subject to U.S. law.
In the 2000 case of Rice v. Cayetano, the Supreme Court struck down race-based voting requirements for certain Hawaii state officers because government schemes that distinguish between “native Hawaiian” and “Hawaiian” are racial classifications that must pass “strict scrutiny” to be deemed constitutional; they must be narrowly tailored to achieve a truly “compelling” purpose (a standard nearly impossible to meet). Yet that exact same category of “native Hawaiian” — whose frighteningly archaic definition is “any descendant of not less than one-half part of the blood of the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778” — was used in the Hawaii Homes Commission Act to distinguish those who can hold certain leases that are subject to little or no property tax.
A group of Hawaiians who do not meet the state’s definition of “native Hawaiian” and therefore suffer under the explicitly race-based law decided to challenge these property-tax exemptions. After paying their taxes, these plaintiffs sought refunds on the grounds that the classification scheme violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, however, ruled that they didn’t have standing — a legal doctrine that determines who can bring a claim — to challenge the taxes on the ground that they had not yet asked for the leases (for which they were indisputably ineligible due to not having enough “blood of the races” flowing through their veins). A lower state court had even ruled that the classification was not race-based—that it merely distinguishes leaseholders and non-leaseholders, even though Hawaiians without the sufficient “blood quantum” cannot be leaseholders!
The group of taxpayers now seek review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Cato, joined by the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Grassroot Institute of Hawaii, the Goldwater Institute, and Professor Paul M. Sullivan, filed a brief urging the Court to take the case and rectify Hawaii’s explicitly unconstitutional taxation scheme. We argue that, after Hawaii’s state judiciary refused to address the issue of racial discrimination head-on, only the U.S. Supreme Court is in a position to guarantee the constitutional protections that Hawaiians have lived under for over a century (since Hawaii became a territory). Only by taking this case and overturning the racially charged definition can the Court continue to ensure that Hawaii is a state that “neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.”
The Supreme Court will likely decide by the end of the year (or in early 2012) whether to hear this case, Corboy v. Louie.
Justice Scalia Reads Cato’s Amicus Briefs
During Wednesday’s oral argument in Golan v. Holder (transcript here), Justice Scalia said something that was at once obvious and startling:
It seems to me Congress either had the power to do this under the Copyright Clause or it didn’t. I don’t think that powers that Congress does not have under the Constitution can be acquired by simply obtaining the agreement of the Senate, the President and Zimbabwe. I do not think a treaty can expand the powers of the Federal government.
This proposition is obvious, because the Constitution vests Congress with limited, enumerated powers, which can only be increased by constitutional amendment, not by treaty. But Scalia’s words were also startling because Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes said exactly the opposite almost a century ago—or at least that’s how his opinion has been read—in the canonical case of Missouri v. Holland. We filed a brief arguing that Holmes was wrong, and we are delighted that Justice Scalia agrees.
Thanks to Tim Lee for pointing out this exchange to me before I had a chance to read the transcript and to Georgetown’s Nick Rosenkranz, the principal author of our brief.
Will GPS Tracking Render the Fourth Amendment Quaint?
If the government put a GPS monitor on your car and used it to track every vehicular movement of yours for four weeks, do you think that would violate your Fourth Amendment rights? The government would like to be able to do that kind of thing without getting a warrant, and the Supreme Court will soon decide whether it can.
On November 8th, the Court will hear oral argument in U.S. v. Jones. Yours truly was the lead author of Cato’s amicus brief in the case, which may have a significant effect on how Fourth Amendment law intersects with new information technologies for decades to come.
In 2004, suspecting that Antoine Jones was dealing drugs, the FBI secretly attached a GPS tracking device to his car without a valid warrant. The FBI used this device to monitor and record the car’s movements, noting its location every ten seconds when it was in motion, for nearly a month before finally arresting Jones. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found that the FBI’s action was unconstitutional because it violated Jones’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”—the two-part Fourth Amendment standard developed in the landmark case of Katz v. United States. Though he traveled on public roads, the totality of his movements was available to nobody and thus was private.
