How to Prevent a Fort Hood Shooting
I wrote some posts a few months ago (1, 2, 3) about the difficulty of discovering and preventing essentially random events like the Fort Hood shooting. I was pleased by the compliment security guru Bruce Schneier paid them in his recent post, “Small Planes and Lone Terrorist Nutcases.” (Such happy subject matter we get to write about!)
Now comes Radley Balko with a great column illustrating what you get when authorities try to “get ahead” of this problem. “Pre-Crime Policing” tells the story of a gun buyer who had been tagged with the adjective “disgruntled.” A SWAT team appeared on his property, police tricked him into surrendering for a mental evaluation, they illegally entered his home, and they seized his guns.
Says the victim of these invasions, “South Oregon is big gun country. If something like this can happen here, where just about everyone owns a gun, it can happen anywhere.”
Especially if we ask law enforcement to prevent random violence.
Filed under: Law and Civil Liberties; Telecom, Internet & Information Policy
Playing Chicken Again
As I wrote in this post, Senators McCain and Lieberman proposed a broad piece of anti-terrorism legislation. The Enemy Belligerent, Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010 would use military detention to incapacitate suspected domestic terrorists, including American citizens. This is a sea change in counterterrorism policy and a break from American principles that mandate a day in court.
This bill is a bad idea for several reasons. First, for the points that I made in my previous post, the civilian criminal justice system successfully incapacitates domestic terrorists. Our laws are built to do that — it’s the international nature of al Qaeda and the necessity of military force in the expeditionary conflicts we are fighting that make things different. Second, I doubt that this policy will be seen as a bonanza for domestic counterterrorism, and the agencies responsible tasked with using military detention won’t actually have much use for it. Third, and most importantly, detaining American citizens minus a suspension of habeas is unconstitutional and will be held so in court.
The policy prescribed under this bill is to direct anyone apprehended and suspected of terrorism into military custody for their initial interrogation. The bill bars them from being read Miranda rights, directs a high-value detainee interrogation group to determine whether or not they fit the bill as an unprivileged enemy belligerent (Military Commissions Act 2009 language for unlawful enemy combatant), and further directs authorities to submit this information to Congress. Anyone designated as an enemy belligerent can be detained until the cessation of hostilities, which amounts to whenever Congress says that the war on terrorism is over.
The kicker is that aliens detained domestically under this system must be tried by a military commission. Citizens cannot be tried by military commissions, and the jurisdictional language in the Military Commissions Act (MCA) reflects this. Basically, the government would collect a bunch of intelligence that is inadmissible in federal courts and then hold American citizens indefinitely. Also, detaining large numbers of Muslim aliens (who may have strong ties to local Muslim communities) and prosecuting them in military commissions threatens to radicalize citizens who are Muslims. The perceived double standard — commissions for Muslims in America, civilian trials for everyone else — is counterproductive when it comes to defeating terrorist recruiting.
I say that this won’t be a bonanza for the intelligence community because I see this scenario playing out in three ways:
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
Every Time I Say “Terrorism,” the Patriot Act Gets More Awesome
Can I send Time magazine the bill for the new crack in my desk and the splinters in my forehead? Because their latest excretion on the case of Colleen “Jihad Jane” LaRose and its relation to Patriot Act surveillance powers is absolutely maddening:
The Justice Department won’t say whether provisions of the Patriot Act were used to investigate and charge Colleen LaRose. But the FBI and U.S. prosecutors who charged the 46-year-old woman from Pennsburg, Pa., on Tuesday with conspiring with terrorists and pledging to commit murder in the name of jihad could well have used the Patriot Act’s fast access to her cell-phone records, hotel bills and rental-car contracts as they tracked her movements and contacts last year. But even if the law’s provisions weren’t directly used against her, the arrest of the woman who allegedly used the moniker “Jihad Jane” is a boost for the Patriot Act, Administration officials and Capitol Hill Democrats say. That’s because revelations of her alleged plot may give credibility to calls for even greater investigative powers for the FBI and law enforcement, including Republican proposals to expand certain surveillance techniques that are currently limited to targeting foreigners.
Sadly, this is practically a genre resorted to by lazy writers whenever a domestic terror investigation is making headlines. It consists of indulging in a lot of fuzzy speculation about how the Patriot Act might have been crucial—for all we know!—to a successful investigation, even when every shred of available public evidence suggests otherwise. My favorite exemplar of this genre comes from a Fox News piece penned by journalist-impersonator Cristina Corbin after the capture of some Brooklyn bomb plotters last spring, with the bold headline: “Patriot Act Likely Helped Thwart NYC Terror Plot, Security Experts Say.” The actual article contains nothing to justify the headline: It quotes some lawyers saying vague positive things about the Patriot Act, then tries to explain how the law expanded surveillance powers, but mostly botches the basic facts. From what we know thanks to the work of real reporters, the initial tip and the key evidence in that case came from a human infiltrator who steered the plotters to locations that had been physically bugged, not new Patriot tools.
Of course, it may well be that National Security Letters or other Patriot powers were invoked at some point in this investigation—the question is whether there’s any good reason to suspect they made an important difference. And that seems highly dubious. LaRose’s indictment cites the content of private communications, which probably would have been obtained using a boring old probable cause warrant—and the standard for that is far higher than for a traditional pen/trap order, which would have enabled them to be getting much faster access to more comprehensive cell records. Maybe earlier on, then, when they were compiling the evidence for those tools? But as several reports on the investigation have noted, “Jihad Jane” was being tracked online by a groups of anti-jihadi amateurs some three years ago. As a member of one group writes sarcastically on the site Jawa Report, the “super sekrit” surveillance tool they used to keep abreast of LaRose’s increasingly disturbing activities was… Google. I’m going to go out on a limb and say the FBI could’ve handled this one with pre-Patriot authority, and a fortiori with Patriot authority restrained by some common-sense civil liberties safeguards.
What’s a little more unusual is to see this segue into the kind of argument we usually see in the wake of an intelligence failure, where the case is then seen as self-evidently justifying still more intrusive surveillance powers, in this case the expansion of the “lone wolf” authority currently applicable only to foreigners, allowing extraordinarily broad and secretive FISA surveillance to be conducted against people with no actual ties to a terror group or other “foreign power.” Yet as Time itself notes:
In fact, Justice Department terrorism experts are privately unimpressed by LaRose. Hers was not a particularly threatening plot, they say, and she was not using any of the more challenging counter-surveillance measures that more experienced jihadis, let alone foreign intelligence agents, use.
Which, of course, is a big part of the reason we have a separate system for dealing with agents of foreign powers: They are typically trained in counterintelligence tradecraft with access to resources and networks far beyond those of ordinary nuts. What possible support can LaRose’s case provide for the proposition that these industrial-strength tools should now be turned on American citizens? They caught her—and without much trouble, by the looks of it. Sure, this domestic nut may have invoked to Islamist ideology rather than the commands of Sam the Dog or anti-Semitic conspiracy theories… but so what? She’s still one more moderately dangerous unhinged American in a country that has its fair share, and has been dealing with them pretty well under the auspices of Title III for a good while now.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; General; Law and Civil Liberties
The Case against Domestic Military Detention
Washington is consumed once more with the problem of terrorism, driven by the dual pressures of an unsuccessful terrorist attack on commercial aviation and upcoming elections that give politicians an incentive to speak in terms of war. We are again treated to the ridiculous argument that a terrorist attack is either an act of war or a criminal violation but never both. Senators McCain and Lieberman recently proposed a bill that mandates military detention for domestic terror suspects instead of civilian criminal justice proceedings — an approach that sidelines half of our domestic counterterrorism tools.
The Enemy Belligerent, Interrogation, Detention, and Prosecution Act of 2010 would use military detention to incapacitate suspected terrorists. Choosing military detention over prosecution takes criminal justice tools off the table, including prosecuting terrorists for the instrumentalities of terrorism — assembling bombs, financing, and all of the illegal activities associated with attacking the system.
We’ve been down this road before, and domestic military detention in lieu of criminal prosecution has not worked as advertised.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
Tuesday Links
- Kids these days…New study shows that most Millennials think “the government should do more to solve problems.” But if you take a closer look at the data there’s also some good news.
- Al Gore’s latest global warming whopper.
- David Rittgers: Why both the Left and Right are wrong about using drones to counter terrorism worldwide.
- The case for reviving the “Privileges or Immunities” clause.
- Podcast: “Why McDonald Matters” featuring Timothy Sandefur.
UPDATE:
Cato Vice President for Legal Affairs Roger Pilon can scarcely believe it himself: The New York Times got it (mostly) right on the gun case argued today before the Supreme Court, while The Wall Street Journal missed the main point.