Our brief argues that the government’s conversion of Jones’s vehicle into a surveillance device was an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Even though he didn’t lose a “possessory” interest in his car, the government invaded Jones’s various property rights, including the right to exclude, the right to manage, the right to use, and the right to the profits. Similarly, using his car to collect detailed data on his movements over this extended period without getting a warrant was an unreasonable search. The data reflecting his movements would never have come into existence without the government attaching its GPS device to his car. These are tough, interesting issues arising in the new circumstances created by information technology.
We spent as much time in the brief on the “reasonable expectations of privacy” test. The product of one Justice’s lone concurrence in the Katz case, it holds that if a person has an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and that expectation is one society is prepared to accept, then the Fourth Amendment protects the object of that expectation.
Courts have never faithfully applied this test, and for good reason: it’s a doctrinal mess that reverses the Fourth Amendment’s focus. Courts have second-guessed what the citizenry thinks in terms of privacy rather than examining government action to see if it is reasonable. Under “reasonable expectations” doctrine, things that are left in plain view are always available to the government while things that are hidden—well, the Court will look to see whether keeping it private comports with “reasonable expectations.”
The majority ruling in Katz rested on physical and legal protection that Katz had given to the sound of his voice when he entered a telephone booth. Because Katz had secured the privacy of his conversation, the government wasn’t allowed to access it using a wiretap—not without a warrant. That’s the rule the Court should apply here. The government can’t use uncommon surveillance technology to access private information, including private information about things that happened “in public,” without a valid warrant.
With information technology still rapidly increasing in power, it is critically important that the Supreme Court update Fourth Amendment law while maintaining its consistency with ancient property principles. Doing so will ensure that technology doesn’t render the Fourth Amendment’s protections for our “persons, papers, houses, and effects” quaint.
You can read more, and our brief, on the Cato.org page about U.S. v. Jones.
Obamacare Legal News Gone Wild
Developments in the Obamacare lawsuits are coming at us so quickly that it’s hard to keep up. After a month and a half of speculation on what the administration would do after it lost in the 26-state/NFIB lawsuit (Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Services), in the last week the D.C. Circuit heard argument in yet another case on appeal, the government decided not to seek en banc review in the Eleventh Circuit, yesterday we went from zero to three cert. petitions in that case, and the government filed a reply in the Thomas More (Sixth Circuit) case. Here’s a breakdown:
1. D.C. Circuit Argument
This past Friday, the D.C. Circuit heard the appeal of Seven-Sky v. Holder (in which Cato filed this brief). There wasn’t much media coverage, in part because the reporting came in on a Friday afternoon but more because the appellate developments after the Eleventh Circuit created a split from the earlier pro-government Sixth Circuit ruling are somewhat anticlimactic — because the action has moved to the Supreme Court. I attended the hearing and can report a few key points:
(a) The government still has not managed to come up with an example of something it cannot do under its reading of the Commerce Clause. This is shocking. Solicitor General Verrilli (who did not argue here), a word of unsolicited advice before Justice Scalia asks you the same question: come up with a couple of outlandish things and move on. Unless, you know, you think the government really can do anything it wants if a congressional majority exists for it.
(b) Judge Bret Kavanaugh, Bush II appointee and rising star in the conservative judicial establishment, had some serious concerns regarding the Anti-Injunction Act (the jurisdictional issue on which the Fourth Circuit based its decision to dismiss the Liberty University case). Beth Brinkmann, arguing for the government and after floundering on the Commerce Clause (see above), seemed to have done a great job in putting Kavanaugh’s mind at ease — or at least getting him over the jurisdictional hump.
(c) Judge Laurence Silberman, Reagan appointee and author of many significant opinions over the years, has a really wide interpretation of government power under Wickard v. Filburn, the 1942 wheat-farming case. I’m not sure that puts his vote in danger — he was also the one who most went after the government — but it does raise an eyebrow.
(d) Overall, I cautiously predict a 2-1 ruling in favor of the plaintiffs, but we won’t know till later this fall. For a more detailed analysis of the hearing, see Randy Barnett’s post at the Volokh Conspiracy.