In a piece for National Review Online, Pilon discusses a subtle but critical point: Conservatives—including the ones on the Supreme Court—are right on guns, but they’re wrong on rights.
Cato VP for Legal Affairs Roger Pilon can scarcely believe it himself: the New York Times got it (mostly) right on the gun case argued today before the Supreme Court, while the Wall Street Journal missed it.
Roger explains why in a terrific post over at National Review Online [hyperlink—you’re right, NRO is down!].
Roger’s post is the best discussion we’ve seen yet of a subtle but critical point: conservatives—including the ones on the Supreme Court—are right on guns, but they’re wrong on rights.
Filed under: General; Government and Politics; Law and Civil Liberties
Wars, Crimes, and Underpants Bombers
I’ve been meaning to follow up on Gene Healy’s post from last week on the interrogation and prosecution of terror suspects. I share Gene’s bemusement at the howls emanating from Republicans who have abruptly decided that George Bush’s longstanding policy of dealing with terrorism cases through the criminal justice system is unacceptable with a Democrat in the White House. But I also think it’s worth stressing that the arguments being offered — both in the specific case of Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab and more generally — aren’t very persuasive even if we suppose that they’re not politically motivated.
Two caveats. First, folks on both sides would do well to take initial reports about the degree of cooperation terror suspects are providing with a grain of salt. For reasons too obvious to bother rehearsing, investigators won’t always want to broadcast accurately or in detail the precise degree of cooperation a suspect is providing. Second, as Gene noted, given that it seems unlikely we’ll need to use Abdulmutallab’s statements against him at trial, the question of whether the civilian or military system is to be preferred can be separated from the argument about the wisdom of Mirandizing him. That said, the facts we have just don’t seem to provide a great deal of support for the conclusion that, warning or no, criminal investigators are somehow incapable of effectively questioning terrorists.
Certainly if you ask veteran FBI interrogators, they don’t seem to share this concern that they won’t be able to extract intelligence their military counterparts would obtain. You might put that assessment down to institutional pride, but it’s consistent with the evidence, as the FBI has had impressive successes on this front already. And if you don’t want to take their word for it, you can always ask Judge Michael Mukasey who, before becoming attorney general under George W. Bush, ruled that military detainees were entitled to “lawyer up” — as critics of the Bush/Obama approach are wont to put it — explicitly concluding that “the interference with interrogation would be minimal or nonexistent.”
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
Was it Terrorism?
A man with a gripe against the system crashed a plane into an IRS office. The first thing people ask is whether this was a crime or domestic terrorism as if the two categories are mutually exclusive.
The official definition is “the unlawful use of force and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives” (28 C.F.R. Section 0.85).
Unlawful use of force and violence? Check.
Requisite grievance? Check. And how. If this manifesto is genuine, the man responsible had an axe to grind with the IRS, politicians, GM executives, drug and insurance companies, the Catholic Church, tax-exempt religious organizations generally, corrupt unions, Arthur Andersen executives, former Senator Patrick Moynihan, wealthy loan companies, his accountant, George W. Bush, communists, and capitalists.
That hasn’t stopped people from trying to lay this man at the feet of political opponents.
This guy’s political affiliation was “crazy.” Everyone should move on and not try to score political points with this incident.
Whether or not he meets the definition, it’s better to deny this man and those like him any credibility with the word “terrorist.” As my colleague Jim Harper said (twice) about the man who shot Dr. George Tiller, this is an unproductive debate that fulfills their desire to be something more than a pathetic murderer.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
The Red Team’s Spin on The Christmas Bomber
In recent weeks, conservatives have worked themselves into a self-righteous lather over how the Obama administration handled the would-be Christmas bomber. It’s a complaint you could hear again and again at last weekend’s Conservative Political Action Conference: Mirandizing the 23-year-old Nigerian Muslim was a big mistake, the story goes, because it denied us valuable intelligence, and it’s just so typical of Barack Obama’s callow, weak, law-enforcement-oriented approach to the terrorist threat.
As a constitutional matter, I’ve never been entirely comfortable with the Miranda decision, which smacks of judicial lawmaking, and I don’t think liberty stands or falls on whether one failed terrorist got read his rights. In fact, I think Mirandizing Abdulmutallab was a pretty silly thing to do. The administration could and should have continued to question him and gather intelligence (and it’s not as if you’d need his statements to convict when there were scads of witnesses aboard the plane).
Nonetheless, I still find it hard to see all the hubbub as much more than manufactured partisan outrage.
After all, Richard Reid, the failed shoebomber of December 2001, was Mirandized repeatedly by George W. Bush’s FBI, who, rather than questioning him for 50 minutes, read Reid his rights as soon as the Massachusetts staties handed him over. That was barely two months after the largest terror attack in American history, at a time when we had good reason to fear that the terrorist threat was far greater than it now appears to be. Somehow, though, I don’t recall hearing quite as much wailing and gnashing of teeth from the Right back then. Moreover, outside of the special pleading of former Bush officials, there’s little evidence that Bush would have handled the situation much differently even if it happened much later in his tenure as president.
We’re told that the Christmas Bomber’s treatment reveals Obama’s pusillanimous new paradigm for the War on Terror. But virtually anyone who’s taken a serious look at Obama’s terrorism policies has concluded they differ from Bush’s mainly in terms of rhetoric, not substance. You can love the Bush approach or hate it, but if you’re drawing a sharp distinction between his policies and Obama’s, you’re misinformed at best.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
Holder on the Hot Seat
Today Politico Arena asks:
Terror suspects: Eric Holder’s defense (nothing new here)–agree or disagree?
My response:
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; General; Law and Civil Liberties
Monday Links
- Another day, another IPCC-gate.
- Why remaining in Afghanistan and creating a stable government there is not a precondition to keeping America safe. For more, watch the debate on Bloggingheads.
- Jeffrey Miron: “Leave Mideast, end terrorism.”
- Could Iran’s nuclear program be a sacrificial pawn?
- Globalization: A curse or a cure?
- Podcast: “Liberate Bone Marrow Donors” featuring Jeff Rowes of the Institute for Justice.
Machine Gun Nests in the War on Terror
Terrorism is a strategy of the weak. Without power of their own, terrorists seek to goad states into overreactions that bestow favors on their otherwise inconsequential movements and ideologies.
When a state goes to war, for example, this wastes its own blood and treasure, driving the costs of its own policies higher and weakening its own military and economy. Overreaction drives support to terrorism when innocents or perceived innocents are harmed or killed by overreacting states. And overreaction tends to energize and promote terrorism worldwide by confirming the narrative that incumbent powers are evil—the portrayal of the United States as an occupier of Muslim lands and exploiter of Muslim people is an example.
With the logic of terrorism in hand, the appropriate responses come into focus. Constant pressure on terror groups worldwide; cool, phlegmatic response to terrorist attacks; constant study of terror groups, their relationships, plans, and methods; counter-rhetoric exposing the venality and bloodiness of terror groups themselves; exploitation of fissures among the many different groups that have been drawn to the “al Qaeda” brand; and so on.
Unfortunately, many people focused intently on prosecuting the war on terror have yet to digest the nature of the challenge or orient their responses accordingly. Presuming a large, united terrorist front with substantial technical and logistical capabilities, they urge the reactions that would be appropriate for an invading state. They deride as dangerous the tailored responses dictated by sound counterterrorism strategy.
Unfortunately, they are counseling overreaction to this enemy, which is far less lethal than a state, if harder to locate and extinguish. The guns of terror warriors are the wrong caliber, and they’re pointed the wrong direction.
Daniel Popeo writes today in the Washington Examiner that legal activism aids terrorists. It doesn’t. It shows that the United States is not frightened, and is not thrown off its game, by attacks and attempts like that of December 25th. Indomitability, not ferocity, will be the hallmark of our counterterrorism success.
Review our recent forum on counterterrorism here, and our counterterrorism conference of a year ago here.
“Risk of Accidents Ameliorated!” Doesn’t Sell Papers
What a headline on the Washington Examiner today! It’s a good illustration of the propensity of media to overplay terrorism.
“Terror threat to city water,” the headline blares in large type. “Chlorine changed to protect D.C., Va. supply.”
The actual story is about the Army Corps of Engineers’ switch from chlorine gas to a liquid form of chlorine called sodium hypochlorite. Gaseous chlorine is relatively more dangerous and difficult to contain if it’s released, so the change is a prudent safety step.
It has as much to do with protecting against accidental release as any terror threat. And an accidental release is not a threat to the water supply; it’s a threat to people near the facilities or transportation corridors where cholrine gas could be released.