Unions Can’t Force Non-Members to Pay for Political Advocacy
As recent events in Wisconsin have demonstrated, public-sector unions are powerful political constituencies that can shape government to their ends. The Service Employees International Union, for example, the defendant in Knox v. SEIU Local 1000, has been ranked by OpenSecrets.org as the fifth biggest “heavy hitter” in federal politics in terms of campaign spending.
In 2005, the SEIU initiated a mid-year campaign against two California ballot measures, one that would cap state spending and another that would restrict the use of union dues for political purposes. In states such as California that do not have “right to work” laws, unions are allowed to take dues from non-union workers to finance collective-bargaining activities that, arguably, benefit all employees. Since 1977, however, unions have not been allowed to take dues from non-union members to pay for pure political advocacy without adequate protections for possible dissenters.
To distinguish political money from collective-bargaining money, the Supreme Court requires that a “Hudson notice” be given to all non-union workers. This notice gives non-members the opportunity to challenge political expenditures. But when the SEIU began garnishing 25-33% more wages to fight the California ballot initiatives, it issued no new Hudson notice, effectively forcing 28,000 non-member employees to finance its political speech.
As Judge J. Clifford Wallace wrote in dissent from the Ninth Circuit’s ruling in favor of the SEIU, “it is undeniably unusual for a government agency to give a private entity the power, in essence, to tax government employees.” Now before the Supreme Court, Cato joined the Pacific Legal Foundation, the Center for Constitutional Jurisprudence, and the Mountain States Legal Foundation, on a brief supporting the non-union workers and arguing that the Court should focus not on the extent of the burden Hudson places on unions (as the Ninth Circuit did) but on the paramount reasons why the notice requirements exist in the first place: to ensure that an individual’s right to speak or remain quiet receives the protection it deserves.
As Judge Wallace put it, “the union has no legitimate interest . . . in collecting agency fees from nonmembers to fill its political war-chest.”
We also highlight the numerous unscrupulous tactics that unions have used over the years that violate the rights of dissenting workers — the same kind of rights that the Ninth Circuit treated with indifference. Finally, in light of the extreme political power that unions enjoy, the Court should find that the only way to adequately protect the rights of dissenting workers is to require that all non-union members must “opt-in” to any garnishment of wages for political purposes.
The Supreme Court will hear the Knox case in early 2012. Here again is Cato’s brief.
Property Rights Are Not Second-Class Rights
When state and local governments violate federal constitutional rights (e.g., First Amendment free speech), they can be sued in federal court — except when that government action violates the Fifth Amendment’s protections for property rights. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, individuals and businesses alleging unconstitutional takings by state or local governments are required to exhaust state review procedures — seeking redress from the very officials who harmed them — before turning to federal courts.
This constitutional anomaly is evident in Colony Cove v. City of Carson, where the operators of a rental property in California alleged an unconstitutional taking when the local rent control board refused to approve an increase in rent to allow their business to operate profitably. California law forecloses judicial review of the findings of rent control boards, so municipal governments have an unchecked license to determine whether such businesses may operate: A property owner’s sole recourse is to appeal to the very rent control board who forbade her from charging a profitable rent in the first place.
These “review” procedures, like some others across the nation, are wildly insufficient. Even more significantly, once a takings claim has been fully heard in state proceedings per Williamson County‘s command, it is usually barred from federal review based on various prudential doctrines. The result is the indiscriminate exclusion of takings claims from federal courts, a situation that invites opportunist states to usurp private property rights.
Seeking to afford citizens across the nation the opportunity to assert Takings Clause claims in parity with other constitutional rights, Cato joined the New England Legal Foundation, National Federation of Independent Business, Institute for Justice, Goldwater Institute, and Professors James Ely and Richard Epstein in filing an amicus brief supporting the California property owners’ petition for Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling against them.
We argue that Williamson County should be overruled because it relegates takings claims to second-class status despite the constitutional first principle that uniform protection of individual rights is vital to our system of government. At the very least, the Court should require federal reprieve when state procedures for rectifying a taking are futile — as they were here. Finally, we argue that the Court should correct lower courts’ misinterpretation of Williamson County, which puts property rights jurisprudence at odds with Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 (a statute that gives people access to federal courts when a state denies them their constitutional rights).
The Court will decide whether to review Colony Cove v. City of Carson later this year. Thanks to legal associate Anna Mackin for her help with the brief, whose counsel of record is Cato adjunct scholar Ilya Somin.
You Can’t Patent Thoughts
Doctors and researchers regularly perform blood tests to determine the effectiveness of various drugs. The resulting correlations between the test results and patient health have recently become the subject of numerous “process” patents. That these patents have been upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit represents a dangerous expansion of traditional patent law.
This expansion threatens to stifle free markets and infringe on individual liberty. In Mayo v. Prometheus, the Court will address the important question of whether someone can patent the process of observing correlations between blood test results and patient health. The primary legal issue here is whether naturally occurring correlations are patentable as “process” patents simply because the methods used to administer prescription drugs and test blood may involve “transformations” of body chemistry.
On Friday, Cato filed an amicus brief, joined by the Reason Foundation and the Competitive Enterprise Institute, arguing that these patents are not “processes” as the term was originally understood in the Patent Act of 1952. We liken medical-diagnostic patents to other abstract-process patents—such as software and business-method patents—that have resulted in financial losses for firms and discouraged innovation, and argue that enforcing these patents “will only serve to further slow the economy, retard technological innovation, distort the free market, and place human health at risk.”
Moreover, upholding the patents at issue will impermissibly restrict public-domain activity because the final step in a medical-diagnostic patent is an entirely mental one that will be violated whenever a doctor performs a previously public-domain medical test after learning about the patented correlation. Our brief thus closes by arguing that the Court should also consider the profound First Amendment implications in allowing processes whose final step is entirely mental to be patented.* “The Court has repeatedly recognized that the First Amendment protects freedom of thought as well as freedom of speech.” Unlike copyrights, patents lack traditional free-speech safeguards (such as exceptions for “fair use”) and, therefore, the Court should reject medical-diagnostic patents as impermissibly restricting the freedom of thought.
Mayo v. Prometheus will be argued late this year or in early 2012. Here again is Cato’s brief.
*Recall Judge Gladys Kessler of the D.C. federal district court, who found Obamacare’s individual mandate constitutional under the Commerce Clause because it regulates “mental activity.” Combining this theory with the theory of patentability at issue here, federal courts could sustain lawsuits based on a defendant’s making the same “patented” decision (or non-decision) as a plaintiff.
Another Judicial Takings Case Reaches the Supreme Court
For over a century, Montana citizens have used non-navigable streambeds along their properties for various purposes without objection from the state government. The hydroelectric energy company PPL Montana and thousands of other private parties exercised their rights over these non-navigable stretches that the state never claimed.
Last year, however, the Montana Supreme Court overturned well-settled state property law by effectively converting the title in hundreds of miles of riverbeds to state ownership. The majority of the court ruled that the entirety of the Missouri, Clark Fork, and Madison rivers were navigable at the time of Montana’s statehood, producing a broad holding that eradicates the right to use rivers and riverbanks that Montanans had enjoyed for over a century.
PPL Montana thus asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review the state court’s decision; Cato filed an amicus brief supporting that request, which the Court granted. Now that the case is before the Court, Cato has joined the Montana Farm Bureau Federation, American Farm Bureau Federation, and National Federation of Independent Business on a brief supporting the property owners.
We are chiefly concerned with two parts of the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling: First, the court incorrectly evaluated navigability for the purpose of establishing title — finding the entirety of the rivers at issue navigable (and thus belonging to the state) because portions of them are — contravening the legal standard established by the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. Utah (which analyzed the riverbeds section-by-section to achieve a “precise” assessment of navigability). Second, the court effectively transferred a substantial quantity of land from private owners to the state — a judicial taking that violates either the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendments (as the Court described in the recent Stop the Beach Renourishment case, in which Cato also filed a brief).