The idea of terrorism may have gotten the Corps moving forward, but nothing in the story says there was any specific threat by anyone to attack the D.C. water treatment infrastructure.
This is a story about risks being ameliorated, and it’s pretty boring—except for the headline!!
Weekend Links
- Prepare for a national debate over devoting more federal aid to Yemen.
- Reason Magazine: Why is Washington spending so much on the military?
- An update on the ongoing tension between mainland China and Taiwan.
- Top experts will meet at Cato next week to discuss the Obama administration’s counterrorism record after one year in office.
- Podcast: “Indefinitely Confining the ‘Sexually Dangerous‘” featuring Ilya Shapiro.
The Buck Stops with Obama
Today Politico Arena asks:
Do you feel safer from terrorism today than you did the day before? Assess Obama’s response.
My response:
Thursday Links
- The populists have it wrong. Why free trade and globalization are great blessings to Americans and poor families around the world.
- How Obama’s plan for health care will affect medical innovation in America: “Imposing price controls on drugs and treatments–or indirectly forcing their prices down by means of a ‘public option’ or expanded public insurance programs–would reduce the incentive for innovators to develop new treatments.”
- Register now for the upcoming Cato forum featuring author Tim Carney and his new book, Obamanomics: How Barack Obama Is Bankrupting You and Enriching His Wall Street Friends, Corporate Lobbyists, and Union Bosses. Buy the book, here.
- Podcast: “Shoes, Undies and Airplane Security” featuring Jim Harper.
An “Attempted Act of Terrorism”
Along with learning the factual details, it remains to be seen whether the effort by a Nigerian traveler to ignite some type of explosive on a U.S.-bound flight was an “attempted act of terrorism”—as it has been characterized by the White House—or a successful act of terrorism.
Though it certainly helps, terrorism doesn’t require explosions and fatalities to work its will. If public fear produced by this incident drives the U.S. toward self-injurious overreactions—abandonment of plane travel, overwrought and poorly directed security measures, and so on—then it will be a successful act of terrorism.
The behavior of the Obama administration, political leaders in Congress, and the media will determine whether this is a successful act of terrorism. One early commentator has framed this event as a “desperate bid for relevance” on the part of al Qaeda, chastising the “permanently hysterical” Rep. Peter King (R-NY) for promoting overreaction.
We will be reviewing the first year of the Obama administration’s counterterrorism policies at a Cato Institute policy forum on Wednesday, January 13, 2010—a follow-on to our hugely successful counterterrorism conference in January 2009, the week before President Obama’s inauguration. Along with an impressive line-up of commentators, the event will feature a keynote address by Daniel Benjamin, Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State Department.
This most recent event will surely be a focus as we review the Obama administration’s first year in counterterrorism. Register here.
Thursday Links
- The War on Terrorism ends; and the winner is… China.
- Fairness Doctrine 2.0: How the government is finding new ways to regulate media.
- Don’t miss Cato’s 27th annual Monetary Conference Thursday, November 19th.
- New Hampshire state government guaranteeing loans to help bail out a local newspaper.
- Podcast: “Atomic Obsession:” When threats are exaggerated, what’s the cost? John Mueller, author of Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, comments.
Greenwald on the Arrar Ruling
Glenn Greenwald has a good post about Arrar v. Ashcroft, an appeals court ruling that came down the other day. Here’s an excerpt:
Maher Arar is both a Canadian and Syrian citizen of Syrian descent. A telecommunications engineer and graduate of Montreal’s McGill University, he has lived in Canada since he’s 17 years old. In 2002, he was returning home to Canada from vacation when, on a stopover at JFK Airport, he was (a) detained by U.S. officials, (b) accused of being a Terrorist, (c) held for two weeks incommunicado and without access to counsel while he was abusively interrogated, and then (d) was “rendered” – despite his pleas that he would be tortured — to Syria, to be interrogated and tortured. He remained in Syria for the next 10 months under the most brutal and inhumane conditions imaginable, where he was repeatedly tortured. Everyone acknowledges that Arar was never involved with Terrorism and was guilty of nothing. I’ve appended to the end of this post the graphic description from a dissenting judge of what was done to Arar while in American custody and then in Syria.
Read the whole thing. Also, the ACLU has put together a short film about the experiences of some prisoners released from Guantanamo.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; General; Law and Civil Liberties
9/11: All the PSA We Needed
Right on the heels of my post the other day discussing the error in inviting terrorism reporting, here’s another video (and suspicious-activity-reporting Web site) produced by the Los Angeles Police Department.
The production values in this video are hipper, and L.A. appears to have its share of actors willing to look concerned about terrorism. But really, the attacks of September 11, 2001 were all the Public Service Announcement we needed to encourage reporting of genuine suspicions.
Asking amateurs for tips about terrorism will have many wasteful and harmful results, like racial and ethnic discrimination, angry neighbors turning each other in, and—given the rarity of terrorism—lots and lots of folks just plain getting it wrong. People with expertise—even in very limited domains—can discover suspicious circumstances in their worlds almost automatically when they find things “hinky.”
My impressions of the LAPD were formed up in the late 80’s and early 90’s when I lived in southern California. To encourage reporting, what that department needs most is to make the community confident of its own fairness and competence. Reporting of meritorious suspicions will naturally follow that. There’s no need for it to artificially gin up crime or terrorism reporting.
Filed under: Foreign Policy and National Security; Law and Civil Liberties
Emanuel on TV and Filkins on McChrystal
A. It’s encouraging to see Rahm Emanuel and John Kerry saying that we shouldn’t up force levels in Afghanistan without a reliable partner. But if we shouldn’t send 40,000 more troops to prop up a crooked government, why keep the 68,000 we have there? A focused counter-terrorism mission would require far less than that.
B. According to Dexter Filkins’ article in the New York Times Magazine, the war in Iraq taught General Stanley McChrystal the following:
No situation, no matter how dire, is ever irredeemable — if you have the time, resources and the correct strategy. In the spring of 2006, Iraq seemed lost. The dead were piling up. The society was disintegrating. One possible conclusion was that it was time for the United States to cut its losses in a country that it never truly understood. But the American military believed it had found a strategy that worked, and it hung in there, and it finally turned the tide.
What’s interesting about this claim is its utter confidence in the potential efficacy of US military power — it is not just necessary to solving Iraq’s problems, but sufficient. If this view is right, Iraqis themselves, and their civil war, were unnecessary to the limited political reconciliation that occurred there.
Filkins, surprisingly, seems to agree, depicting the evolution of the war this way:
For four years, the American military had tried to crush the Iraqi insurgency and got the opposite: the insurgency bloomed, and the country imploded. By refocusing their efforts on protecting Iraqi civilians, American troops were able to cut off the insurgents from their base of support. Then the Americans struck peace deals with tens of thousands of former fighters — the phenomenon known as the Sunni Awakening — while at the same time fashioning a formidable Iraqi army. After a bloody first push, violence in Iraq dropped to its lowest levels since the war began.
Note the use of the word “then” preceding the sentence about peace deals. It carries a heavy load. Filkins wants to say that the hearts and mind theory of counterinsurgency caused the Anbar Awakening. But he offers no real causal story about how they are connected; he just says that one happened and then the other.
Another view, one that leaves Iraqis some agency, is that the growth of the al Qaeda Iraq and the progress of the civil war changed the Sunni insurgents’ strategic calculus, such that they decided to cooperate with Americans to gain locally. And that in turn, limited violence. U.S. forces had a role in this — the covert killing campaign that McChrystal led and Filkins chronicles probably pressured insurgents and weakened AQI, for one. But the deals — the awakening — began well before the troop surge and before David Petraeus took command and tried to implement a new counterinsurgency doctrine. The key American decision was willingness to play ball with insurgent groups. This decision had little to do with winning hearts and minds via population security and increased troop levels. And by empowering forces at odds with the central government, it contradicted the goal of state-building in Iraq, at least in the short-term.
I obviously agree with the latter view. Our dependence on local politics limits what we can accomplish in counterinsurgency. We can certainly affect what happens in Afghanistan, but it is hubris to think we control it.
Filkins also quotes McChrystal on Afghanistan’s effect on Pakistan:
“If we are good here, it will have a good effect on Pakistan,” he told me. “But if we fail here, Pakistan will not be able to solve their problems — it would be like burning leaves on a windy day next door.
It’s sensible to conclude chaos nearby is unhelpful to stability in Pakistan, but it goes way too far to say that Afghanistan’s stability is necessary to Pakistan’s, which has been fairly stable for long periods while Afghanistan was not. What’s more, as Robert Pape argues, it is likely that U.S. forces are a cause of insurgency in both countries.
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