In short, the Court should reaffirm the Utah standard for navigability in the context of establishing title and protect private property owners against judicial takings. By doing so, it would send a strong message to state courts across the nation that judicial usurpations of property rights are just as unconstitutional as those undertaken by other branches of government.
The Court will hear the case of PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana late this year or in early 2012. Again, you can find Cato’s brief here.
California’s Water-Liu
Over the last year and a half, I’ve blogged many times about Berkeley law professor Goodwin Liu, the controversial nominee to the Ninth Circuit, the federal appellate court with jurisdiction over the western states and territories. Here’s an op-ed I published in the wake of that nomination — which happened to coincide with Obamacare’s enactment. And here’s a taste of what I wrote when Republicans filibustered Liu, which ultimately led him to withdraw:
I’m not going to weigh in here on the issue of whether judicial nominees ought to be filibustered in general . . . but if ever there were an “extraordinary circumstance” fitting into the Gang of 14 agreement that broke the judicial logjam under President Bush, this is it.
As I blogged last year, Liu is, without exaggeration, the most radical nominee to any position that President Obama has made. He believes in constitutional positive rights — not that the welfare state and all its accompanying entitlements (and then some) are a good idea, but that they are constitutionally required.
Well, today Liu finally reached the bench, being confirmed to the California Supreme Court. This is an unfortunate development for the citizens of California, to be sure, but, as I tweeted earlier today, at least Liu’s damage will be limited to that irredeemable state.
Of course, a state supreme court justice may be an attractive choice for appointment to the U.S. Supreme Court, particularly given that we haven’t had a state jurist appointed since President Reagan tapped Sandra Day O’Connor in 1981. And Liu would be the first Asian-American on the highest court in the land, which could further tempt Barack Obama or a future Democratic president to select him. Such are the stakes for every presidential election until the 40-year-old Liu is deemed too old for elevation.
Constitutional Structure Matters: A Response to Larry Tribe
SCOTUSblog’s symposium on the constitutionality of Obamacare — to which I contributed, as did Bob Levy – provides a glimpse at the astonishing views of the law’s supporters. It particularly shows how divorced the legal academy’s leading lights are not only from basic constitutional text and structure, but from jurisprudential reality.
Most prominently, in responding to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision striking down the individual mandate (and to Richard Epstein’s symposium essay), storied Harvard professor Laurence H. Tribe criticizes the court for “reflecting what appears to be a widely held public sentiment” that Congress cannot “mandate that individuals enter into contracts with private insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive product from the time they are born until the time they die.” That sentiment is a problem, according to Tribe, because it elevates form over substance. That is, just as it has done with Social Security, Congress could (under modern jurisprudence, which is wrong as a matter of first principle but not at issue in the Obamacare lawsuits) levy another income or payroll tax and use that revenue to provide health insurance and/or care for otherwise uninsured individuals:
Put otherwise, Congress may undoubtedly use its taxing power to mandate that individuals pay for coverage supplied by private insurers, so long as it acts in two steps: step 1, impose a tax, and step 2, use the proceeds of the tax to fund privately provided health insurance for each individual. If Congress may accomplish this objective in two steps, why not in one? No federalism or liberty-related concern, whether the dignity of the states or that of individuals, is served by denying Congress that authority.
Tribe’s reasoning echoes Justice Breyer’s reason (in dissent) for rejecting the notion that the Takings Clause applies when the Government orders an individual to pay another individual, in the case of Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel:
The dearth of Takings Clause authority is not surprising, for application of the Takings Clause here bristles with conceptual difficulties. If the Clause applies when the government simply orders A to pay B, why does it not apply when the government simply orders A to pay the government, i.e., when it assesses a tax?
But there is a very good reason why courts should deny Congress the power to compel individuals to purchase products from private parties or, for that matter, the power to order A to pay B — even if a similar result could be accomplished through the taxing power: political accountability. As Georgetown law professor (and Cato senior fellow) Randy Barnett explains:
Like mandates on states, economic mandates undermine political accountability, though in a different way. The public is acutely aware of tax increases. Rather than incur the political cost of imposing a general tax on the public using its tax powers, economic mandates allow Congress and the President to escape accountability for tax increases by compelling citizens to make payments directly to private companies.
Indeed, scholars as diverse as Richard Epstein and Cass Sunstein have argued that the Takings Clause requires just compensation precisely to preserve political accountability in the provision of public goods. As Justice Scalia explained in the case of Pennell v. City of San Jose:
The politically attractive feature of regulation is not that it permits wealth transfers to be achieved that could not be achieved otherwise; but rather that it permits them to be achieved “off budget,” with relative invisibility and thus relative immunity from normal democratic processes.
Under modern jurisprudence, essentially the only check on Congress’s taxing and spending powers under the General Welfare Clause (as opposed to its regulatory power under the Commerce Clause) is political. So yes, Professor Tribe, there is a constitutional reason for depriving Congress of the power to do in one step what it could surely do in two other steps: to maintain that remaining constitutional qua political check. Indeed, the very reason why Congress adopted the individual mandate was because it lacked the political will — it feared political accountability too much — to impose single-payer universal coverage, where the government would first impose a tax on everyone and then provide health care (at this point it’s no longer “insurance”) to everyone.
To accomplish the same result without having to impose significant new taxes — as President Obama famously promised there would not be – Congress tried to evade political accountability through the individual-mandate mechanism. That’s why the Eleventh Circuit wisely declined to grant Congress the power to move a significant part of its spending “off budget” and “mandate that individuals enter into contracts with private insurance companies for the purchase of an expensive product from the time they are born until the time they die.”
Cato legal associate Chaim Gordon co-authored this blogpost.
What’s Next in the Obamacare Litigation?
My colleagues and I have covered the substance of the Eleventh Circuit ruling that two weeks ago struck down the individual mandate, but where do we go from here? Why hasn’t the Supreme Court yet resolved the conflict between that ruling and the Sixth Circuit’s from earlier in the summer? When will it do so? A few points:
- The government is now likely to seek en banc review, meaning that they want the entire 10-judge court to review the 3-judge panel’s ruling. It’s extremely unlikely that the Eleventh Circuit would grant such a motion because the panel is already 2-1 against and the members of the court not on the panel are a 4-3 Republican-appointed majority. You need a majority (6 of 10) to get en banc review, which means the dissenting Judge Stanley Marcus from the panel, plus the three other Democratic appointees, plus two others. Not gonna happen. Thus, a government motion for en banc rehearing would be a purely political ploy to push the eventual Supreme Court decision past the election — no legal reason to do it. The release of the decision not to grant en banc review (which doesn’t require a written opinion) could be delayed, however, by the writing of a dissent from that denial.
- The earliest the Supreme Court could grant cert — on the existing petition out of the Sixth Circuit — is the moment after this blogpost goes live. (Note that Cato adjunct scholar Tim Sandefur filed an amicus brief supporting that petition for the Pacific Legal Foundation, which brief he describes here.) More realistically, it would be the week before the term opens for argument in October, right after the so-called long conference, when the justices review and rule on all the petitions that have come in over the summer. But they’ll likely wait to get the Eleventh Circuit case because they’d probably rather hear from the 26 states (and their counsel, former solicitor general Paul Clement) than any other plaintiffs. Here’s where it gets interesting: Assuming the government asks for en banc review, the plaintiffs could still file their own cert petition because they lost on severability and the Medicaid-coercion issue. Stay tuned.
- I still think this will get to the Court this term one way or another, with argument in the spring and a decision the last week of June.
- No stay of the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling is needed because the individual mandate doesn’t go into effect until 2014 and that’s the only provision that’s been struck down. So we don’t need to go into the type of analysis we did after Judge Vinson’s decision about what the federal government is authorized to do to keep implementing the legislation, in the 26 states or generally.
For more analysis, largely based on the above, see Jennifer Rubin’s Washington Post blog.
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